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 Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the changing rurality and the profound social stratification in 
contemporary Vietnam through the lens of rural-to-rural female migration. It is based on 
eighteen months of ethnographic research in a rural offshore fishing community in northern 
Vietnam called Hải Thành. I study the migration of two groups of women: 1) transnational 
women, who are young Hải Thành girls that marry Taiwanese and South Korean men, and 
migrate to mostly rural areas in East Asia, and 2) translocal women, who are women from other 
rural Vietnamese communities who migrate to Hải Thành to marry local men. My dissertation 
analyzes the relationship between movement and social class. It shows how female migration 
both sustains and transforms social hierarchies and binaries in unexpected ways via the 
embodiment of ethnicity, class, gender, age, and rurality, and practices of beauty, migration, 
education and morality. The double rural-to-rural female migration pattern in Hải Thành 
indicates that movement and social stratification are indicative of a complex rural landscape, and 
productive of modern and gendered rural subjectivities in Vietnam, which are produced through 
multiple political, cultural, historical and economic forces.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WOMEN AS FISH: PHYSICAL MOVEMENT AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN 
CONTEMPORARY VIETNAM 
 
 
 
by 
 
Linh Khanh Nguyen  
 
 
 
B.A., Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 2007 
M.A., Syracuse University, 2014 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology. 
 
 
 
 
Syracuse University 
August 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by Linh Khanh Nguyen 2016 
 
All Rights Reserved 
!! iv!
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
It takes a village to raise a child. In the long journey from my hometown in Vietnam 
across the Pacific Ocean and back that culminates in this dissertation, I have been sheltered and 
nurtured in countless ways to grow intellectually, socially, and personally. Words seem 
inadequate to acknowledge my gratitude toward the kindness, patience, encouragement, and 
inspiration I have received along the way. I research how Vietnamese people move, yet it is I 
who is moved by the people who cross or share the path with me.  
My utmost thanks go to the people of Hải Thành, especially my host family. Their 
passion, candidness, wit, and hospitality in the truest fashion of seapeople who eat the waves and 
speak like the wind (ăn sóng, nói gió) have allowed me insight into the richness of a complex, 
changing, troubling, yet endlessly fascinating rural life in Vietnam. My time of living in and 
writing about Hải Thành is one of my most humbling experiences, as Hải Thành locals helped 
me to see a rurality that I did not know existed and taught me to make meaningful sense of 
deeply social and personal differences. My host family, without any questions asked, gave me 
the privilege of entering their intimate lives and granted me unreserved warmth, affection, 
wisdom, and support. I would never have been able to complete this research without Uncle Tú, 
Ms. Thơ, Hạnh, and Mơ.  
My advisor, Professor Azra Hromadzic, has been pivotal in guiding and helping me 
finish this Ph.D. degree. Looking back at our time together, I am so grateful for your patience, 
steadiness, and unwavering championship as I struggled with my anger, depression, and grief at 
the loss of Bill. You never demanded from me but always gently and persistently provided 
encouragement and guidance whenever I needed them, from sending quick checking-in emails to 
me in the field to reading many drafts of proposals, papers, and chapters, or writing 
!! v!
recommendation letters at my usual last-minute request. Your intellectual acuteness and 
sensitivity have profoundly shaped my thinking and writing of the research while allowing me 
the freedom to make it my own. I have learned to write ethnographically and think more 
critically yet less judgmentally from you. I know how incredibly fortunate I have been to have a 
sense of complete trust in your guidance and support, something I thought I had lost. I am very 
proud to be one of Azra’s people.  
Professors Hans Buechler and Ann Gold both agreed to join my dissertation committee 
when I was experiencing an academic and personal turmoil after Bill was gone. I have been 
blessed with their knowledge and kindness. To Hans, I will never forget our meetings in your 
office, where you gave me crucial suggestions on my research such as rural-to-rural migration 
and the layers of rurality, both of which are now the backbone of this dissertation. You have 
really helped me develop an agenda for my fieldwork. Your insistence on keeping your students’ 
interests first and helping them at all means is heartwarming and admirable. Ann, your 
intellectual depth, heartfelt encouragement, and invaluably insightful comments have challenged 
me to avoid the problem of empty words in the academia and asked me to be more thoughtful, 
sharp, and original with my research, an important goal that I am still working on.   
I hold a special place in my heart for Professor Jackie Orr, who has stood by me from the 
beginning of this Ph.D. and never lost faith in me, even when I tumbled and failed my first 
qualifying exam. Your wonderful classes, performances, political fire, and integrity have 
inspired me to continue the academic journey when I wanted to quit. The stimulating readings in 
your classes and discussions with you in your office and via Skype have nurtured in me the 
courage to follow my convictions, yet never forget to critically question and challenge them. 
Your warmth and beauty (in writing, thinking, and being) is a standard that I strive to meet. 
!! vi!
Professors Erik Harms and Keith Taylor are both my outside committee members, yet 
‘outsider’ is the most incorrect term to describe their roles. I have so much respect for Erik’s 
work and was pleasantly surprised by his genuine kindness towards me. Erik has given me 
thought-provoking and critical feedback, helping me see the loopholes in my research and 
providing much-needed preferences. With Erik in my committee, I feel confident that I am 
standing on solid foundation to explore Vietnamese studies and more. 
I have the privilege to be mentored by Keith during my two years as a visiting scholar at 
Cornell University. To me, Keith is a remarkable teacher and an honorable person, and I am 
grateful to be his student. Keith read draft after draft of my dissertation chapters, even though I 
wrote them in a reverse order, and he spent many hours in his office teaching me about Vietnam 
(the history, wars, literature, language, etc.). More important, I have learned so much about life 
from his extraordinary experiences, courage, and principles. His generosity, care, consideration, 
thoughtfulness, and calmness have moved me to tears and lifted me up to be a better version of 
me.  
I am sincerely thankful for the financial support I received for my research. The generous 
Bucerius Ph.D. Scholarships on Migration Studies made possible my fieldwork in Hải Thành and 
a year of writing up my research. The Department of Anthropology at the Maxwell School of 
Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, funded years of my preliminary research 
and another year of dissertation writing. The Southeast Asia Program (SEAP) at Cornell 
University gave me two years of visiting fellowship, including access to library resources, office 
space, and a community of Southeast Asian studies scholars, to which I am very grateful.  
As a stranger having lived in a strange land for the last 12 years, I owe my deep gratitude 
to my American and Syracuse families, who put a roof over my head for years, fed, advised, and 
!! vii!
taught me about American culture while fiercely protecting me. My loving families in the U.S. 
are role models of care and dedication for me to follow. Professor Jack Harris, my college 
advisor and American father, is the reason I became a social scientist and continue to be a 
lifelong academic. Jack and Deb have given me a solid ground beneath my feet so that I can go 
after my goals. The thought of coming ‘home’ to Jack and Deb has comforted me through the 
years. Thank you for encouraging me to explore new paths and growth, knowing that if I fall, 
you will catch me. Thank you for teaching me the lesson of paying it forward. Stew and Judy 
sheltered me through the first five difficult years of graduate school in Syracuse. Not only did 
they put up with me then, they have continued to look after me from afar. Judy jokingly calls it 
distant ‘bossiness,’ but I know that it is the expression of love, and I have been a very lucky 
recipient.  
My friends have provided me with joy, inspiration, and strength to face life challenges. 
Being in the company of these wise, beautiful, witty, courageous, and creative women and men 
has given my life value, meaning, and enrichment. Despite our closeness and distance as we 
meet and depart, you are my constant pride. I want to send my wholehearted appreciation to 
Hường, Hằng, Hà, Tú, Karen, Chen-I, Madhura, Carolina, Sravani, Nkechi, Trudy, Paul, Jeff, 
and Clare. I also want to thank Patricia Demyan and Tom Schneider for walking with me on the 
journey of personal growth. I treasure the skills that you have taught me, the faith you have in 
me, and the kindness you have given me.  
This dissertation is dedicated to my family and my former advisor, Bill Kelleher. Words 
cannot express the depth of love my family has shown and the sacrifices they have made for me. 
Because of them, the world has opened its doors to me. Bill, you were my catcher in the rye. 
Your voice is a compass of direction in my head that I will carry through the rest of my journey.  
!! viii!
Table of Contents 
Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………………... i  
Acknowledgement ……………………………………………………………………………… iv 
Part I. On the Move ……………………………………………………………..……………….. 1 
Introduction: Social Class in Motion ……………………………………………………. 2 
Chapter I: Population Movements and Social Mobility in Contemporary Vietnam …... 45  
Part II. Gendering Marriage Migration: Beauty, Education, and Class in Rural Vietnam …..… 78 
Chapter II: The Pretty Modern: ‘Outer’ vs. ‘Inner’ Beauty ……………………………. 79 
Chapter III: The Desire to be Pretty: Beauty, Gender Power, and Social Class ……… 112 
Part III. Marriage, Social Stratification, and Moral Contours of Rural-to-Rural Migration ..... 140 
Chapter IV: Why not?: Transnational Class and the Normalization of Transnational 
Marriages ………………………………………………………………… 141 
Chapter V: “Good” or “Bad”? The Morality of Transnational Migration ……………. 177 
Chapter VI: Women as Fish: Internal Rural Migration, Social Displacement and the 
Morality of Personhood ………………………………………………….. 199 
Part IV. The Illness of Pride: Mobility/Movement Contested …………………...…………… 246 
Chapter VII: The Illness of Pride: Expectations and Disappointments of Transnational 
Movement ………………………………………………………………... 247 
Chapter VIII: Aging in Timepass: Waiting for a Better Life …………………………. 261 
Chapter IX: Humans are not Dragons: Displacement and Class within the Family ….. 288 
Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………. 301 
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………….. 307 !!
  
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part I 
 
ON THE MOVE: INTRODUCTION  
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Introduction 
 Social Class in Motion 
 
“Back in the 1980s, almost all people from this place crossed the border (vượt biên)1 and 
sailed to Hong Kong. Oh, they all left. It was so easy for them because they were fishermen. I 
was told that many of them even went back and forth between home and the refugee camps in 
Hong Kong. They would go home during harvest time to reap the crop and return to the camp 
after it was done. Then they lived in the West and sent so much money home. That place was very 
wealthy; we call it the village of Vietnamese transnationals (làng Kiều).” 
I was greatly puzzled by the story that was told to me by my aunt in 2010 about the 
Vietnamese boatpeople, or the people who famously escaped extreme poverty and the 
communist regime. It reflected deeply shared and historically informed yet idealized ideas about 
place, movement, gender and consequential upward mobility. I wondered whether people’s 
journeys to change life (đổi đời) from poor rural Vietnamese to rich transnationals thanks to 
movement was indeed as straightforward and fairy-like as the tale being told. My desire to make 
sense of the story and my personal concern with the profound rise in social stratification in 
Vietnam have motivated me to conduct long-term research in Hải Thành commune, “the village 
of transnationals,” to study if, and how, social mobility in contemporary rural Vietnam can be 
achieved via movement and in what way an unusual place like Hải Thành can further our 
understanding of the constantly transforming rurality in a global order.   
                                                
1 This is another term for boatpeople; it literally means ‘crossing borders.’  
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Hải Thành is a rural fishing commune (xã),2 belonging to the rural district (huyện) Thuỷ 
Nguyên of Hải Phòng municipality in northern Vietnam, where I grew up. It was once a major 
site of departure for Vietnamese boatpeople in the north who fled by sea for economic reasons in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Recently, it has become known for sending the largest percentage, 
nationwide, of its young women abroad in transnational marriages. Hải Thành definitely 
deserves its title as the village of transnationals. I was curious about this rich but rural commune 
in my own city—how did it come to be both rural and modern3, a seeming contradiction in 
contemporary Vietnam? How come, when all literature and media described the journey of 
boatpeople as deadly dangerous and poignantly irrevocable, the transnational migration of Hải 
Thành people was painted, surprisingly, as its opposite: trouble free, smooth, and repeatable? 
Thinking about Hải Thành and its embodiment of contradictions as well as Hải Thành people’s 
unusual mobility made me wonder: How is its unique status as a modern rurality produced 
largely by movement emblematic of larger forces converging and producing new ways of being 
in the world? As a result, I conducted 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Hải Thành in 
order to explore an intimate relationship between physical movement and social mobility, or, 
                                                
2 According to the Vietnamese official definition of rural and urban zones in Government Decree 
Number 72/2001, dated October 5, 2001, an urban zone must meet three criteria at the same 
time: the off-farm labor force accounts for more than 65% of the total labor force; the 
commune’s total population is more than 4,000; and the density is higher than 2,000 people/km2. 
Rural zones are those that do not meet all three criteria. Hải Thành is a rural area because most of 
Hải Thành laborers are still farmers and fishermen. In terms of administration, Vietnam 
generally has rural and urban categories at each level: the province level includes Province 
(rural) and Municipality (urban), the district level includes rural district and urban district, and 
the commune level includes commune (rural) and ward (urban). Hải Thành is a rural commune 
(xã) in a rural district (huyện) of Hải Phòng municipality (thành phố trực thuộc trung ương). 
Here, I am using the term “commune” in its sense of a small administrative unit to describe Hải 
Thành.   
3 I argue that Hải Thành is modern due to several popular indicators of modernity in Vietnam 
such as fashion (what people, especially women, wear), the high number of transnationals, the 
appearance of expensive houses, and the frequent use of technology such as Facebook. The 
modernity of Hải Thành is elaborated more clearly in the next chapter.  
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more specifically, between migration on the one side, and class, status, and money on the other. 
This research shows how movement enriches our understanding of rurality in globalization and 
urbanization and highlights the role of movement as a powerful maker of difference in how 
people craft their lives and community in the contemporary world.  
When I got to Hải Thành, the boatpeople were long gone, having settled down across the 
ocean and the sea. What I found was a rural commune of fancy houses, significant wealth, and a 
younger generation that continues to circulate the globe in different ways. Most of the men in 
this community are still fishermen but the industry has become 20 times bigger and more 
profitable. While the majority of men venture further than before into the sea, it is the young 
women who, through transnational marriages, have been fueling migration abroad for the last 15 
years, mostly to East Asia but also parts of the Western world. Filling in the place of spouses of 
local men is now a new group of young women from other rural communes in Thuỷ Nguyên  
district and other provinces, from the north of Vietnam and all the way to the south. As a result 
of these processes, Hải Thành has been in a constant flux with the movement of people and along 
with it the movement of ideas, values, and money. I captured some of the visible effects of these 
movements in the photographs below:4 
 
                                                
4 All photos in this dissertation, unless otherwise credited, were taken by me.  
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Figure 1.1 A local man prepared for a cockfight 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Men gathered for an elaborate and expensive linage ritual 
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Figure 1.3 A big house with a fenced in garden and front gate 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Houses in Hải Thành 
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Figure 1.5 Boats docking in the local port 
 
 
Figure 1.6 Children and teens gambled during a New Year festival 
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Figure 1.7 A kid’s birthday party 
 
 
These photos paint a general impression of the commune: a mixture of lavishness and 
rurality, modernity and tradition. Local people were wealthy enough to build sumptuous houses, 
engage in costly rituals, and organize an annual three-day new-year festival. While they maintain 
the tradition, they also aspire to modernity, reflected, for example, by the Western clothes that 
youth wear and the birthday celebration with cake and torches. Hải Thành looked rosy from the 
outside and was famous within the city for its wealth and Việt Kiều (Vietnamese transnationals). 
My uncle always made sure to ask if I attended special occasions in Hải Thành because these 
events would be among the gossip even in Hải Phòng due to their extravagance. I realized that I 
also had this “outsider, urban” perception of Hải Thành until I met my host family.  
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On the surface, the family checked all the general boxes of a typical Hải Thành family: it 
had a boatperson in the family, a daughter who married a foreign man, and a son whose wife was 
from another commune. However, the family did not have a big house, it received little in 
remittance, it was tight with their day-to-day expenses, and it coped with their financial 
insecurity by sending more daughters and granddaughters abroad for marriage or for work. 
While trying to make sense of their predicament, I noticed how the two migrations—the 
transnational marriage migration of the daughter and the translocal marriage migration of the 
daughter-in-law—were different. While the former was celebrated, the latter was treated as 
inconsequential. The discrepancy between my struggling host family and the general stereotype 
of a well-off “migrating” family in Hải Thành, and the distinction between international 
migration and internal migration have made me realize that the relationship between physical 
movement and social class is extremely complicated. Furthermore, any evaluation of movement 
and its effect on social class must be considered within the social structures of class, gender, 
ethnicity, age, neoliberalism, post-colonialism and the rural/urban/global hierarchy that continue 
to frame aspirations, values, negotiations, and struggles in Hải Thành.  
This dissertation aims to examine these nonlinear and complicated relationships between 
rural movement and social class and how they help further our understanding of rurality. I do not 
attempt to paint a complete picture of the social life in Hải Thành or rural Vietnam in general. 
Rather, by studying and comparing the similar yet also distinct rural migrations of two specific 
groups – local women marrying foreign men and women from other, even more rural places 
marrying local men – I want to illuminate how movement shapes class formation and, along the 
way, restructures rural life, especially with regard to morality, such as ways of morally living in 
a rural place, being a moral rural person, and contesting/negotiating a rural identity.  
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I refer to the first group as transnational women and the second group as translocal 
women.5 My research explores the structural elements of these two kinds of movement and 
focuses on how different kinds of movement become coded with specific kinds of class status, 
and how these kinds of movement are themselves entwined with specific culturally, politically, 
economically, and historically conditioned meanings. For instance, both transnational and 
translocal movements include rural-to-rural female marriage migration,6 and they therefore 
cannot be separated from cultural notions of femininity, gender hierarchy, age order, beauty and 
body, morality, and social devaluation of rurality in Vietnam. Indeed, the intersection of these 
social markers and scripts constitute the core of my analysis on movement and social class in Hải 
Thành.  
In what follows, I examine closely the process of migration, from the desires for 
migration and the waiting period before migration, to the aftereffects of migration, including 
praise, backlash, and displacement in Hải Thành. I conclude that social citizenship, what Castel 
(1996) defines as a recognized position in society, is indeed movement-motivated. Movement, 
along with money and lifestyle, has become a register of class hierarchy and self-worth. 
However, movement is also highly differentiated. The opportunity to migrate, in a context of a 
highly stratified Vietnamese society, has allowed the women in Hải Thành to claim their sense of 
worth as they strive to overcome their marginal status of rural and female Vietnamese. Ironically, 
class aspiration and the differentiation of movement have essentially further divided the country, 
community, and family, deepened the issue of social inequalities, and presented many layers of 
                                                
5 These are my own terms for easier comparison. Locally, transnational women are called 
Taiwanese and Korean Kiều (Kiều Đài Loan, Hàn Quốc) (see chapter I), while there exists no 
term to identify translocal women (see chapter VI).  
6 A large number of transnational women move from Hải Thành, a rural place, to rural areas in 
Taiwan and South Korea. There are transnational Hải Thành women in Taiwanese and Korean 
cities but the number is small and more recent.  
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rural life that are as complicated, changing, and stratified as those of urban and cosmopolitan 
centers.  
The specific interactions of rural-to-rural movement, age, gender, class, and ethnicity in a 
rural place like Hải Thành reveal many social contradictions and thus, allow us to examine and 
question the dualisms centering on issues of gender and agency, gender and identity, and many 
aspects of mobility. By focusing on relationships between victimhood and agency, morality and 
immorality, modern and tradition, stasis and motion, international and internal movement, 
experiences and imaginaries of movement, my work questions those conceptual orientations that 
are based on binaries in mobility and gender studies. Moreover, mobility and globalization are 
often associated with urban metropolitan centers. My research on a highly mobile population in a 
small rural community in Vietnam illuminates this bias in the existing scholarship on migration 
and underscores the diversity and livelihood of rurality. Centering on rural-to-rural migration, the 
research aims to provide a different way to conceptualize migration, as distinct from commonly 
studied rural to urban migration, and a more robust insight into how to understand rurality in the 
context of a globalized Vietnam and beyond.  
 
Of Theory and Movement  
My study is deeply rooted in the rich body of literature on mobility. Within the last two 
decades, there has been an increasing interest and focus on mobility and globalization, leading to 
a vibrant and stimulating literature on mobility across disciplines. This vast literature starts with 
the emergence of a mobility paradigm in social sciences.  
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The mobility turn  
In the increasingly globalized world, mobility is viewed as a key component of 
globalization and scholars have called for a new mobility “paradigm” (Sheller and Urry 2006) or 
a mobility “turn” (Hannam, Sheller, and Urry 2006). They have argued that mobility is 
“constitutive of the structures of social life” (Urry 2000, 49) and that it affects other aspects of 
life. Thus, according to these scholars, the study of mobility is crucial to the understanding of 
human evolutionary and social changes (Kelly 1992). They further argue that the mobility 
paradigm/turn must address issues of globalization, the deterritorialization of nation-states, 
identities, and belonging as well as the subjects and objects of social inquiry (Hannam, Sheller, 
and Urry 2006). In other words, scholars believe the mobility “turn” refashions not only how we 
think about society and culture but also how we conceptualize social science.  
In anthropology, mobility has been a popular topic as the notion of mobility is central to 
understanding some processes of change that are of great anthropological interest, including 
tourism, migration, diaspora, cosmopolitanism, transnationalism, etc. The scholarship on 
mobility has developed new concepts that attempt to theorize the spatial and temporal 
movements of not only people but also cultures, objects, images, ideologies, and capitals. 
Concepts such as deterritorialization, reterritorialization, scapes (Appadurai 1996), time-space 
compression (Harvey 1990), nomadology (Deleuze and Guattari 1987), and the replacement of 
roots by routes (Clifford 1997, Gilroy 1993) are just some among numerous attempts of using 
mobility to study and explain processes in contemporary society. As a result, mobility scholars 
tend to reject the longstanding anthropological framework that implicitly makes sedentarist 
assumptions (Malkki 1992) and that privilege spatially-bounded units of analysis (Gupta and 
Ferguson 1997). Instead, they question the assumed relationships between peoples, places, and 
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cultures and focus on multiple, diverse mobilities. Anthropologists therefore move from 
regarding border-crossing movements as deviations from the normative place-bound 
communities to seeing mobility as normative (Salazar and Smart 2012).  
There has been much optimism in mobility, especially its association with freedom, 
liberation and resistance. The romanticization of mobility in the image of the nomad is evident 
from the works of Mackinders, Deleuze and Guattari, and Bachelard, all of which connect 
mobility with power and thus perceive in the nomad the ability to evade power and link mobility 
with freedom and liberty (Adey 2009). Pels (1999) and Wolff (1993) point out that this 
scholarship seamlessly merges with postcolonial, cultural, and feminist studies that hail black, 
subaltern, and female experience as exilic, diasporic, and producing double consciousness, 
hybridity, creolization, inappropriated others, and marginality (Young 1995, Trinh 1995, Bhabha 
1994, Braidotti 1994, Davies 1994, Kristeva 1994, West 1994, Gilroy 1993, Hall 1992, Harding 
1991, Haraway 1990, Hill Collins 1990, Spivak 1990, Anzaldúa 1987, hooks 1984, Lorde 1984). 
In their writings, strangerhood and distance make for better vision, deeper reflexivity, increased 
objectivity, and better access to truth (Pels 1999). Moreover, as mobility has become essential to 
the understanding of contemporary social phenomena (Sheller and Urry 2006, Hannam, Sheller, 
and Urry 2006), it is pivotal as well to the rearticulation of people’s contemporary sense of self 
from fixed to uprooted (Clifford 1997), nomadic (Braidotti 1994) and cosmopolitan forms (Beck 
2006). Cresswell also sees “the longstanding history of positive valuation of mobility as progress, 
as freedom, and as change” (Cresswell 2006, 43) because of ideas about mobility as a 
progressive force, a freedom, and a break from earlier and more confused spaces and times 
(Cresswell 2006). In globalization, mobility is usually given positive values as it is assumed that 
mobility increases in globalization (Friedman 2002) and that mobility generates changes for 
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people (especially migrants and their families). People often link spatial and physical mobility 
with social (status), economic (financial), and cosmopolitan climbing (Salazar and Smart 2012, 
Ong 1999).  
Despite the optimism, mobility scholars have critically examined the phenomenon of 
movement. Similar to theorists of globalization, mobility scholars have argued that mobility is 
not new. The celebration of the “newness” of the late modern condition of displacement, 
hybridity, and mobility is criticized as Eurocentric and class-blind as it refers to the elite’s 
experience and Europe’s greater awareness of its receding central position rather than a new 
reality (Wilding 2007, Friedman 2002, Pels 1999, Morley and Robins 1995). However, what is 
different about the contemporary state of mobility is how mobility is interconnected with the 
system of nation-states that control and promote certain kinds of mobility. Indeed, in a world of 
constant flux, controlling people’s mobility has become an important project of governance 
(Salazar and Smart 2012, Salazar 2010, Nyíri 2010).  
At the same time, mobility does not necessarily bring freedom, better truth or better 
social capital either. The experiences of forced migrants (the environmentally displaced, the 
political refugees, the sans-papier, etc.) show that there is as much unfreedom and undesirability 
in mobility as there is in dwelling (Gill, Caletrío, and Mason 2011, Kibreab 1999). Forced 
migration complicates the relationship between states, freedom, and mobility, particularly since 
the states can no longer be considered as blockage to mobility and as freedom because mobility 
does not equate with freedom (Gill, Caletrío, and Mason 2011). Kaplan (1996) argues that the 
bias in associating mobility with freedom comes from the intellectuals’ tendency to favor the 
more elite and singular “exiled” rather than the migrant or refugee, while Cresswell (2006) 
indicates that the romanticization of the nomad is infected with the discourse of Orientalism. 
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There is also a danger with what Pels (1999) calls the nomadic narcissism among intellectuals. 
He writes that  
 
Construing the migrant, exile, or nomad as alter ego of the modern intellectual, or beyond this, as 
a privileged metaphor for modern subjectivity, often leads towards an intellectualist 
domestication and appropriation of the experiences of ‘real-life’ migrants or exiles, while it 
simultaneously euphemizes the comparatively settled, sedentary and privileged situation of 
academics, who are invited to indulge in fictions of social ‘weightlessness’ and dreams of 
perpetual transcendence in boundary-breaking journeys of the critical mind (Pels 1999, 72). 
 
In other words, Pels is critical of the representation of mobility that takes away the difference 
between the representer and the represented by precisely representing the representer as a generic 
stranger: the represented. In so doing, Pels argues, scholars hide their elite marginality while 
benefiting from the profit of marginality.  
While Pels is critical of the intellectuality of mobility and strangeness, Friedman is 
cautious about the belief that “before we were local but now we are global” (Friedman 2002, 33). 
Since less than two per cent of the world’s population is on the international move, Friedman 
reasons that the titillating focus on movement and mobility in scholarship is obscuring serious 
facts about the world. More importantly, he believes that this transnational trend and the 
obsession with the closure of locality and boundedness in anthropology and other disciplines is 
more than intellectually flawed. It represents a top down, elitist view that equates the elites’ 
cosmopolitan experiences with the rest of the world while not acknowledging that the world is 
becoming increasingly more divided, more stratified where potentially deadly rigid boundaries 
are being created and maintained everywhere (Friedman 2002). In a similar vein, Ho (2005), 
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Graeber (2002), and Rockefeller (2011) notice the similarities between the language of flows and 
decenterdness in intellectual writing with the way the business/managerial people talk and 
represent themselves. They raise the concern of how the managerial, bird’s-eye view of global 
mobility could potentially marginalize the already marginal.  
Anthropologists are also scrutinizing the discipline’s popular concepts employed to 
describe and celebrate mobility and globalization since they allow for such misrepresentations 
like flow, transnational, multi-sited, and imagined communities. Rockefeller (2011) traces the 
genealogies of the term “flow” and concludes that the term is currently used  
 
for talking about large-scale, even global, cultural, and economic phenomena; it was a 
heterogeneous word that allowed writers to highlight formal commonalities in the movement of 
people, ideas, money, images, goods, and more; it was a way of talking about social relations and 
culture while emphasizing process rather than stasis; accordingly, it was antagonistic to 
traditional conceptions of place (Rockefeller 2011, 560).  
 
However, Rockefeller points out that this term puts more emphasis on the flowing rather than the 
materials that are flowing, on form rather than on content. Therefore, the term flow usually 
evokes the kind of pure mobility and tends to erase the specificities of action, agency, materiality, 
and place while abstracting them into a single category. It enables the analysis at a large, 
systemic scale without saying anything particular about how the flow is generated at a local level. 
Flow, argues Rockefeller, is the view from above that erases its own construction (Rockefeller 
2011). Thus, Tsing calls for attention to what she considers “zones of awkward engagement” 
(Tsing 2005, xi), rather than assuming a smooth movement of flow. Favero (2011) agrees that 
flow, used as pure movement, deletes the agencies and processes at smaller scales and ends up 
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dehumanizing the phenomena it aims to describe. For example, the flow of human migrants 
involves a lot more serious stakes than that of ideas or money; the term flow, because of its 
abstraction, blinds us to the embodied and individual sufferings of migration (Hart 2011).  
In a similar vein, Wilding (2007), Hage (2005), and Hannerz (2003) are cautious about 
uncritical usage of concepts like transnational, imagined community, and multi-sited 
ethnography. Wilding, for example, questions the extent to which the focus on transnational 
migrancy and practices reflects the concerns and experiences of the migrants as opposed to 
reflecting the particular conditions under which the researcher lives and conducts the research 
(Wilding 2007). Multi-sited research has become the popular method for studying migration, but 
both Wilding and Hage question the feasibility and purpose of multi-sited research. If a concept 
of a site means one has to spend a great deal of time and labor to become familiar, Hage (2005) 
argues that it is impossible to be involved in more than two sites, at the most. Moreover, he 
believes it is more appropriate to understand that one is studying one site, the site occupied by 
transnational families rather than a multi-sited reality. It is one site even if it is a globally spread 
and geographically noncontiguous site (Hage 2005). Likewise, Wilding (2007) notices that 
multi-sited research tends to privilege following the idea or relationship, resulting in place being 
de-emphasized in favor of processes despite the researcher’s claim of being there. That is why 
Hannerz (2003) says that “being there” for anthropologists has become “being there, and there, 
and there,” but such a research method is not so much multi-local as much as “translocal” 
because “being there” is less about emplacement than about the relationships that link these 
various sites together. To these critics, the uncritical claim of multi-sited research and the 
emphasis on multiple places bring certain value to the researcher because the capacity to move 
across borders has not only been assumed but also privileged (Wilding 2007). Therefore, is it 
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possible, asks Wilding, that the research’s focus is influenced by the researcher’s global 
experience as such a global experience is beneficial to the researcher’s identity and privilege?  
Both Hage and Wilding argue that in reality transnational mobility is not always the most 
impactful event for migrants. Reflecting on his research on international Lebanese migrants, 
Ghassan Hage states, “it is a mistake to think that if people move across national borders, this 
movement is necessarily the most significant and defining element in their lives” (Hage 2005, 
459). Critical of migration literature’s tendency to overemphasize the importance of “imagined 
communities” and mobility as the defining aspects of migration, he argues for more careful 
ethnographic attention to what is symbolically significant in people’s actual lives. Similarly, 
Wilding argues that by focusing on transnational movement, the researcher might overlook other 
important processes and practices because “nation” is not always the appropriate and significant 
unit of analysis. In many cases, it is the non-national local and regional cultural values and social 
ties that matter (2007).  Thus, we need to be critical and reflexive about using these concepts as 
analytical tools because they might be blinding rather than illuminating. The focus on mobility, 
while significant in many cases, might also lead researchers to lose sight of the continued 
importance of place-based practices that (re)produce cultures and societies (Salazar and Smart 
2012). Instead of celebrating “pure” mobility and the growth of mobility, the focus should be on 
examining how mobility is formed, experienced, imagined, regulated, and distributed differently, 
as well as how such formation, imagination, regulation, and distribution is (re)shaped culturally, 
politically, economically, etc. In other words, we need to question and study the politics of 
mobility. 
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The politics of mobility 
Mobility, as a social practice, is infused with meanings and not all forms of mobility are 
valued equally. The very processes and systems that allow one form of mobility could weaken 
other forms of mobility (Urry 2007, Massey 1993). As such, scholars of mobility have called for 
attention to the politics of mobility, questioning how mobility is experienced, represented, and 
evaluated and what the relationship is between mobility and power (Cresswell 2010, Frello 2008, 
Adey 2006, Massey 1993).  
As scholars reject the notion of absolute stasis, they are also aware that unimpeded 
movement is impossible (Hannam, Sheller, and Urry 2006, Tsing 2002, Pels 1999, Kaplan 1996, 
Wolff 1993). Mobility has always been embedded in unequal power relations, and the tendency 
to “romanticize mobility as a free-floating alternative to the rooted traditions of place” is just as 
dangerous as the mythologizations of place (Kaplan 2006, 395). Massey (1993), using the 
concepts of power-geometry and differentiated mobility, suggests that different social groups and 
individuals are placed in different positions with regards to global movements and 
interconnections. It is not simply about the unequal distribution of power; more importantly, the 
mobility of some groups can weaken others. Differentiated mobility can weaken the already 
weak (Massey 1993). Thus, as Tesfahuney claims, “differential mobility empowerments reflect 
structures and hierarchies of power and position by race, gender, age, and class, ranging from the 
local to the global” (Tesfahuney 1998, 501).  
Feminist theorists, for example, argue that women have never had the same access to the 
road as men. Discourses, ideologies, and practices of mobility have often excluded or 
pathologized women as being feminine. Femininity, in many cultures, is associated with being at 
home, while masculinity means a passport for travel (Wolff 1993). Moreover, the notion of 
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travel often rests on a Western, middle-class idea of a leisure journey; thus, a black maid going 
with a white family is usually not given the status of a traveler (Ahmed 1999, Wolff 1993). 
Racially speaking, in the post-Wall Berlin where travel is a form of liberty (because white East 
German subjects can visit non-socialist, non-European countries with legality), travel becomes 
what defines the nature of social membership and citizenship. Black Germans and black bodies 
living in Germany face what Partridge calls “technologies of exclusion,” including legal regimes 
and popular fantasies of travel that make white bodies more mobile and limit the mobility of 
black bodies, delegitimizing their attempts to travel (Partridge 2009, 347). The ability as well as 
the conditions, regulations, and imaginations of mobility reveal what it means for black bodies in 
Germany to become noncitizens (Partridge 2009). In terms of class, Skeggs (2004) illustrates 
how mobility has displaced and subsumed the category of class as a key dimension of social 
stratification and critiques how the mobility paradigm is linked to a “bourgeois masculine 
subjectivity” that privileges cosmopolitan mobility.  
This mobile form of subjectivity that is highly gendered, classed, and raced depends on 
the exclusion of others who do not have the same resource of mobility and who are already 
positioned as immobile (Ahmed 2004, Skeggs 2004, Tsing 2002). Differentiated mobility has 
been a central theme in studies about migration (for example, Chu 2010, Khosravi 2008, 
Lubkemann 2008, Amit 2007, Constable 2005, Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001, Parreñas 2001, 
Hyndman 2000), the movements of tramps, hobos, and the homeless (Brennan 2008, Cloke, 
Milbourne, and Widdowfield 2003, Cresswell 2001), women (Faier 2009, Silvey 2004, Gamburd 
2000, McDowell 1999, Wolff 1993), transport technologies (Merriman 2009, 2004, Hubbard and 
Lilley 2004, Law 2002), and urban infrastructure networks (Graham and Marvin 2001). Thus, 
Mai and King conclude that “if late modern subjects are allowed to enjoy a plurality of lifestyles 
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and contradictory identities, these possibilities are very unequally distributed at a local, national, 
and globalized level” (Mai and King 2009, 305). Therefore, the question is not simply who 
travels but how, when, and under what conditions. 
The relationship between power and movement, cosmopolitanism and movement, as well 
as the differentiated nature of movement naturally lead mobility scholars to explore the role of 
movement as a marker of differences and modernity in society. In the following section, I 
discuss how my research on movement to and from a modern rural place like Hải Thành 
contributes to the conceptualization of rurality and the growing body of works on movement and 
social class.   
 
Differentiated Movement as Social Distinction   
Physical movement and social mobility are often assumed to be interrelated. In the 
popular culture, the often-cited immigrant stories of transformation from rags to riches reinforce 
such an assumption. In academic research, movement, especially migration, is linked with 
accumulation of economic, social, and cultural capital. Movement, in a global world, has become 
an important resource. Not surprisingly, mobility scholars have made a call for studies on how 
movement can help us understand social class better, particularly to explore how movement is a 
resource that has differential access. For example, the ability and right to travel are one of the 
criteria by which class is defined and class privilege is upheld (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, 
Urry 2007). Building on this framework with the literature on the differentiated movement, my 
research asks how class formation in Vietnam can be seen through physical movement. I 
examine the migration of two different groups of women in Hải Thành, Vietnam and their 
different class standings. I focus on not only how movement is differentiated (by exploring who, 
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why, where one moves) but also how the differentiation is particularly shaped by the rural 
context in which it happens. I argue that specific meanings and dimensions of rurality, while 
encouraging movement in search of upward mobility, also reinforce and transform social 
hierarchies in surprising ways.  
 
Where – The politics of destinations  
 The question of where one travels is not new. This question is often asked in diaspora 
studies and linked with the politics of return (Chu 2010, Jansen and Löfving 2009, Jansen 2007). 
However, in an unequal global field, a large number of people from underdeveloped countries 
move away from home for better economic prospects (Chu 2010, Jansen 2009, Gamburd 2000). 
In Hải Thành, the population is set on the moving mindset because as one of my main informants 
said, “there is nothing here to develop” (không có gì để phát triển ở đây). The increasing gap 
between the rural and the urban in Vietnam and the lack of sustainable agricultural work have 
pushed people out of the rural in search of life opportunities elsewhere, to cities or to foreign 
countries.  
In a context of post-colonial Vietnam, different destinations are differently evaluated and 
translated into the formation of social inequalities and subjectivities. We see a clear hierarchy 
between international migration and internal migration, and consequently, between transnational 
women and translocal women in Hải Thành. While the former are praised, desired, and expected, 
the latter are minimized and made invisible. The difference between the two kinds of migration 
lies in both economic capital (remittances) and social capital (by moving to foreign countries, 
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transnational women have transformed from rural to cosmopolitan women,7 while translocal 
women, moving to Hải Thành, remain rural). Moreover, not all foreign destinations are equally 
attractive. Imagination and experience of movement play a significant role in people’s desires 
and evaluation of destinations.  
Studying the politics of destinations sheds light on the importance of imagination for 
movement as well as the need to connect experiences and imaginaries of movements. Culturally 
and historically laden imaginaries are at the root of movement as they produce the motivation 
and desire to move. Such imaginaries, enmeshed in global circuits of mediated images and 
narratives, inform how people envision the world and their mobilities in it. Moreover, 
imaginaries of other places are highly molded by colonialism, reflected in both horizontal 
(geographical) and vertical (economic-financial, social-status, cultural-cosmopolitan) values 
(Salazar 2011). In Vietnam, there is a hierarchy in how people imagine their destinations and this 
hierarchy is often shaped by colonial legacy, as well as other arrangements of power such as 
capitalism, nationalism, and modernities. 
People in Hải Thành formulated clear binaries that reflect the postcolonial way of 
thinking about development and modernity. Like in many other postcolonial societies, the former 
colonial power becomes the standard against which those living in the former colony are 
measured (Gupta 1998). Thus, to the local residents, Europe and the United States are “ahead” 
and the Vietnamese need to catch up. These Western societies are associated with 
cosmopolitanism, cleanness, movement, rights (particularly women’s rights) and welfare, 
opportunity to make money and support families while home in Vietnam is rural, polluted, 
                                                
7 This upgrade in social status is highly desirable for rural women because it even bypasses the 
middle level, the urban, in the rural/urban/global hierarchy.  
  
24 
absent of the ability to travel, full of domestic violence, deprived of welfare benefits, and lacks 
opportunity to make a living and support a family. 
However, the evaluation of places in terms of being “behind” or “ahead” is only one side 
of the story. Jansen (2009) shows that places are often ranked by their movement through time. 
That is, for a place to become home, the place must bring a sense that it is going somewhere. 
Arguably, most Hải Thành people felt that Hải Thành was not going anywhere. But more 
importantly, Hải Thành people often rank the destinations in terms of how “far” they imagine a 
place could go, or in other words, how much hope they can pin on that place. South Korea, even 
though not a Western country, has become much more attractive than Canada or the United 
Kingdom to the locals thanks to the abundant job opportunities for both transnational women and 
their parents. The perceived movement of the place itself in this case has challenged the assumed 
hierarchy between the East and the West. Many transnational women in Hải Thành have 
surprised even their families and neighbors by choosing Korea over Canada as their migration 
destinations.  
 
Who – Beauty, education, and age  
The movement in Hải Thành that I am interested in is female marriage migration from 
one rural place to another. As I learned, this relatively novel phenomenon cannot be separated 
from issues of beauty, education, and age.  
Rural Vietnamese have often been discursively described as uneducated, and implicitly 
this language of education works as a register of social class in Vietnam. More specifically, it 
separates the allegedly educated urban middle class from allegedly uneducated rural working 
class (Harms 2011, Taylor 2004b). In the case of transnational marriages, the media and popular 
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opinions in both Vietnam and other Asian countries view poverty and the lack of education as 
two main reasons for marriages between Vietnamese women and East Asian men (Bélanger, 
Khuat, and Tran 2013). In Taiwan, their unions are referred to as marriages of the inferiors, 
blatantly suggesting that both Vietnamese women and their foreign spouses are uneducated low-
class people and that is why they marry each other. In these discourses Vietnamese women, in 
particular, are often portrayed as naïve and uneducated, thus entering transnational marriages out 
of greed.  
However, the phenomenon of transnational marriages in Hải Thành challenges this 
stereotype. The young girls of Hải Thành are not poor but the majority of them have still chosen 
to marry foreign men. They are not the victims of poverty and the commodification of women; 
rather they assert their agency, whenever possible within structural constraints, in selecting their 
spouses and migration destinations. Moreover, they largely decline to pursue education even 
when they have the finances. I argue that their rejection of education is a critique of the view of 
education as life changing (Sen 1999) and reflects the rising educated unemployment among 
youth across the world due to the mobile and flexible nature of neoliberalism (Lukacs 2015a, 
Jeffrey 2010). The girls in Hải Thành, seeing no future for their investment in education, have 
turned instead to beauty. Thanks to Facebook, K-pop culture, and connections with families and 
friends living in East Asia, the young girls keep up with Korean fashion, don their Korean-style 
dresses, put on makeup, and transform themselves into what the local call ‘pretty girls.’ My 
research shows that beauty, rather than being a symptom of narcissism or vanity, is a way for the 
girls to self-fashion themselves into modern subjects, elevate their social status locally over boys 
and other girls, and attract foreign men in future marital arrangements. Beauty is thus both a 
form of social capital (Edmonds 2010) and investment in the future which are often denied to 
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rural Vietnamese women. Contrary to how certain feminists view beauty as oppressive to 
women, beauty is an important issue that should not be dismissed. Studying Hải Thành girls’ 
beauty practices and translocal women’s lack thereof is key to understand rural Vietnamese 
women’s strategies for social advancement and ranking.  
Beauty, moreover, is generally associated with youth (Twigg 2013). Most local women 
who married Taiwanese and Korean men are young. However, studies on transnational marriages 
have not considered the crucial role of age in facilitating marriages. In fact, this absence is quite 
common across social sciences disciplines. Twigg (2013) states that even though age is one of 
the master identities and a key dimension of difference, age is often left out of the 
intersectionality of gender, class, race, and sexuality. Age is highly significant to apprehend how 
society is divided and structured and to study questions of power, subjectivity, and inequalities. 
The importance of age for Hải Thành girls is displayed in the achievement of youthful beauty, 
the possibility of transnational marriages, and the choice of potential spouses. Age, naturalized in 
the body and treated as obvious that we cannot see its power, indeed can shape people’s 
experience, determine how people are evaluated and judged, and limit or enable their 
development. 
Taken together, the intersectionality of education, beauty, and age influences who gets to 
marry transnationally, who is praised, admired or criticized locally, and is highly relevant to the 
formation of class distinction in rural Vietnam.  
 
Why – The morality of migration 
Morality is a crucial aspect of rural and gendered migration because in Vietnam, both 
women, as a group, and the rural, as a place, are seen as the keepers of tradition and morality 
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(Nguyen-Vo 2008, Pettus 2003). In the research body on gendered migration (transnational 
marriages, migrant domestic workers, sex workers, care workers), scholars have documented the 
changing patterns and processes of relations of intimacy, complicating the binaries between 
public and private, global and local, love and money, victim and agent, nature and culture. Many 
have focused on the problem of commodification of social relations and the relationship between 
gift exchange and social intimacy (Bélanger 2010, Cheng 2010, Faier 2009, Constable 2009, 
2005, Thai 2008, Bernstein 2007, Donato et al. 2006, Abelmann and Kim 2005, Zelizer 2005, 
Brennan 2004, Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003, Manalansan 2003, Franklin and McKinnon 
2002, Franklin 2003, Gamburd 2000). My research, however, aims to understand the dynamics 
of gendered movement in Hải Thành through the lens of moral narratives because discourses of 
movement in Hải Thành are framed around who should move and why (good and bad reasons for 
moving). 
Morality is always inclusive in the experiences of migration because the transnational and 
translocal social fields are often bound together by different value systems (Carling 2008, 
Gowricharn 2004, Hage 2002). On the other hand, morality studies have illustrated how local 
moralities can provide insights into local notions of sexuality, gender relations, and kinship 
(Mahmood 2005, Alter 1997, Stoler 1989, Herzfeld 1985). It is thus unfortunate that most 
migration studies have not theorized how morality beyond a male/female binary shape gendered 
movement. While there exist studies on the interconnection between morality and gendered 
movement, they mostly rest on how assumptions about appropriate gender roles and gender-
specific ideologies (such as meanings of “good girls,” “obedient daughters,” “virtuous women,” 
and “respectable places”) enable and limit gendered (mostly female) movement (Sun 2009, Yan 
2008, Silvey 2007, 2000, Ong 1991). I am not interested in this functionalist and cause-
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consequence approach to gendered movement. Instead, following Strathern (1997), I want to 
focus on moral reasonings in contextual relationships beyond the simple male/female divide. I 
explore moral discourses because discourses provide a range of possibilities for negotiating the 
nature of moral interactions in everyday life (Zigon 2008). Zigon explains that “through such 
everyday, language-utilizing practices ... speaking individuals negotiate, construct, and come to 
agree on their moral ways of being” (Zigon 2008, 136). I want to stress that my focus on the 
negotiation over moral discourses is not to find out what are the shared assumptions of a moral 
woman/man in Hải Thành and how these assumptions affect gendered movement. Rather, I 
explore how people interact with each other in everyday life in order to live through the moral 
conflicts, especially between transnational and translocal women with regards to being “good” 
women. In other words, I am more interested in considering how relationships form not on the 
basis of mutual and shared understanding (about morality), but in spite of identified differences. 
In Hải Thành, the marriage migration of transnational and translocal women was 
immersed in moral discourse. The discourse often framed the issue of morality on binaries: love 
vs. money, self vs. nation/family, and modernity vs. tradition, rural vs. urban. These dichotomies 
created conflicting and shifting moral discourses, depending on who is conversing with whom. 
For instance, to a parent, a transnational woman might be a dutiful loving child while to many 
men in Hải Thành, she was seen as a selfish gold digger. Similarly, local girls tended to view 
transnational women as a symbol of beauty and modernity while translocal girls regarded 
transnational women as indecent and lacking traditional values that are associated with rural 
people. I argue that these examples demonstrate morality is relational and situational, and 
reducing morality to totalizing binaries (such as good vs. bad, selfish vs. altruistic, modern vs. 
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traditional) removes its complexity, including how morality is often classed and gendered, and 
obscures personal struggles and feelings.  
More importantly, through moral discourse, Hải Thành people make sense of their 
differences in terms of class, gender, age, ethnicity, and movement. To deny or confirm one 
group of women the righteousness due to their marriage migration was also a way to assert 
superior social standings in Hải Thành. However, Zigon (2012) argued that what is important 
about narratives is not its meaning-making and meaning-sharing capacity but the very act of 
speaking with another so as to charitably live through moral conflicts with the other. My study 
shows the ways the morally charged and conflicting narratives about the migration of two groups 
of women in Hải Thành reveal their grappling to morally accept themselves as good rural women 
and to be comfortable with one another in spite of social differences between the two. By 
looking at how moralities are negotiated, reevaluated, and enacted through everyday discourses 
and narratives, we can see the moral reasonings and better understand the dynamics of gendered 
movements beyond the push-pull and determining approaches based on gender binaries. 
 
Differentiated movement: Displacement, class within the family, and the pride illness  
Not all movements are the same. In Hải Thành, the differences in terms of who, where, 
and why one moves often lead to unequal results. My research shows that transnational marriage 
migration, despite the moral backlash, is still regarded by local people as desirable and life 
changing. However, in reality, not all transnational women achieve their dreams of life 
transformation for both themselves and their families in Hải Thành. For those who experience 
disappointment in transnational migration, they and their families consequently suffer from the 
pride illness (bệnh sỹ diện): painfully trying to save face and hide the fact that they do not live up 
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to the expectations of rich Việt Kiều and families with Kiều. Translocal women, on the other 
hand, face a much harsher outcome of their migration compared to transnational women. 
Contrary to the romanticization of movement as freedom and upward mobility, their migration 
results in being made invisible and displaced in Hải Thành. As a result, translocal women usually 
obtain different economic and social status from their in-law parents, sisters and brothers, 
demonstrating a crucial but often neglected aspect of social class: stratification runs deep, from a 
global and national level to the intimate relationships within the family.   
In Vietnam, it is not a new phenomenon that social distinction is related to movement. 
During the high socialist period between 1954 and 1986, people who were associated with the 
state (those with a good class background) had significantly more opportunities to move for work 
and education both internally and internationally than those who did not (those with a bad class 
background) (Hardy 2003b). Currently, the case of migration in Hải Thành shows that as 
movements differentiated, movement has become a clearer index for social stratification, putting 
those who are mobile ahead of those who are immobile and those who move transnationally over 
those who do so locally. More crucially, this stratification not only distinguishes different groups 
within society based on gender, generation, occupation, and movement but also creates 
differences within nuclear families whose members are often assumed to occupy the same social 
status. 
 
Reconceptualizing Rurality 
The rural in Vietnam, as an ideal, conjures up ambivalent meanings. On the one hand, it 
represents the tradition, the root of the country, and a stable immobile foundation as observed by 
Nguyen-Vo: “the rural, that clump of earth with the nation’s metaphorical roots attached, a 
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source and resting place, a depository of a national soul” (Nguyen-Vo 2008, 55). It is 
romantically viewed as a moral place insulated from the ills of capitalism and modernity (Harms 
2011, Nguyen-Vo 2008). On the other hand, that same traditional foundation of the rural is 
associated with ‘backwardness,’ lacking ‘civilization and modernity.’ In both instances, the rural 
represents the past: it is either traditional or backward, even though the interpretation of the past 
(positively as traditional or negatively as backward) depends on the context and what people 
want to do with the representations of the past. Moreover, because the city is supposedly neither 
traditional nor backward, the rural is seen as fundamentally different from the urban (Harms 
2011, Taylor 2001).  
As the rural is contrasted with its counterpart, the urban, both function as cultural ideals 
that provide meanings and legitimize hierarchies in Vietnam. However, while there has been 
much attention on the diversities and dynamics of cities thanks to their identification with 
movement and changes, the rural receives much less consideration and is often treated as a 
homogeneous category. Focusing on rural migration in Hải Thành and its rapid transformation, I 
want to show that the rural is just as active, complicated, modern, and stratified. In fact, 
movement is an effective lens to study the rural and its many layers because movement disrupts 
the cultural ideal of the rural as immobile and traditional.  
The phenomenon of movement in Hải Thành is constituted largely by the need of rural 
people to move away from the past and look for a better future somewhere else, physically and 
figuratively. Coupled with the fact that differentiated movements produce differentiated subjects, 
we have a complex picture of rurality in Hải Thành. On the surface, transnational migration turns 
Hải Thành into a modern rurality.8 Hải Thành has extravagant houses, modern young girls in 
                                                
8 The success of the fishing industry also contributes to the wealth and modernity of Hải Thành. 
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their flashy Korean fashion, a large number of residents who no longer have to do agricultural 
work thanks to remittances, and transnational marriage agencies that do the matchmaking via 
Facebook and the internet. Staying alongside the modern rural Hải Thành is another rurality that 
is not so modern yet not so traditional, generated by the translocal marriage migration. 
Translocal women in Hải Thành constantly face moral struggles over dualisms. For example, 
they have to balance between modernity and backwardness, carefully choosing what to wear so 
as to maintain the modern modesty while not slipping into ‘rural dressing.’ Or they weigh up the 
pros and cons of acting as good women, wives, mothers, and daughters-in-law (in contrast to 
transnational women) while dealing with the social exclusion due to their gendered migration. 
There are also two other kinds of rurality that exist outside of Hải Thành: a backward rurality, 
the hometown of translocal women, where it is so poor and ‘undeveloped’ that it must be ethnic 
areas and a capitalist rural, the migration destination of transnational women, where it is rural but 
desirable because it is overseas. Together, these four different kinds of rurality are stacked in a 
hierarchical order shaped by the interaction of movement, class, and rurality.  
In Hải Thành, the significant hierarchy between transnational and internal migration 
heightens the difference between these two kinds of rurality. There are expectations of upward 
mobility and modernity associated with (transnational) migration, such as beauty and 
remittances, that translocal women cannot meet. Therefore, we see the stratification of ruralities 
right within the family: a family with a transnational daughter is modern rural while a translocal 
daughter-in-law is not. Consequently, family members feel the need to both distance themselves 
from and support translocal women. The contrast between and coexistence of different kinds 
rurality in Hải Thành enable us to see how rurality is fluid, diverse, continually changing, 
challenged, and renegotiated.  
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The coexistence of different ruralities also demonstrates the importance of the connection 
between movement and emplacement. While (transnational) movement tends to be highly prized, 
the situation in Hải Thành proves the crucial role of emplacement in maintaining and building 
locality, allowing for a diverse rural life. The transnational marriages of young Hải Thành girls 
have substantially affected the community (for example, the shortage of local women for local 
marriages, changing gender and familial relations, and issues of remittances that create many 
dependent receivers who have chosen beauty over education, leisure over work). However, 
translocal women have quietly come and stayed in Hải Thành to sustain families and the 
community. They have married local men, given birth to the next generation, and taken the 
responsibility for keeping moral values. They are the hidden force that is holding the social 
structure together amid affluent changes. Thanks to the not-so-modern rurality created by 
translocal women, the modern rurality in Hải Thành can continue. Unfortunately, similar to the 
dynamics between movement and emplacement in which the former is more visible and the latter 
is trivialized, the flashy modern transnational women are noticed while translocal women remain 
invisible in Hải Thành.  
  
 
Beyond binaries 
My research, focusing on two kinds of movement in Hải Thành, aims to see the 
interrelationships that link differences. I have argued previously that generalizations based on 
dichotomies such as victimhood and agency, morality and immorality, modernity and tradition, 
and the East and the West fail to describe the constant transformation in Hải Thành. The 
critiques of dualisms are extended also to mobility studies. Glick Schiller and Salazar (2013) 
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have noted that theorists of movement often fixate on binaries of fixity-motion, self-other, same-
difference, and rootedness and cosmopolitanism. For example, among classic social theorists, 
Ferdinand Tönnies postulated the gemeinschaft-gesellschaft distinction; Robert Park, Ernest 
Burgess, and Robert Redfield distinguished between the rural and urban; and Emile Durkheim 
theorized the population as a fixed territorialized social fact. More recent migration and mobility 
scholarship has unintentionally further concretized the binary by focusing either on the 
experiences of immigrant settlement or the global flows of migration and tourism (Glick Schiller 
and Salazar 2013). These “covert dualisms” (Rockefeller 2011) between movement and non-
movement conceal the fact that movement and stasis have been both relative and constructive to 
social life in interrelated processes. Indeed, my research shows that distinction between motion 
and stasis is very fluid. For example, translocal women have moved to Hải Thành yet their 
movement mostly results in their displacement and confinement at their new homes. Or local 
girls are stuck in Hải Thành waiting for foreign men to arrive; yet their waiting period is a crucial 
preparation for their future migration. Indeed, movement and non-movement are interconnected 
to create a constant changing dynamics of everyday life.  
Not only do we need to move away from seeing movement as oppositional to fixed 
territorialized relationships, we also need to see the interconnection among different kinds of 
movement. King and Skeldon (2010) have shown that migration studies retain a division 
between internal and international migration and that since the 1990s internal migration has been 
largely ignored (see also Kalir 2013). They observed that there exist two almost entirely separate 
literatures from different conceptual, theoretical, and methodological standpoints, which rarely 
talk to each other. And since the emergence of the “migration-development nexus” in the 1990s, 
both scholars and policy-makers have tended to focus almost exclusively on the relationship 
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between development and international migration, overlooking the fact that in most developing 
countries, internal migration is equally important (King and Skeldon 2010). This separation 
between internal and international migration probably occurs due to the fact that nation-state 
remains as the unit of analysis for most migration studies (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003, 
Beck 2000). This methodological nationalism led scholars to study only movement that crosses 
borders and to view only those who cross borders as mobile (Glick Schiller 2010). My research 
focuses on the parallel relationships between transnational and translocal marriage migration to 
highlight not only how the two kinds of migration are related (the internal migration happens to 
compensate for the transnational migration) but also how they define each other (the identities 
and social rankings of transnational and translocal women are formed in dialogue with one 
another). I demonstrate the often-ignored similarities in the migration processes between the two, 
and provide more robust insights into the complex livelihoods of migrants and their communities 
(see also Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, Cohen 2011, King and Skeldon 2010). 
Similar to the internal-international dichotomy is the tendency of scholars to focus on 
rural to urban migration and mostly ignore the rural to rural migration. Migration scholars often 
study rural migration to urban areas, both internally and internationally. Vertovec (2011) claims 
that the city is the foremost setting for the anthropology of migration because of its everyday 
multiculturalism and its large scale (Caglar 2010, Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, Brettell 2003, 
Bommes and Radtke 1996). As such, the most recent research on migration and movement is 
based in big cities such as New York, Miami, Barcelona, Frankfurt, Manchester, and London 
(Glick Schiller and Caglar 2011, Foner 2010, Però 2007, Römhild and Bergmann 2003, Stepick 
et al. 2003, Zhang 2002). This lack of rural to rural migration studies creates the biased 
assumption that only cities, and not rural places, are diverse, resulting in an unbalanced 
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interpretation of migration. Hải Thành has proven that a rural place can be diverse and global as 
well as attractive and sustainable enough for many other rural Vietnamese to make it a new 
home.  
 
Why Hải Thành?   
Hải Thành is a truly unique site: it is a place that is simultaneously rural and modern, 
local and global. Its residents are sandwiched between the space of desirable cosmopolitan Việt 
Kiều and the rural working-class fishing people. It is famous for sending the largest number 
nationwide of its young women to foreign countries through transnational marriages, despite its 
rural location and small population. It is also one of the few rural locations in Vietnam that is a 
migrant destination. Yet it is precisely the uniqueness of Hải Thành that provides us with insights 
about the social conditions in contemporary Vietnam and beyond. In particular, Hải Thành 
allows us to understand the relationships between place, movement/mobility, identity (gender, 
age, education, ethnicity, and class) and morality through this uneasy, constantly negotiated 
encounter of difference (rural/urban, modern/traditional, old/young). Hải Thành reveals the 
nature and interplay of these processes that are happening globally and locally (almost) 
everywhere else. In other words, this extraordinary village is actually an important site to study 
and understand these different social, political, historical and economic forces at play. 
 
Field Research and Ethnography of Encounters 
Over the course of four years, from 2011 to 2014, I spent 18 months doing field research 
in Hải Thành, including an eleven-month period of ethnographic fieldwork in 2013-2014. During 
my long stay in Hải Thành, I daily ate and interacted with my host family. The father of the 
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family, whom I fondly call Uncle Tú, is an old friend of my uncle’s. Because their house was 
small and noisy with young children, Uncle Tú arranged for me to live on the second floor of the 
house owned by his sister, now in Japan. His other sister, Ms. Hy, lived on the first floor with her 
grandson to look after the house.  
Twice a day, I went to have lunch and dinner with Uncle Tú’s family and stayed for 
hours. They welcomed and considered me as part of the family and I participated in all familial 
events and gatherings, significant or otherwise. My time with the family allowed me glimpses 
into their intimate life, from personal desires to interpersonal struggles and mending, from 
jealousy to kindness and acceptance, and from frustration to hope and resilience.  
Thanks to Uncle Tú’s introduction, I got to know his neighbors and relatives and from 
there, I built my own network of connections. I spent the mornings and evenings visiting people 
at their houses and interviewing. Sometimes I went to cafés, karaoke bars, and restaurants with 
them at night. In the afternoon, I went to Korean classes where I met many of the local girls 
before they married East Asian men and migrated. My relationships with the girls in my classes 
remain even though all of them have gone to Korea. We have been keeping in touch via 
Facebook. I also hung out with fishermen, frequented their boats and homes, interacted with their 
wives and children, went to Cát Bà Island to observe their occupation in action. Through both 
Uncle Tú and the fishermen I knew, I met translocal women who are wives of local men. 
Altogether, I tried to build relationships with diverse groups of people in Hải Thành to develop a 
better sense of how people in the commune interacted, built relationships, and made sense of 
their own identities.  
I changed the names of the commune and all people in this dissertation because of the 
possibility of risks that my work might cause. Due to the highly charged morality surrounding 
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transnational marriages and women who engage in them as well as the sensitive nature of being 
daughters-in-law in a strange place, I have chosen not to expose my informants to such a risk of 
being judged for what they said and did. Therefore, I use pseudonyms when referring to 
individuals in this dissertation and I also changed some minor details of people’s background to 
prevent possible identification.  
The politics of knowledge engagement and production remain important and central 
throughout the process of fieldwork and writing.  I went into the field as a middle-class, urban 
and cosmopolitan, single woman in my 30s. I grew up in the center of Hải Phòng municipality, 
lived in the capital of Vietnam for a few years, and have been studying in the United States for 
the last 12 years. My background made me very different from the people whom I studied and 
with whom I worked. I was not unaware of “the politics of solidarity” (Nelson 1999, 57) with the 
people I studied and I have found that asserting solidarity in my case was highly inappropriate. I 
could not claim to speak for the people of Hải Thành because this research, in the end, reflected 
my own intention and bias (see Spivak 1988). Moreover, such a claim would erase the glaring 
differences between us as well as glossing over our complicated relationships. Hải Thành people 
noticed my differences and constantly pointed them out to me. Similar to the women in Hải 
Thành, I was confronted with questions about my appearance (Why I did not wear makeup? Why 
didn’t I dress in what the local viewed as modern?9) and my single status. The decision to stick 
to my personal choices, especially with regards to my appearance, was made easier for me 
because I had other forms of social capital to draw from that most people in the commune did not 
have (such as education, urban dweller, middle class). That earned me respect locally. But as I 
faced and made sense of the critiques of me, I also strived to understand people who held very 
                                                
9 See more in chapter VI about local women 
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different values and practices. For example, there were many moments during the writing 
process when I slipped into being judgmental, and I am thankful to my advisor for making me 
realize my own biases. I struggled to write about Hải Thành people. 
Taking a cue from Lieba Faier (2009) and following the tradition of ethnographic writing, 
I chose to focus on personal narratives, to retain the contradictory ways Hải Thành residents 
represented themselves in our interaction, and to portray them as complex persons with both 
admirable and ‘ugly’ sides. I agree with Faier that “I am less interested in presenting people as 
consistent and coherent subjects than asking why, at certain moments and for certain contingent 
historical, cultural, political-economic, and ethnographic reasons, they presented themselves as 
they did” (Faier 2009, 28). Therefore, in my research people helped and praised each other in 
some circumstances, judged, lied and took advantage of one another in other circumstances. Acts 
of kindness and practices of discrimination, including racism, classism, sexism, and ageism, 
coexisted as people struggled to live in an unequal world.  
The feminist literature on third world women has a tendency to assume their victimhood 
or overemphasize their agency in resisting marginalization (Narayan 1997, Mohanty, Russo, and 
Torres 1991). However, Avery Gordon (2008) reminds us that people have “the right to complex 
personhood” and that they “possess a complex and oftentimes contradictory humanity and 
subjectivity that is never adequately glimpsed by viewing them as victims or, on the other hand, 
as superhuman agents” (Gordon 2008, 4). She goes on to clarify that “[c]omplex personhood 
means that all people … remember and forget, are beset by contradiction, and recognize and 
misrecognize themselves and others … that people suffer graciously and selfishly too, get stuck 
in the symptoms of their troubles, and also transform themselves” (Gordon 2008, 4). Keeping 
this theoretical statement in mind, I tried to understand how people became entangled and 
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maneuvered in their lives and relationships and to present the larger contexts in which 
contradicting behaviors, beliefs, and characteristics occurred. I often did not agree with the 
choices people made but I could not always claim my own innocence either (see Haraway 1988). 
In the end, I believed in the importance of doing long-term fieldwork and writing in ways that 
show our mutual interacting, enriching, and learning from each other.   
Interaction is a key word for me. First, it reflects an accepted dictum of partial, 
fragmented, and incomplete truth (hooks 2015, Stewart 1996, Trinh 1989, Haraway 1988, 
Clifford 1986). My research findings make no claim for a complete understanding of movement 
or social class or people in Hải Thành. They only reflect my own interpretation of our interaction 
and encounters in the commune, structured by our specific differences in terms of gender, class, 
age, and ethnicity. Second, it is the foundation of what Faier (2009) calls “the ethnography of 
encounters.” This method presents a distinct way to study transnationalism and movement. 
Studies of movement often explore how people, ideas, and capital transgress and transform 
national boundaries or how ideologies and the political economy inform the ways people move. 
Scholars also tend to research how a certain population negotiates mobile flows or how the 
global processes of capitalism or new regimes of citizenship and sovereignty reshape their lives. 
While focusing on how people’s lives relate to large-scale formations of power, this approach 
leaves little space for the dynamics of everyday cultural crossings or the in-between space where 
relationships form on the basis of differences (Faier 2009). Similar to Rockefeller’s (2011) 
criticism of the term “flow” that erases the specificities of action, people, and place and Tsing’s 
advocacy of “zones of awkward engagement” (Tsing 2005, xi), the ethnography of encounters 
takes into account the messy and surprising way that people create cultural meanings and 
identities through everyday encounters and relationships (Faier 2009).  
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Choosing to focus on cultural encounters and mutual relationships helps me understand 
the crucial interconnection between transnational women and translocal women, and by 
extension, between transnational and translocal migration, which is often neglected in migration 
literature. On the surface, they appeared locally as two distinctly separate groups, but their 
subjectivities are mutually formed through dialogic processes where desires, gender, class, age, 
and ethnicity all play a role in creating and sustaining the dynamics. It is important to explore not 
only how the transnational, national, and local cultures influence the migration of transnational 
and/or translocal women but how their identities, desires, and transformation come into being 
through relationships and encounters with one another, oftentimes intimately and sometimes 
unexpectedly.  
Furthermore, examining the crossings between transnational and translocal women 
illuminates what both Hage (2005) and Wilding (2007) cautioned against the inclination to see 
the “transnational” aspect of migration as the most impactful for migrants, mobility as the 
defining characteristic of migration, and “nation” as the most significant unit of analysis. In fact, 
the waiting period in Hải Thành before transnational women migrated to East Asian was very 
important in producing the modern girl identity for young local women and enabling their 
eventual migration. For translocal women, their migration was often not acknowledged but 
instead minimized. Coupled with their difficulties in Hải Thành, their migration was better 
defined by immobility rather than mobility. Both of these interesting issues were only revealed 
through the women’s encounters and relationships in the local context even though they were 
tied with and demonstrated global and national values. Through the ethnography of encounters, 
extending from the relationships between the two groups of women to include other relationships 
in the commune, I aim to map out the dynamics of movement and class in the intimate 
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relationships (where stakes and desires are revealed) and the larger structures in which these 
relationships are positioned.  
 
Chapter outline 
 This dissertation has four main parts. The first part, On the Move: Introduction, 
discusses theories on movement, the methodology of the research and introduces my main field 
site: an offshore fishing community called Hải Thành in northern Vietnam. Chapter I explores 
the movement of the local population in the context of profound social inequalities in Vietnam. It 
focuses on the extraordinary culture of movement in Hải Thành by detailing the historical, social, 
political, and spatial conditions that enable and sustain movement in Hải Thành. Here I describe 
the patterns and characteristics of the different kinds of movement: those of boatpeople in the 
1980s and 1990s, and currently of offshore fishermen, translocal women and transnational 
women. I argue that the desires for movement in this commune stems from their status of being 
in-between: they are well-to-do but feel discriminated against because they are rural people with 
a working-class profession – fishing. As such, movement makes a crucial resource to overcome 
their liminality and gain economic and social distinction.  
The next two parts of the dissertation center on the close relationship between gendered 
movement and social class. Here I discuss the internal and international migration of women – a 
double rural-to-rural migration pattern in which women from rural Hải Thành marry East Asian 
men and migrate to Korea while women from other rural places marry Hải Thành men and 
migrate to Hải Thành. By comparing different kinds of movement and their social values, I aim 
to challenge the often assumed simple and causal connection between physical movement and 
social mobility as well as to complicate the uncritical celebration of movement in a global era.  
  
43 
The five chapters on the migration of women in Hải Thành explore how female migration 
is intimately tied to cultural ideas of beauty, age, class, and morality. In chapters II and III, I 
argue that youthful beauty is both the motivator and product of the un/successful marriage 
between migration and class. Rather than being seen as a site of vanity and narcissism, beauty 
can be viewed as another form of capital that enables poor women to migrate transnationally and 
transform their lives and social statuses. Yet, on the other hand, the perceived lack of beauty with 
regards to translocal women, closely examined in chapter VI, proves that not all kinds of 
migration are the same and that there exists a big gap in social and economic capital between 
international and internal migration. Since both beauty and marriage are highly moralized, in 
chapters V and VI, I also investigate the morality of movement, especially how transnational and 
translocal women navigate the discourses and practices of morality to combat their 
marginalization, and, in the process, to illustrate the complicated relationship of class, movement, 
and gender.  
In the last part of the dissertation, I introduce my host family and their struggle in the 
search of upward mobility. Unlike many other families in Hải Thành, the migration of their 
daughters and granddaughters did not sufficiently elevate their social and economic status. To 
make it worse, the family had to live with what my informants referred to as a pride illness in 
order to hide their failure to achieve the expectations of migration. Their unique experiences 
highlight the differentiation of movement and illustrate how the politics of movement play out 
concretely in everyday lives of ordinary Vietnamese.   
By focusing on gendered movement in Hải Thành and stories of aspirations and hopes, 
broken dreams and struggles, my dissertation reveals the disjunctures in the mobility regime in 
Vietnam: the normalization and valorization of the mobility regime that promises class climbing 
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does not necessarily produce subjects that perfectly fit into it. The specific chapters focusing on 
my host family, their daughter and daughter-in-law (chapters VII, VIII, and IX) examine this 
tension and serve as a powerful example of the desires for movement and the feelings of 
displacement when such desires fail to actualize. I conclude this dissertation by reminding the 
readers of the diverse rural life with continual changes. In this place, we see the achieved dreams 
as well as a harsh reality of disappointment and marginalization as people wait, move, and 
interact to confront, produce, and rework understandings of belonging, self-worth, and their 
place in the shifting global order.  
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Chapter I  
Population Movements and Social Mobility in Hải Thành and Contemporary 
Vietnam  
 
Introduction  
The (extra)ordinary lives in contemporary Vietnam are largely shaped by two intersecting 
and intimately connected processes – physical movement and class mobility. Scholars involved 
in Vietnamese studies have noted that new forms of social stratification have been emerging in 
modern Vietnam as a result of the country’s tremendous socio-economic changes in the last 
twenty years. After the implementation of the free market in 1986, the notion of class in Vietnam 
has moved from a Maoist ideology of “good” and “bad” classes (that valorized the rural, the 
farmers, and the workers and criticized the urban, the entrepreneurs, and the middle-class) to a 
capitalist notion that reversed the hierarchy (Nguyen-Marshall, Drummond, and Bélanger 2012, 
Taylor 2004b, Luong 2003). Along with class, physical movement has become an important 
marker of distinction in modern Vietnam (Hardy 2003a). Movement is seen as the break from the 
high-socialist past that is often perceived as restricting. This sense of restriction stems from the 
teleological narrative of progress that contrasts the presumed socialist immobility to capitalist 
mobility (Schwenkel 2007).10 In actual fact, population movement in Vietnam is not a new 
phenomenon, but what is different now is how it has become relatively accessible. This 
accessibility is crucial since the discourse and practices of movement articulate larger, 
historically-informed and transforming relations of social, economic and cultural capital. More 
specifically, Vietnamese today can move more freely outside of the state’s directions as non-state 
                                                
10 For the opposite process in Serbia, see Greenberg (2011). 
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jobs are available and the system of household registration is loosened (Hardy 2003b). 
Additionally, the normalization of diplomatic relationships between Vietnam and capitalist 
countries in the early 1990s also made it much easier for Vietnamese citizens to cross national 
borders (Thai 2011). These larger transformations in the political economy have led to new 
stratifications of Vietnamese society into different social groupings: overseas Vietnamese, 
internal and seasonal migrants, mobile urban dwellers, and immobile farmers.  
In order to capture and map out the converging processes of movement and class, this 
chapter introduces a Vietnamese commune called Hải Thành at the particular nexus of history, 
geography and political economy. I especially focus on different forms of movement from and to 
Hải Thành as well as Hải Thành people’s class positioning in contemporary Vietnam.  
 
Hải Thành – A Rural Commune in Global Motion 
Located near the Tonkin Gulf, Hải Thành is a small rural fishing commune (xã) 
belonging to Thuỷ Nguyên district (huyện) of Hải Phòng City in northern Vietnam with a 
population of around 12,000 people. Located near the Bạch Đằng river, the community lives in 
an area that is slightly larger than 4 square miles (12 square km). Historically, Hải Thành was 
part of Hải Thái village (làng). Ancestor (thuỷ tổ) Đinh Huyền Thông originally from Hà Tây 
(now part of the capital Hà Nội) migrated to this locale in the early 15th century, seeing it as a 
better area for fishing than Hà Tây. His siblings and family members gradually followed him, 
over time making the Đinh lineage the majority in Hải Thái (70-80%). Hải Thái fishermen 
started to move further from Hải Thái towards the water for better catch and till the end of the 
19th century, more than 200 households lived in the area that is Hải Thành today. In 1891 Hải 
Thành separated from Hải Thái as another village while maintaining strong lineage ties with Hải 
  
47 
Thái people. Till this day, the Đinh people in Hải Thành still go to Hải Thái to attend the annual 
ancestor worship ceremony (giỗ tổ) held on January 8th of the lunar calendar (the date of Đinh 
Huyền Thông’s death in 1461). While the Đinh lineage makes up around 70% of the population 
in Hải Thành, other lineages such as Nguyễn, Lê, and Vũ also have a relatively large population 
(Thành 1999). The importance of patrilineal kinship and lineage here is similar to many rural 
communes in Vietnam, but in Hải Thành it paves the way for the out-migration of local women, 
puts pressure on male behaviors, and complicates gender relations.11 
Naturally people in the community have always been fishers and for a century they were 
as poor as many other fishing villages scattered along the coast of Vietnam. But in a twist of 
dramatic social changes in the country following the American War12 that ended in 1975, the 
unique combination of a fishing occupation and nearshore location of Hải Thành has changed the 
fate of the commune and transformed it into an unusually mobile and financially comfortable 
rural community.   
 
Vietnam in Turmoil: Political and Economic Reforms 
During the last century, Vietnam has experienced lengthy wars with the French, Japanese, 
and Americans that devastated the country. In contrast to the significant aid that was directed to 
the postwar reconstruction of many war-torn Asian countries, including Japan and Korea, 
Vietnam had little help from its allies to rebuild from decades of ruinous wars from 1975 to the 
early 1990s. The 1979 border war with China put an end to Chinese aid to its neighbor. The 
decline and final disintegration of Communism in Eastern Europe at around the same time 
significantly reduced the Soviet and East European aid to Vietnam. Vietnam was also suffered 
                                                
11 The local gender tensions will be discussed in the following chapters.  
12 The Vietnam War is called the American War in Vietnam. 
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from the U.S.-led trade embargo from 1975 to 1994 (Luong 2003). These external factors 
seriously slowed down Vietnam's economic recovery process.  
The Communist state's implementation of the command-economy model in 1954 only 
further deteriorated the situation, resulting in many years of poverty for the Vietnamese, 
including the Hải Thành people. The victory of the Communist force at the end of the American 
war in 1975 reinforced the Vietnamese Communist leaders' confidence in their ideology and 
command-economy model of development, which had been applied to the northern half of 
Vietnam from 1954 to 1975. This model sought to achieve rapid industrialization and economic 
development through state control of key resources (raw materials, labor, and capital) and 
marketing of output (through the state's trading network) (de Vylder and Fforde 1988). The 
economy had three main sectors: state, cooperative, and household. In the state's ideological 
vision, the state sector played the leading role in the economy (mainly in industries and services), 
while the cooperative sector dominated agriculture, making most households belong to the 
cooperatives.  
However, this command-economy model encountered many difficulties, especially in 
agriculture. Cooperatives faced problems of increasing membership due to population growth 
and lower returns on labor input as members paid greater attention to their own household 
garden plots. The result was declining and stagnating agricultural productivity from cooperative 
land (Luong 1992, 204). Moreover, in both the agricultural and industrial sectors, an increasing 
percentage of products ended up in the open market as state procurement prices were kept 
artificially low. The resulting shortage of foods and industrial goods in the state commercial 
system and their availability on the open market at considerably higher prices eroded the 
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purchasing power of state workers' salaries on the one hand and inflated the economy on the 
other (Fforde and Paine 1987, 93-95).  
By the end of the 1980s, the Vietnamese command economy was in a state of major crisis. 
Many local households and individuals survived by breaking the laws and relying on the 
informal market, further undermining the state and cooperative sectors of the economy. The 
urban practice of raising pigs and chicken, for example, illustrates people’s struggle to face 
economic difficulties. It was not uncommon for better-off families in the cities to raise pigs in 
their living rooms, feeding them with chicken scraps and then selling the pigs to private traders. 
This practice was illegal because private ownership in a Communist economy was not allowed. 
Yet it reflected the poverty of Vietnam to such an extent that agricultural production in urban 
houses became a sign of affluence (Hardy 2003b). In 1988, Vietnam experienced acute food 
shortages and had to appeal for international food aid (Kolko 1997).  
Hải Thành people described the time after the American War as extremely difficult in 
which most people were starving. Farming did not provide enough food because the cooperatives 
were facing the same problem of low labor input. Each household had less than one kilogram 
(four cups) of rice and nothing else to survive on per day (The People Committee of Hải Thành 
2005). Moreover, fishing was not productive because no one could afford to buy boats and gear. 
The whole community of 2450 households only had 260 fishing boats, the majority of which had 
deteriorated over the years and had very small-capacity engines (from 6 CV to 15 CV13) that 
limited fishing to nearshore areas. At the same time, trading was banned and Hải Thành people 
had no choice but to sell their products cheaply to state-owned seafood export companies (The 
People Committee of Hải Thành 2005). Mr. Tòng, a local man, frustratingly wrote a poem about 
                                                
13 CV means chevaux vapeur and is a measuring unit of engine power (horsepower). 
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the hardship of people and the problems with the command economy. The older generation in 
Hải Thành that survived the difficult period still remembers the poem by heart: 
Con cua con càng cửa hàng quản lý 
Cá to cá tí quản trị liên hoan 
Hòn gạch hòn than cửa hàng phân phối 
Cá ươn cá thối phân phối xã viên 
Thịt lợn ưu tiên để phần cán bộ 
Con dê ăn bổ cán bộ chùm chăn 
Xã viên đói nhăn xin ra hợp tác. 
 
Crabmeat is controlled by the (state) stores 
Big fish, small fish are consumed at managers’ parties 
Bricks and coals the stores distribute 
Stale fish, rotten fish are given to collective members 
Pork is saved for cadres 
Goat is devoured, cadres sleep well under their blankets 
Starving, members ask to get out of collectives.  
 
During this straitened economic time, the border war with China in 1979 particularly 
affected Hải Thành residents and subsequently changed the course of their lives. The mass 
deportation of Chinese Vietnamese by the Vietnamese government left behind a big void in the 
fishing industry of Hải Phòng city. Chinese Vietnamese had traditionally taken charge of 
offshore fishing in Hải Phòng and contributed the majority of seafood yield. Following their 
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forced departure, Hải Thành fishermen were assigned to take over offshore fishing. However, the 
city only gave them two offshore boats left by Chinese Vietnamese. Their own boats were old 
and small, the state provided a limited amount of oil, and seafood prices were too low. These 
difficulties were coupled with their significant lack of experience with offshore fishing. The 
consequence was major losses for many years for Hải Thành fishing, further worsening their 
poverty (Đảng Uỷ Xã Hải Thành 1999). 
Many border areas also became vacant with the flight of Chinese Vietnamese. Hải Thành 
was among Northern rural communes tasked with sending their residents to populate the border. 
In 1979, 495 Hải Thành households (around 30% of the commune population) were relocated to 
a commune in Quảng Ninh province. Yet, their lives in the new place were unstable and difficult 
and soon after a quarter of them came back to Hải Thành. Unfortunately, their houses and 
agricultural land in Hải Thành had already been reallocated to others. They ended up camping 
out in the field, arguing with authorities, and harrasing neighbors. Crime, theft, and social chaos 
in Hải Thành surged while destitution spreaded (Thành 1999). 
The poverty in Hải Thành and Vietnam, in general, after the wars resulted in an exodus of 
northern Vietnamese “boatpeople,” as they were commonly referred to, seeking refuge in 
capitalist societies. The early migrants leaving Hải Thành in the 80s and 90s belonged to this 
group.  
 
Hải Thành and the Boatpeople  
Boatpeople is the name given to a large group of Vietnamese who left the country as 
refugees after the American War. The fall of South Vietnam in 1975, the dismantlement of the 
capitalist economy in the south, and the brief border war with China in 1979 resulted in the 
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departure, by boat and by land, of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese, southerners 
associated with the South Vietnam regime, and marginalized returnees from the new economic 
zones (Hardy 2003a, b, Duiker 1983). They were political refugees that marked the postwar 
refugee crisis of Vietnam in the late 1970s. While most boatpeople were often political refugees 
from the south, little is known of those who left from the north as economic refugees due to 
widespread poverty in the late 1980s and 1990s. As Chan (2011) explains, for those northern 
boatpeople, boarding a boat was not a consequence of political fear of or exclusion by the 
Communist regime. Rather, it reflected the frustration with the political and economic system 
that could not provide for even basic human needs. Even the Vietnamese Ministry of Interior 
admitted the economic hardships in 1988: 
 
the majority left because they could not deal with or adapt to our new society, sympathize with 
the country’s difficult conjuncture, or recognize their responsibilities to society and their 
fatherland at a time when it faced hardship in many areas, especially economics and society, etc. 
(Vietnam, Ministry of Interior quoted in Hardy 2003b: 118).  
 
In response to the deep economic crisis, a large number of Vietnamese in the north left 
for Hong Kong (because of its close physical distance) as economic refugees. They largely 
boarded boats at northern parts of Vietnam, especially Hải Phòng and Quảng Ninh, two 
provinces at the northeastern coast of Vietnam (Chan 2011). Hải Thành was an important point 
of departure during this migration due to its coastal location and its new offshore fishing industry. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, Hải Thành fishermen were hired to transport Hải Phòng and Hà Nội 
refugees from Vietnam to Hong Kong. Gradually, a large number of Hải Thành people started 
taking their families with them to Hong Kong to escape the poverty at home. As the economy 
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kept getting worse, Hải Thành people went on illegal, dangerous, and uncertain journeys that 
lasted months to reach Hong Kong. It was estimated that starting from 1988, more than 2000 
Vietnamese boatpeople arrived in Hong Kong each month (Chan 2011). The surge of boatpeople 
arrivals created widespread fear of a Vietnamese invasion in Hong Kong, forcing the government 
to adopt a new screening policy that aimed to distinguish refugees from non-refugees (i.e., 
economic refugees) in 1988. As a result, more than 80% of economic the boatpeople who arrived 
after the 16 June 1988 cutoff date were deemed non-refugees and were repatriated to Vietnam 
(Chan 2011, Hardy 2003b). Many Hải Thành people were repatriated in the 1990s, but those who 
were lucky enough to flee before 1988 were resettled in third countries after Hong Kong, 
including America, Canada, Australia, Japan, and most countries in Europe (Mignot 1995). They 
became Hải Thành’s first wave of Việt Kiều (Kiều for short). Việt Kiều is a Vietnamese term to 
indicate overseas Vietnamese; it literally means Vietnamese sojourners. This first wave of Kiều 
is referred to locally as third-country Kiều (kiều nước thứ ba) to differentiate it from the 
community’s second wave of Kiều – transnational women.  
While the earlier boatpeople left the country for political reasons, the later boatpeople left 
because they could not tolerate the hardships of a socio-economic system that had not worked for 
decades, and they were exhausted with the effort of believing in it. As Hardy (2003b) puts it, the 
boatpeople exodus was both the symptom and result of the social, political, and economic 
changes taking place since 1975. It was only after the Vietnamese state implemented a series of 
reform policies known as Renovation (Đổi Mới) in 1986 that real economic gains were 
experienced in people’s everyday life. The reform, along with compassion fatigue of the 
countries of asylum and the repatriation program created in 1989, put an end to the boatpeople 
phenomenon.  
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Đổi Mới reform was implemented in 1986 in an attempt to get the country out of the 
economic—and, thus, political--crisis. At the center of Đổi Mới were the development of a free 
market, the dissolution of land collectivization, and the removal of restrictions on private 
business (Hardy 2003b). Politically speaking, the Vietnamese state also began to normalize its 
relations with former enemies. Within 20 years after Đổi Mới, the Vietnamese economy was 
growing at an annual rate of 7%, and poverty was nearly halved (Federal Research Division 
2005). Hải Thành benefited tremendously from these reform policies. Before Đổi Mới, Hải 
Thành was one of the poorest communities in an already poor country, but the remittances from 
Việt Kiều sent after Đổi Mới have helped the local economy to boom. Even though the number of 
third-country Kiều (former boatpeople) in Hải Thành was not high, they contributed substantially 
to the socio-economic development of the community. In the 90s, they started paying return 
visits to Hải Thành. Thai (2011) observed that these return visits have been a relatively new 
opportunity made possible by recent changes in Vietnamese diplomatic policies that reopened its 
door to the global economy (Đổi Mới reform in 1986, ASEAN membership in 1993, and the 
establishment of full diplomatic relations between Vietnam and the U.S. in 1995).  When 
boatpeople left Vietnam, they were considered criminals and traitors and subsequently lost their 
Vietnamese citizenship. However, the normalization of economic and political relations has 
gradually stimulated the increasing return visits by Việt Kiều.  
The Vietnamese government was also quick to realize the importance of remittances and 
a growing Việt Kiều economy. The originally hostile discourse towards Việt Kiều was 
transformed into a welcoming rhetoric of patriotism where perceptions of Việt Kiều transitioned 
from traitors (phản quốc) to compatriots (Kiều Bào). The recent decree of the Vietnamese 
government calls for favorable policies for all non-resident Vietnamese citizens to facilitate the 
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return of Việt Kiều for investment and nation building. It allows Việt Kiều to return home without 
entry visas, opening up legal channels for reintegration into Vietnamese society (Dang, Tacoli, 
and Hoang 2003).14 Within 15 years, remittances from Việt Kiều rose from $35 million in 1991 
to $5 billion in 2006, accounting for 8% of Vietnam’s GDP (Thai 2011). In Hải Thành, 
remittances from third-country Kiều has led to the development of an offshore fishing industry 
and motivated the migration of women, bringing wealth to a once poor community.  
 
The Fishermen, the Brides, and the Migrants: Movement as Normalcy 
 Until the early 1990s, local fishing was in a poor condition. Local people fished with 
small nets on boats with small engines (6-15 CV) that could only operate nearshore. Hải Thành 
households that had always been dependent on fishing could barely survive (The People 
Committee of Hải Thành 2005). In 1994, two local fishermen (Nguyễn Đức Sông and Nguyễn 
Đức Nhẫn) who traded seafood with Chinese fishermen from Guangdong learned from them the 
techniques of harvesting squid by light attraction. This technique brought much higher yields, yet 
it required high investment. In order to fish for squid, fishermen needed to purchase bigger 
vessels (around 15 yards long), a high number of halogen 1000W bulbs (40-150 bulbs per boat), 
and expensive engines (100 to 300 CV). These boats cost from $50,000 to $150,000, a sum that 
was hard for most fishermen to obtain. Thanks to the remittances from boatpeople in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, a large portion of Hải Thành fishermen had been able to switch to squid fishing 
within 10 years, making squid fishing an important source of income for the local economy. The 
number of fishing boats increased from 260 in 1996 to 700 in 2014, the amount of seafood 
caught increased from 4,800 tons in 2001 (worth $3.3 million) to 11,000 tons in 2008 (worth 
                                                
14 For more detailed research on the Vietnamese state’s policies towards Việt Kiều, see Small 
(2012a). 
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$8.2 million) to 30,000 tons in 2014. Nowadays, the fishing industry makes up more than 70% of 
the local economy (The People Committee of Hải Thành 2014).15 The success of squid fishing 
has helped change the face of Hải Thành. The Hải Phòng government is investing in building a 
new port in the community to accommodate the growing number of vessels and new roads to 
better connect Hải Thành with the center of Hải Phòng. It was the remittances from third-country 
Việt Kiều spent on building boats and buying gears (or used as loans for these investments) that 
helped the transition to squid fishing transpire much faster and more smoothly.  
While men in Hải Thành engage in offshore fishing, a large number of Hải Thành women 
have been migrating to Taiwan and South Korea in the last ten years for marriages. Transnational 
marriages between young rural Vietnamese women and Taiwanese and South Korean men have 
become very common. Statistics from the National Statistics Offices show that Vietnamese 
women are the second largest group of transnationals, after Chinese women, to marry Taiwanese 
and South Korean men (Bélanger 2010). In Hải Thành, transnational marriages between local 
women and East Asian men started in the early 2000s and as of now, it is the rural community 
that has the highest number of transnational brides nationwide, estimated to be around 2500 
(21% of the population) (Duong 2013). The statistics from the Hải Thành Youth Union in 2013 
shows that Hải Thành only had 50 transnational marriages in 2011 and the number decreased to 
20 in 2012 because there were hardly any single eligible women left (Duong 2013). I will discuss 
Hải Thành’s transnational marriages in depth in chapters II and III.  
The high number of transnational brides in Hải Thành is, in part, influenced by Hải 
Thành boatpeople migration. Third-country Kiều and their remittances have created a desire 
                                                
15 Even though most Hải Thành fishermen catch squid, there are a small number of local seafood 
traders that sell the harvest to seafood companies in Hải Phòng city and China or to local 
markets.  
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among Hải Thành people for a better life elsewhere overseas. Combined with the local residents’ 
familiarity with traveling (fishing movement, boatpeople’s migration, and transnational 
marriages) and extensive social networks, the local women have developed a mental confidence 
in surviving migration. This mentality and the political economy that enables it played a 
significant part in encouraging a second wave of Việt Kiều in Hải Thành: transnational women 
who married East Asian men (Taiwanese and South Korean men). Locally, they are referred to 
as Taiwanese/Korean Kiều (Kiều Đài Loan, Hàn Quốc).  
Even though Taiwan and Korea are two main destinations of transnational marriages in 
Hải Thành, young local women also marry, through matchmakers, men from other Asian 
countries such as Hong Kong, China, Singapore, and Japan. Third-country Kiều also arrange 
fake and real marriages to enable Hải Thành residents to migrate to “third countries,” including 
Sweden, France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. In addition to 
marriages, Kiều help Hải Thành residents to go abroad through other routes such as assistance in 
getting labor contracts and studying abroad.  
Since most Hải Thành women opt to marry foreigners, Hải Thành men have no choice 
but to marry women from other places, usually remote places far from the community. Some 
local men who do not want to be fishermen have gone to big cities (like Hồ Chí Minh city, Đồng 
Nai, or Hải Phòng city) to work in factories and have met their wives there. The division 
between the rural and the urban in Vietnam is clearly manifested in the fact that almost all of 
these women who marry Hải Thành men in big cities are themselves from rural places and also 
migrated to the cities for work. Once Hải Thành men get married and have children, most of 
them decide to return to Hải Thành because the fishing industry there pays more and because 
they have an extended family to care for them and who will help take care of their own children. 
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For the majority of Hải Thành men who are fishermen, their profession cripples their ability to 
find potential spouses. The long monthly trips away from home hinder their capability to court 
non-local women and maintain the relationship. Many of them also have to resort to 
matchmakers. Ironically, their translocal marriages become very similar to the transnational 
marriages that they often criticize: there is often a matchmaker (an acquaintance of both sides), 
the bride and the groom meet briefly, and if they like each other, a wedding will be held soon 
after. These women are often from rural areas poorer than Hải Thành and some are ethnic 
minorities (Thái, Nùng, Tày and Hmong). The community at large and the women themselves 
consider translocal marriages as ‘marrying up’ for the women. Hải Thành, while still a rural 
place, is significantly wealthier than other rural localities thanks to foreign remittances and the 
profitable fishing industry. One can argue that like in transnational marriage, money also plays a 
role in translocal marriage. Additionally, once they get married, both the local and foreign 
husbands want their wives to stay home out of fear that they may become runaway wives. 
The ‘very mobile people’ of Hải Thành, including boatpeople, fishermen, transnational 
brides, translocal brides, and migrants constantly draw people in and out of Hải Thành. They 
have established a global and translocal network that people can utilize to move to Hải Thành or 
to go abroad, either through citizenship sponsorship, labor contracts, fake marriages, real 
marriages or studying abroad. Movement has become so normalized in Hải Thành that their 
residents frequently say: “Everyone runs like a horse here” (ở đây ai cũng chạy như ngựa). As a 
result, the flow of people, capital, and remittances has transformed Hải Thành from a poor rural 
commune to a place priding itself for its modernity and prosperity. 
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‘Just like the City:’ Wealth, Houses, and Distinction 
Hải Thành is well known in Hải Phòng as ‘làng Kiều’ (village of Kiều), implying 
prosperity thanks to the high number of people overseas. Yet, in addition to remittances, the 
fishing industry also contributes significantly to the commune’s financial well-being (75% of the 
commune economy) (Thành 2014). Statistically speaking, the poverty rate in Hải Thành is only 
2.63% in 2014 (75 households) (Thành 2014) compared to a national rate of 17.2% in 2012 
(World Bank 2012). The poverty rate of Hải Thành is even lower than the urban poverty rate 
(6%) and much lower than the rural povery rate (27%) (World Bank 2012). Hải Thành stands out 
among other rural communes, which are a lot poorer and mostly rely on agricultural work, in the 
rural district of Thuỷ Nguyên thanks to its wealth from the fishing industry and foreign 
remittances.  
Visually, Hải Thành does not look like a regular Vietnamese rural commune. For 
example, almost all the roads, even those connecting inner hamlets, are paved. The two main 
roads winding through the commune are filled with stores. Motorbikes, cars, and small tractors 
(xe công nông) hauling construction materials and fishing gears scuttle back and forth noisily. 
Here one also finds an abundance of cafes, bars, and restaurants. Moreover, Hải Thành has other 
businesses that rarely appear in rural Vietnam: a Vietnam Airlines ticket agency, a legal 
consulting firm for going abroad, fancy salons, fitness centers, and two discotheques. Hải Thành 
residents are proud that their commune is very similar to urban places thanks to the many social 
activities happening here. The amount of stores and shops exemplify their spending power. 
Cường, a fisherman my age who spent a few years living in Hải Phòng city, explained to me how 
Hải Thành is more like an urban than a rural place:  
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“Now we want to buy beautiful stuff. We can throw out clothes worn only a few times. 
Then we spend more money on buying good food, like seafood has to be fresh and big. And we 
go out at night, to cafes or bars. We know how to play and spend. Other rural places are 
completely dark at 7; they are not crowded and fun as here. We party like city folks.” 
Cường is not alone in being particularly proud of Hải Thành’s nightlife. Streams of 
people, young and old, couple and single, make their ways into cafes, music shows, festivals, and 
discotheques till late every night in Hải Thành. They are particularly crowded during the ten days 
when fishermen are home. Despite being at the very edge of the Bạch Đằng River, Hải Thành 
has gained a luster of being the commercial and social center for the four neighboring communes. 
On the other hand, it also attracts thieves and robbers from outside who keep a close eye on big 
houses without male presence at home.  
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Figure 1.8 Social Life in Hải Thành  
Photo credits: www.facebook.com/HaiThanhQueHuongToi 
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What is especially striking about Hải Thành, however, is its fancy, newly built houses in 
the last ten years. Were it not for patches of farmland here and there in Hải Thành, it is hard to 
tell that this is a rural commune because of the huge houses. These houses stand out for being 
typically enormous with two or three floors and flashy decorations on the outside. They are 
painted with popping colors such as green, yellow, pink. Many have marble pillars, tiled 
exteriors, giant wooden doors, and high brass gates. The aesthetic features are intentional and 
reflect the competitive spirits of owners who try to outdo each other. They admit it is “roosters 
competing with their cock-a-doodle-doos” (con gà tức nhau tiếng gáy). Thus, a newly built 
house has to be a little taller than its neighboring houses, a bit more excessive with flashier 
exteriors.  
Interestingly, it is all about the façade. The houses are often bigger than needed and I was 
surprised to find out many rooms are left unfurnished and unused. Hải Thành people do not 
spend much money on furniture and amenities and the houses often look very bare inside. Most 
will invest in buying a good set of wooden table and chairs and a flat screen TV in the living 
room. Other than that, most appliances and furniture are old and cheap and very few houses have 
a washing machine or an air conditioner even though it is burning hot in the summer. The 
importance of a house’s appearance fits well with the Vietnamese face-saving culture and marks 
the heightened awareness of social distinction in Vietnam today.  
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Figure 1.9 Houses in Hải Thành 
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The mansion-like houses in Hải Thành are a clear indicator of the residents’ physical 
movement and social mobility, linking dwelling with movement. Generally, migrants often build 
houses like mansions in the homeland to display their social statuses. For example, Chu (2010) 
and Taylor (2015) describe that Longyan and Punjabi migrants have houses in their villages that 
are mainly unoccupied. Paradoxically, it is precisely the emptiness of these houses that marks the 
distinction of abundance and wealth because only those who are rich can afford to have vacant 
houses. Similarly, most of the remittances in Hải Thành are spent on building houses for their 
parents. Their houses have become a statement—depending on how modern, how big, and how 
expensive they are—testifying to whether the family has any Kiều and how well the Kiều are 
doing overseas. But Kiều are not the only people who are competing with one another. 
Fishermen also invest in building mansion-like houses for rather similar reasons: the bigger 
houses indicate more successful fishermen and make it easier to borrow loans from the banks.  
Houses and social status in Hải Thành are so intertwined that when I came back to the 
commune in 2013, people could not help talking about a new mansion of a fisherman. This new 
house, unlike any other houses before, is five floors high, immediately visible from almost any 
location in the commune. This house raises the silent debate and gossip about distinction and 
prosperity in Hải Thành to a new level because it looks like a castle.  
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Figure 1.10 The fisherman’s house in Hải Thành 
 
Most people only see this house from the outside because the owners are rarely home, 
choosing to live on Cát Bà Island nearby for the convenience of fishing and seafood farming. Its 
mystery and luxury causes rumors about the house to spread wildly. It is said to have cost 12 
billion VND (around six million USD), half of which might have been borrowed. The owners 
supposedly went into the city to ask for an architect who would design ‘a French mansion’ for 
them. It looks almost identical to a huge mansion of a billionaire in the city. It is also rumored to 
have an elevator inside, which fits perfectly with the imagination of superiority at a new level. 
When I asked Cường about the house, he said the male owner once told him that they built the 
house “for posterity.” In other words, houses have become the most visible and lasting evidence 
of bona fide successes in Hải Thành. Houses, as a form of dwelling, connect with movement in 
Hải Thành in financially and symbolically meaningful ways. They act as a powerful, tangible 
marker of conspicuous consumption, demonstrating hierarchical travel relations—that is, they 
socially mark who moves and who does not and how well/far they move.  
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The connection between materiality (such as houses) made possible by movement and 
social distinction reveals the relationship of physical movement and social mobility in Vietnam. 
It also illustrates how social class has become a crucial social organizing aspect of Vietnamese 
society. The commonality of movement in Hải Thành is related to its history of migration, 
offshore fishing, and global networks that enable and motivate local people towards, supposedly, 
upward mobility. Yet, the movement patterns must be understood in a context of an increasingly 
stratified and neoliberal Vietnam that separates the rural from the urban, the ethnic minority from 
the Kinh majority, the working-class from the emerging middle-class and upper-middle-class. In 
the following section, I will discuss how class emerges as a very important aspect of 
contemporary Vietnam and why mobility matters for Hải Thành people in such a political 
economy. 
 
Social Classes and Stratification in Vietnam  
 Social stratification has always been commonplace in Vietnam. In the feudal period, the 
society was divided, in accordance with Confucian values, between the peasants, merchants and 
the literati class who succeeded in the madarinal examinations or participated in military service 
(Woodside 1998). With the beginning of the French colonial rule in 1883, a modern Vietnamese 
middle class emerged for the first time. This group usually consisted of businesspeople and 
entrepreneurs as well as Western-educated and professionally trained Vietnamese such as 
journalists, physicians, lawyers, clerks, and teachers (Bélanger, Drummond, and Nguyen-
Marshall 2012). However, until 1986, after the Vietnamese Communist Party took over the 
country (first North Vietnam in 1954 and later South Vietnam in 1975) the Vietnamese middle-
class was actively punished and eradicated as a result of the pervasive socialist social 
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reorganization. Similar to the Cultural Revolution in China, individuals and families identified as 
businesspeople, landowners or bourgeois had their properties confiscated, themselves sent to re-
education camps or jailed. Scholars often describe the Vietnamese society during this period as a 
fairly egalitarian society since the whole country suffered from a state of “common poverty,” a 
result of more than a hundred years of wars (Taylor 2004b). However, there were still class 
distinctions based on good- and bad-class background. Those who participated in the wars on the 
Communist side, those who were party members, and those who were peasants or workers 
belonged to the good-class background. Depending on occupation and rank, different individuals 
had different rations of daily and monthly necessities from the state such as rice, meat, oil, sugar, 
clothes, etc. (MacLean 2008).  
The persistent poverty and famines after the American War led to the implementation of 
Đổi Mới reform in 1986 that moved Vietnam from a command economy to a market economy 
officially referred to as market socialism. Like in many Eastern European countries, the 
Vietnamese citizens moved from worker-citizens to consumer-citizens (Dunn (Vann 2012, Dunn 
2004, Verdery 1996). The consequences of Đổi Mới reform can easily be seen in terms of social 
classes with the reemergence of the Vietnamese middle-class and the sharp increase of social 
inequalities. The reemerged Vietnamese middle-class is often identified by certain consumption 
practices and lifestyles such as shopping, using ATM machines, going to fitness clubs, living in 
high-rise apartments, having second or “weekend” houses in the countryside, etc. (Drummond 
2012, Leshkowich 2012a, To 2012, Truitt 2012). Even though the Vietnamese state avoids the 
term middle-class, it often describes consumption practices and its practitioners as “modern,” 
“urban,” and “normal” (Vann 2012). This points to how social differences are mapped onto 
physical spaces, especially between the rural and the urban.  
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Social inequality has increased substantially in the last 25 years since Đổi Mới, 
motivating the widening gap not only between urban and rural areas and but also along class, 
gender, and ethnic axes. Statistics from the government and research in Vietnam have indicated 
that social inequalities are indeed growing. According to Nguyen Manh Hung (2003), in the 
2000s, Vietnamese families in the richest five percent of the population earned an average of 20 
times more than those in the poorest five percent. A child born in a poor household was 7.5 times 
more likely to be severely stunted due to malnutrition than a child born in a rich family (Koch 
and Linh 2001). More than 40 percent of children from poor households dropped out of 
secondary schools (Vo, Truong, and Nguyen 2001). Women are half as likely as men to be in 
salaried employment and are paid only 78 percent of the amount earned by men. Ethnic 
minorities are faced with problems of lower incomes, higher rates of poverty, poorer health, and 
lower school attendance (Taylor 2004b). 
 The gap in standards of living and poverty between rural and urban areas stands out as 
the most observable. People living in rural areas earn less than half of what is earned by those 
living in urban areas (General Statistical Office 2003). More than 90 percent of those living in 
poverty dwell in rural areas (Fan et al. 2004). This gap is largely the result of major socio-
economic changes since Đổi Mới. After 1986, the unit of the economy moved away from the 
state and collectives to households. This policy shift was accompanied by the dismantling of the 
state subsidy system. In the 1990s, the Vietnamese state introduced a policy called “Socialization” 
(Xã hội hoá), a user-paying policy requiring individuals and households to contribute to funding 
social services that were formerly provided by the state, including education, healthcare, and 
agricultural and cultural activities. For most Vietnamese, the “socialization” of state services was 
basically a form of privatization and life became about the survival of the fittest (Luong 2003). 
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The rural poor in Vietnam have become socially and economically excluded. For example, 
declines in the price of rice, dependence on commodity markets, the rising cost of inputs (e.g., 
fertilizer, pesticide, machines, hired labor), and the ending of state subsidies have made farming 
unprofitable, “a guaranteed way to become poor” (Taylor 2007). Moreover, mounting fees for 
health and schooling coupled with insufficient incomes have led to rising debt and many farmers, 
consequently, have to sell their land and become hired laborers (Taylor 2004b).  
 While the rural areas are struggling, the urban areas in Vietnam are growing rapidly. 
Processes of industrialization, capitalism and heavy investment have created high-paying jobs, a 
heightened sense of consumerism, and changed urban landscapes. According to Taylor (2004), 
professionals working in urban corporate sectors can earn more than $1000 a month. More than 
just economic differences, it is significant that in Vietnam, as in many places around the world, 
the urban has replaced the rural as the national cultural center that sets social values. The ethics 
of individualism, market values, prosperity, and privatism have replaced those of sacrifice to the 
collective. The pursuit of prosperity has become the standard of what it means to be a modern 
Vietnamese (Bélanger, Drummond, and Nguyen-Marshall 2012, Vann 2012). Also, while in the 
pre-Đổi Mới period, the Communist state praised the ethics of farmers and their rural-based 
values, now rural people are seen as backward and irrational. Official development reports often 
describe rural people as poor, unaware, unconnected, and dependent on the state for their uplift, 
which reflects the paternalistic attitude of the Vietnamese state towards the poor. In contrast, city 
(middle- and upper-class) people are regarded as agents of change, bringing a new ethos of 
modernity to Vietnam (To 2012, Higgins 2008, Taylor 2007). What is important is that rural 
people have started to internalize these discourses, often calling themselves poor, describing 
  
70 
farming as an occupation for the poor, and characterizing their lifestyles (religious beliefs, 
housing styles) as signs of deprivation (Taylor 2007, 2004b).  
 
Being In-Between and the Desires to Move 
Within this context of the increasingly stratified gap between the rural and the urban, Hải 
Thành is a rare well-to-do rural community. However, the wealth of people in Hải Thành has put 
them in an awkward liminal position between the “backward” rural working-class Vietnamese 
and the new modern urban middle-class Vietnamese. Hải Thành people are still rural, yet their 
incomes rival those of urbanites, and they constantly remind me of that fact by showing that they 
have nhà tầng (houses of multiple floors), xe xịn (expensive scooters), quán đêm (a night life), 
etc. But to most Vietnamese, Hải Thành people are still second-class citizens: rural folks with a 
working-class profession as fishermen. Despite their wealth, Hải Thành residents believe that 
they are not respected. While Hải Thành people are proud of their on-par-with-the-city living 
standards, they also bitterly complain about being looked down on by city folk. Cường, my 
fisherman friend, felt it deeply.  
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Figure 1.11 Youth gathered outside of a café in the evening 
 
I first met Cường through another fisherman and seeing that he seemed so friendly, I 
asked if he could show me around the newly built local port. Cường said he would be working 
on a boat the next day and I could come if I wanted. When I arrived, nobody was seen on deck 
but Cường emerged from below 15 minutes later after fixing the engine; his shirt torn and his 
hands were covered in black oil. He apologized for the delay of our tour. I asked if Cường owned 
the boat and as I commented on how talented and young he was to be the owner, he looked at me 
and said, “You don’t understand; nobody believes I am a boat owner. Look at my sun-tanned skin, 
covered in oil. Look at my fishing clothes. People do not believe I have money. A rural rich is 
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less than a city peddler (giàu nhà quên không bằng ngồi lê thành phố). Even a beggar or a 
rickshaw driver is proud because they are city people. They don’t have money like me but they 
still say to me ‘Fuck those rural folks. I’m urban and you are still rural’”  
This is an example of how the Vietnamese are experiencing a high form of social 
stratification, especially between the rural and the urban areas. Erik Harms notes that the 
opposition between rural and urban in Vietnam acts as indexes of social differences, from social 
lifestyles, differential access to health care and education to poverty and living standards (Harms 
2011). Moreover, the spatial binary of the rural/urban is often mapped onto the temporal binary 
of the modern/backward. Urban people generally look down on rural people as uneducated, 
uncivilized, uncultured, and crude (Harms 2011, Taylor 2001). The Vietnamese government has 
launched campaigns to “civilize” the rural in order to meet the goals of urbanization, 
development, and progress. This public denigration of the rural diverges sharply from the 
communist idealization of peasants and workers during the Vietnamese revolution and high 
socialism from 1945 to 1986 (Harms 2011).  
Although the hierarchy between the rural and urban is long-standing (from the French 
colonial discourse of civilizing the fringe to the modern day discourse of urbanization), 
Vietnamese studies scholars have shown that the meanings of such difference can be shifting. 
The rural Vietnam, while being deprecated as backward, is also at times celebrated as the true 
guardian of Vietnamese tradition and purity,16 not yet polluted by capitalism (Harms 2011, 
Nguyen-Vo 2008, Taylor 2001). In fact, “the rural” and “the urban” work mostly as idealizations 
as the meaning of the rural and the urban depends on what people in the present politically want 
                                                
16 The belief that the rural is moral matters much in Hải Thành. In later chapters, I will discuss 
how the Hải Thành youngsters are morally judged because they have embodied “modern” 
behaviors. 
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to do with the representation of the past (backward vs. tradition) and the future (modern vs. 
corrupted) (Harms 2011, Nguyen-Vo 2008, Taylor 2001).  
Such shifting meanings enable people living in the border between the rural and the urban 
to develop what Erik Harms calls social edginess that cuts both ways. For some, the edge 
represents being pushed to social and economic exclusion while for others, it enables creative 
social actions to manipulate the idealizations of the rural/urban binary and create opportunities in 
their lives (Harms 2011).  The edginess becomes empowering when people can transcend the 
binaries themselves. On the other hand, it becomes limiting when people are bound by the 
binaries (Harms 2011). This sense of edginess can be observed in Hải Thành itself where the 
feeling of liminality between the rural and urban intensifies local people’s aspiration to move out 
of it both physically and socially. However, as I will demonstrate in my research, while some are 
successful in their efforts (such as transnational women), others often feel trapped and resentful 
(such as fishermen).  
In Vietnam, there exists a strong connection between rural people and the supposed lack 
of education. The Vietnamese use the terms uncultured and uncivilized (không có văn hoá, văn 
minh) interchangeably with uneducated (vô học) to describe impolite behaviors and “funny” 
dressing, both of which are often associated with rural people. In other words, rural people are 
presumed to be lowly educated, thus they do not know how to act and dress properly (in 
Bourdieu’s term, they belong to the lower class and lack the class sophistication). Hải Thành 
residents themselves internalize this link between education, rurality, and class. They believe that 
they are looked down on not only because they are rural but also because they are not well 
educated. As we shall see later in the dissertation, the lack of education comes up frequently as 
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explanations for the commonplace of ‘unacceptable’ behaviors of Hải Thành youth (chapter II), 
and the bad reputation of transnational marriages (chapter V).  
Being in this liminal place, rural and low level of education yet financially comfortable, 
creates in most Hải Thành residents a feeling of being ignored. They have strongly demonstrated 
this sentiment through expressing several types of bitter complaints. They complain about not 
being rich enough to compete with the city people in getting loans from the state-owned banks, 
having enough money for bribery when their children apply for jobs in cities, or educated enough 
to deal with local authorities. Yet, they are wealthier than most other fishing villages so they do 
not receive enough financial support from the state to be able to be successful in fishing despite 
all the talk on TV about the growing importance of the fishing industry. “On my own” (tự mình) 
has been the most common local statement of pride as well as resentment.  
The liminal position of local people makes them very aware of the boundaries between 
which they are sandwiched. This awareness is further sharpened by their interaction with a large 
number of family members and neighbors who have become the privileged Việt Kiều. Not only 
are Hải Thành people stuck between the urban middle-class and the rural working-class, they are 
also the in-between of the international/national dichotomy. They remain at home but have 
unusually strong ties to foreign countries, lifestyles, and currencies since so many family 
members and neighbors reside abroad. Their awareness of being stuck and being ignored fuels 
their desire to transcend these boundaries, especially given their perception of the lives of Việt 
Kiều being desirable and how their own lives are so much better through remittances from Việt 
Kiều who have successfully crossed the boundaries. This acute awareness of class, as we shall 
see in the next chapters, might explain why, unlike the stereotypical poor community, a well-to-
do Hải Thành continues sending so many women overseas through transnational marriages. This 
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is why movement and its expected social mobility are such crucial aspects in this community and 
why there is so much movement in a small rural place. Movement has become key to 
understanding how Hải Thành people organize their lives, make sense of their standing within 
society, and hope to transcend class boundaries.  
The desires for physical and social mobility in Hải Thành are reflected in the following 
story. Six months into living in the commune, I accompanied Cường’s aunt to a wedding 
between her relative – a man named Kiệt – and a Vietnamese Canadian woman, Tracy Nguyễn. 
Kiệt’s extended family in Canada had arranged this marriage so that Kiệt could later apply for a 
spousal visa to migrate to Canada. Cường’s aunt told me that the family had to pay Tracy 40,000 
Canadian dollars. However, when Tracy met Kiệt, she liked him enough to agree to make this 
fake marriage real and later returned all the money. Kiệt, on the other hand, was not happy with 
his soon-to-be real wife.  
Tracy’s family was originally from southern Vietnam and she spoke with a southern 
accent. Moreover, she was a big woman. In the wedding, I heard people gossiping about Tracy. 
They said that southern women were lazy and not as hardworking as northern women; they 
implied that Tracy would be more interested in spending money than taking care of her husband. 
They even criticized her weight and remarked that she was so big that she would need to sit on 
two chairs, not one. Later when we were dining at the wedding, Kiệt’s father and mother stopped 
to greet us at the table. Cường’s aunt asked them how Kiệt felt about the wedding, the father 
responded that Kiệt was not very thrilled now that the marriage was real, not fake anymore. 
However, Kiệt’s father added, “I told him – if you don’t marry her, you want to marry an angel?” 
(Mày không lấy nó thì mày đòi lấy tiên à). Essentially, Kiệt’s father conveyed that this 
  
76 
opportunity to migrate to Canada was so great that any complaint (even a complaint of marrying 
a woman one did not like) was ridiculous, just like wanting to marry an angel.   
The desires for transnational migration are so strong because of the assumed status and 
capital that it brings forth. Following normal Vietnamese customs, I gave the couple an envelope 
with money inside as a wedding present. However, other Hải Thành residents told me later that I 
did not need to give money to those who marry people from abroad because they already have a 
lot of money. It is well known in Hải Thành, even though I was unaware, that weddings between 
locals and overseas Vietnamese or foreign men require no monetary presents. These norms speak 
to the perceived causal connection between movement and social mobility and the aspirations for 
leaving in Hải Thành. They also explain the very high number of locals leaving this small rural 
commune. 
The situation of movement in Hải Thành is unique but not surprising as the two emerging 
social processes of movement and class are increasingly intertwining at the particular nexus of 
history, geography and political economy in Vietnam. The relationship between movement and 
class is mutual: movement supposedly results in certain upward mobility and class is thus 
reflected in movement. For example, the rural are usually internal migrants considered to be 
uprooted, backward, problematic and in need of catching up. The Việt Kiều are transnational 
migrants, thus upward and ahead (Harms 2013, Huynh and Nonneman 2012, Small 2012b, Dang, 
Tacoli, and Hoang 2003, Hardy 2003b). In other words, not all movements are equal. The 
intimately interconnected relationship between social mobility and physical movement will be 
explored through the stories of people who move and who do not move in Hải Thành, those who 
have achieved their class aspirations and those who have not. These stories will reveal that the 
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relationship between physical movement and social mobility is not simply linear, but rather that 
movement, just like social class, is differentiated.  
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Part II 
 
GENDERING MARRIAGE MIGRATION: YOUTHFUL BEAUTY, 
EDUCATION, AND CLASS IN RURAL VIETNAM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
79 
Chapter II 
The Pretty Modern: ‘Outer’ vs. ‘Inner’ Beauty 
 
Anh ơi, trót xấu vô duyên  
Đạ vào phận gái để phiền lòng anh 
Xuân về cho bưởi nở hoa 
Ngờ đâu con gió hoa đà héo khô 
...  
Xin đừng nhiếc móc nhiều lời 
Con người có thế miệng đời mới chê 
Em xin giữ đứa con thơ 
Ngày mai khôn lớn đợi chờ ngày mai  
Ngày mai khôn lớn lên rồi 
Tìm người hạnh phúc chọn người đẹp khôn  
My dear, unfortunately I don’t have the beauty and charm 
Making you upset when you had to marry me 
When spring comes, the grapefruit flowers blossom 
Who knows that a wind has dried them out? 
… 
Please don’t berate or complain 
I know it’s my fault you are ridiculed 
I will keep this young child 
Waiting for the day he grows up 
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He will be a grownup tomorrow 
And will look for his happiness in a beautiful woman. 
 
During the American War, Mạn departed his home in Hải Thành to join the army. He left 
behind a newly married wife and a young son. His regiment marched to the South and no one 
heard from him for the longest time. Many months after, his letter finally arrived. It was 
addressed to his wife who had been worriedly waiting. His words to her, first in a very long time, 
were expressions of his disappointment in her and her appearance. Embarrassed and saddened, 
his wife composed a poem, quoted above, to acknowledge how her appearance made him 
ridiculed and failed to bring him happiness, and to hope that her son would not repeat the 
mistake his father had made. Her son should “look for happiness in a beautiful woman.” 
This story highlights the importance of beauty17 for women and their marriages in 
Vietnam. It makes an interesting antidote to the usual undermining of appearance as trivial and 
emphasis on inner virtues as essential in Vietnamese culture. Even though appearance is one of 
the four qualities, along with usefulness, articulation, and morality (công, dung, ngôn, hạnh), that 
an ideal traditional Vietnamese woman possesses, too much focus on appearance is often judged 
as being vain and shallow. However, beauty for many rural women, including Mạn’s wife, is no 
inconsequential matter. My study in Hải Thành demonstrates that beauty, in close relationship 
with age, plays an important role in “elevating” the social status of girls, enabling them to get 
married transnationally and thus, significantly change their lives. Second, beauty is a site of 
investment in the future of transnational marriage and life abroad but requires maintenance in the 
present. And third, beauty practice is how the local girls exercise what Fiske (1993) calls “weak 
                                                
17 I analyze (outer) beauty as both physical features as well as acquired fashion styles that 
include clothes, cosmetics, and accessories. 
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power”: a localizing form of power that enables the girls to change their lives without changing 
the larger and oppressive gender structure. Before I get to the stories of Hải Thành women and 
their beauty practices, I first discuss the construction of Vietnamese femininity and its alignment 
with morality.  
 
Between Sacrifice And Desire: Femininity and Morality in Vietnam 
Ashley Pettus, in her book “Between Sacrifice and Desire: National Identity and the 
Governing of Femininity in Vietnam,” documents how Vietnamese women have been the 
symbols and tools for the national quest of sovereignty and modernity. For centuries before 
Western colonialism, folk heroines, whose military triumphs marked the tradition of Vietnamese 
resistance against the Chinese, were among the Vietnamese pantheon of historical figures. Under 
French colonialism in the 20th century, the Communist Party saw women as the vehicle for anti-
imperialist struggle, proclaiming that women were the “slaves of the slaves” and thereby linking 
women’s emancipation to the Vietnamese people’s freedom from feudal and capitalist rule 
(Pettus 2003, Marr 1984). Ho Chi Minh regarded women as embodying the values and 
aspirations of the new socialist society that ensured equality and sovereignty.18 The result was a 
double burden for Vietnamese women: on the one hand, Vietnamese women, similar to women 
in many other Asian countries, were assigned by nationalist movements to the spiritual domain 
where their practices and behaviors signified the cultural “essence” and “authenticity” against the 
influence of the West. On the other hand, they also needed to transform from being the most 
“backward” members (because of such assumed cultural attributes as greed, superstition, 
ignorance, dishonesty, and pettiness) to being skilled socialist workers as evidence of 
                                                
18 The Communists were not the only ones that embraced gender equality. The intellectuals of 
the Tự Lực Văn Đoàn and Thơ Mới movements shared a similar ideology about gender.  
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Vietnamese society transforming from a feudal agrarian to a modern, industrial country. 
Egalitarian relationships at home and work, equal inheritance between sons and daughters, and 
making polygamy illegal were affirmed in the laws.  
However, the government and its institutions produced patriarchal structures, thereby 
undermining their own gender ideologies (Wiegersma 1988). For example, the agricultural point 
system in collectives gave more value to men’s labor than women’s labor. In the political 
system, patriarchy was reinforced as the organizing principle of society as kinship membership 
determined access to leadership positions. Ironically, while the Communist Party was committed 
to the socialist discourse of gender equality, in reality it replaced one form of patriarchy with 
another. As women were encouraged to have educational and professional advancement, their 
femininity was also redefined in Confucian terms. The dutiful daughters, devoted wives, and 
sacrificing mothers were the foundation of a national morality because women’s virtues such as 
faithfulness, endurance, compassion, and self-sacrifice were hailed as invaluable to the national 
cause of building a socialist nation (Pettus 2003).19 
Yet, as the collective economy collapsed and the market reform, Renovation (Đổi Mới), 
began in 1986, Vietnamese women again found themselves to be the terrain on which the 
government and the wider public have sought to define what should constitute “national 
traditions” in the face of global capitalist integration. With the market reform, the nuclear family 
suddenly became fundamentally important to national wealth and development. Local collectives 
no longer existed, free trade was allowed, and household-based production turned to be the norm 
(Luong 2003). But as the important role of household has increased, the threats to its stability 
                                                
19 Despite evidence that patriarchy persisted, the Communist Party did succeed in partly 
improving women’s status and position in the society during the post-war socialist period 
(Bélanger and Liu 2004, Knodel and Jones 1996, Eisen 1984, Werner 1981). 
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have also become a more major concern . The Vietnamese state decried gambling, drug use, 
prostitution as social evils that jeopardized “civilized” families. It once again sought women to 
provide the buffer against the corrupting influences of the market and to protect as well as foster 
self-sufficient households. It promoted a vision of modernity based on the “civilized” and 
middle-class family that harmonized the contradiction between economic policy and political 
ideology. This was done by combining Confucian values of filial piety, devotion, and 
faithfulness with scientific standards of modern households (hygiene, proper nutrition, good 
parenting, birth control) and economic comfort. Vietnamese women were again relegated to 
keeping traditional roles as nurturing mothers, devoted wives, and skilled housekeepers (that 
implied cooking, hygiene practices, dress style, etc.) at the expense of the socialist ideals of 
gender equality (Pettus 2003, Werner and Bélanger 2002, Gammeltoft 1999). The tensions 
between the market economy and socialist ideals, between aspirations for modernity and fear of 
cultural loss are reflected in conflicting representations of Vietnamese women: as evidence of the 
human cost of market transition as well as the symbol of modernity (Pettus 2003).  
As Gammeltoft observes, the emphasis on family is not new (it is in line with Confucian 
ideology), but the way it is approached by the Vietnamese state is systematic. It is introduced by 
law (the 1987 Law on Marriage and Family and the 1992 Constitution describe the family as the 
cell of the society), which is then disseminated in the media and reinforced by government 
bodies such as the Women’s Union and the Youth Union. Women are taught by the media how 
to bring up children, how to treat their husbands and parents-in-law, how to preserve and protect 
the family’s happiness through one’s self-sacrifice. Then they participate in the competition 
organized by the Women’s Union where their knowledge is tested (Gammeltoft 1999). The 
construction of women as being responsible for the happiness and health of the family results in 
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the representation of women as belonging to the domestic domain ((Nguyen-Vo 2008, 2002, 
Pettus 2003). Yet, it is also necessary for women to venture out of the domestic sphere to 
participate in the workforce so as to increase their families’ well-being. Vietnamese women are 
faced with the increasing tension and conflicting social pressure of juggling the demands of work 
and family. As women in Khuat, Bui, and Le’s studies declare, “[t]o be good at public and 
domestic work, I need three heads and six hands” (2012, 191). 
Vietnamese women have always been crucial in conditioning the population in a post-war 
period of ideological uncertainty and economic collapse. They are the morality bearers of 
authentic Vietnamese culture against Western influence as well as the symbol of a modern 
Vietnam. In the Đổi Mới era, the Vietnamese ideal types of self-sacrificing woman, faithful wife, 
dutiful daughter, and devoted mother are both challenged and reproduced (Truong 2009, 
Drummond and Rydstrom 2004, Pettus 2003). Their double standards are summarized by Pettus:  
 
The questions of female character, duty, and behavior that have become central to the current 
dilemmas of national identity in Vietnam are rooted in earlier struggles for national independence 
and modernity, which established women’s deep cultural responsibility to uphold the shifting 
ideals of the nation (Pettus 2003, 7). 
 
With such heavy responsibilities, what is it like for women who do not meet the ideals? 
To answer this question, I turn to young women of Hải Thành, who, on the surface, seem to 
blatantly defy the moral standards of Vietnamese women.  
 
The Modern Beautiful Rural Girls 
In Vietnam, as in many other parts of the globe, the phrase “modern rural” seems like an 
oxymoron because it violates the cultural mapping of rural/backward and urban/modern. Yet Hải 
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Thành proves to be a place of surprises. When I first came to the commune, I was amused at the 
transformation of the streets from day to night. During the day, the residents look like regular 
rural people with working, non-fancy clothes. I often spot women wearing conical hats (nón) 
typically associated with rurality. The night, however, brings forth a different Hải Thành. All of 
a sudden, Hải Thành residents dress up to go out to cafes, restaurants, karaoke bars, street shops, 
or to each other’s houses. Men wear shoes instead of flip flops, pants instead of shorts, and 
change into clean shirts. Women put on make-up and wear jeans, skirts or dresses. Hải Thành’s 
night life was lively and vibrant for a rural commune with lights, shops, and activities. But it is 
the young women who caught my attention because they dress even better than many city girls. 
As we shall see, the young women of Hải Thành broke the rural women’s stereotypes as they 
strived for a global/Korean ideal of modernity and fashion.    
From this part on, I will consciously use the term “girls” to describe the young women in 
Hải Thành (usually from 16 years old to 21 years old) because that is how they are addressed in 
Hải Thành (gái Hải). Furthermore, in Vietnam, a female is a girl (con gái) until she gets married; 
therefore only a married female becomes a woman (đàn bà). Girl, in Vietnamese culture, signals 
a liminal stage of no longer a child but not yet a (married) woman. It is a contested space, and 
similar to many other cultures, being a girl indicates “unstable and sometimes subversive 
relationships to social norms relating to heterosexuality, marriage, and motherhood” (The 
Modern Girl Around the World Research Group 2008, 9). This contested and potentially 
disruptive status of a “girl” manifests in a wide range of practices and behaviors of the girls in 
Hải Thành, from consuming to partying, from beauty practices to sexual activities. The girls in 
Hải Thành both reinforce and challenge gender and social norms and, for this, they are both 
tolerated and criticized. 
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I got to know some of the girls in Hải Thành by taking Korean language classes with 
them. My classmates learned Korean because they had already married Korean men (and wished 
to pass their language tests) or they wanted to marry Korean men in the future. In Hải Thành, 
Nga is the only Korean teacher and everyday except for the weekends we gathered at her house 
for two hours of Korean. Nga, 32, learned Korean at a university in Hải Phòng city and has been 
teaching in Hải Thành since the phenomenon of transnational marriages began in the mid 2000s. 
She has gained a reputation of being a good teacher and has taught all groups of people in Hải 
Thành wanting to learn Korean: parents preparing to visit their daughters in Korea, children soon 
to be united with their mothers in Korea, men going to Korea on labor contracts, or young 
women who marry Korean men. Nga herself has a sister who married a Korean and her mother, 
at the time I was taking classes, had gone to Korea to visit Nga’s sister. Being personally and 
professionally involved, Nga knows all the details about the transnational marriages and the girls 
that married and how well they have been doing. Nga has a sharp sense of humor and easy-going 
personality, making her classes a safe place for her students to talk and gossip about life desires, 
marriages, and other girls. It is in Nga’s classes that I learned not only Korean but also how the 
local young girls discussed and performed gendered modernity as well as how they were 
evaluated.  
I met Hoa, then 21 years old, in one of my Korean classes. Unlike most other girls in Hải 
Thành, Hoa went to Hải Phòng to attend college for a year before she dropped out and returned 
home to learn Korean, determined to marry a Korean man soon. By Vietnamese standards, Hoa 
is very pretty with a slender body, big eyes, a sharp nose, and fair, smooth skin.20 When she put 
                                                
20 As I will discuss in more details in chapter VI, fair skin is a major indicator of beauty in 
Vietnamese culture. Many of the young girls in Hải Thành have fair skin because they are often 
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on her nice clothes, she looked very much like the Korean girls she admires. Sometimes, when 
the summer heat became unbearable in my teacher’s bedroom, which also functioned as a 
classroom, we stopped learning. Instead, we lay on our teacher’s bed and talked about hot local 
girls and fashion. One day, as we were discussing the current Korean trend of skirts, Hoa pulled 
out her phone and showed the class photos of how she imitated the Korean fashion with her 
miniskirt:21 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – Facebook photos 
 
In this picture, Hoa looked very different from most rural Vietnamese girls. She wore 
make-up, heels, a mini skirt, pantyhose, sunglasses, and a purse. She had her nails done and she 
did the popular duckface. What made her particularly trendy and fashionable was the style of 
                                                                                                                                                       
dispensed with having to do agricultural work due to the small amount of land in Hải Thành and 
the relative wealth from overseas remittances and fishing revenues. 
21 I mainly used photographs posted publicly on Facebook by the girls themselves rather than the 
photos I took of them in this chapter because I want to show how they choose to represent 
themselves. 
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sunglasses (aviator) and sweater (perforated, which, according to my fashion expert friend, 
Annie, “screams the Kardashians”). My friend also complimented Hoa on her choice of color: 
the sweater was nicely contrasted with the cobalt blue purse. Hoa also chose to wear the skirt and 
pantyhoses in one black color, making her look taller and skinnier. What is striking to me in the 
first photo is that Hoa was standing in front of a Buddhist pagoda. Generally speaking, when a 
Vietnamese goes to a pagoda, he/she should dress conservatively; wearing a short bottom is 
considered as disrespectful. Thus, the first photo appears to represent Hoa’s disregard for 
tradition, emphasizing even more her “modernity.” 
My teacher, Nga, and classmates immediately complimented Hoa’s photos. Two 
classmates said they were jealous that she looked so beautiful and wondered if she had 
photoshopped the pictures. Another exclaimed that Hoa was even prettier with her fashionable 
outfit, how could men resist her? My teacher concluded that Hoa was “delicious, nutritious (for 
the eyes), and cheap (because her outfit does not cost much money)” (ngon, bổ, và rẻ), using a 
common Vietnamese phrase of describing food to comment on Hoa. Implicitly, they implied that 
Hoa is like great food waiting to be eaten by men, linking the role of beauty and marriages for 
Hải Thành girls, a topic I will later elaborate.  
Hoa’s style, however, is not unique in Hải Thành. Rather, it is quite typical. Most of the 
Hải Thành girls, whom I know and have seen, cultivate a similar look. This look can be 
summarized as follows: heavy make-up, well-done hair, fashionable dress or skirt, high-heel 
shoes, and sunglasses (but usually cheap copies of the original22). This style is so widely adopted 
that it has become a dress code for young girls in Hải Thành. The Facebook pages of my 
                                                
22 This is an important marker of the girls’ social class as well as their attempts to cross the class 
boundary. I will explain the class issues later in this chapter. 
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classmates are full of photos (posted publicly) with the same look and they usually attract 
lengthy compliments and garner 70 or more “likes”:  
 
 
Figure 2.2 – Facebook Selfie Photos 
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Figure 2.3 – Facebook Photos 
The girls in Hải Thành resonate well with the descriptions of the modern girls that 
appeared in the early 20th century around the world: 
“The Modern Girl emerged quite literally around the world in the first half of the twentieth 
century. In cities from Beijing to Bombay, Tokyo to Berlin, Johannesburg to New York, the 
Modern Girl made her sometimes flashy, always fashionable appearance. What identified Modern 
Girls was their use of specific commodities and their explicit eroticism. … Adorned in 
provocative fashions, in pursuit of romantic love, Modern Girls appeared to disregard roles of 
dutiful daughter, wife, and mother. Contemporary journalists, politicians, social scientists, and the 
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general public debated whether Modern Girls were looking for sexual, economic, or political 
emancipation” (The Modern Girl around the World Research Group 2008, 1). 
Similar to these modern girls around the world, the young girls in Hải Thành are 
considered to be modern and stylish (sành điệu) by local people and neighboring communes. 
They are identified with their Korean-styled fashion and, as we shall see later, eroticism. 
However, what makes them different from the modern girls described in the aforementioned 
book is that they are from a rural place. The wealth of Hải Thành as well as the easy prospect of 
transnational migration make Korean fashion desirable and affordable and certain “risqué” 
lifestyles possible for girls growing up in this rural community. In that sense, Hải Thành girls are 
distinctive from both other rural Vietnamese women and urban Vietnamese women, thus 
occupying a liminal space between rural and urban while bridging the local and the global 
through their bodies and lifeways. 
 
Femininity and Modernity 
This modern girl’s look in Hải Thành, surprising as it might be, does not just come out of 
nowhere but reflects convergences of femininity and modernity. Major socio-economic and 
political changes in Vietnamese society in the last 70 years have put women and their look in the 
spotlight. The establishment of the nuclear family as the norm, the socialist policies that allowed 
both men and women to receive education and join the work force in integrated public spaces, 
and the emergence of an urban culture targeting the young (Barbieri and Bélanger 2009, Pettus 
2003) have enabled young women to play new roles in public spaces. These public roles for 
women resulted in unprecedented visibility and a shift in representation. Vietnamese women, 
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like women in many other societies, were often called on to maintain the image of the nation 
(Pettus 2003).  
This modernist aesthetics now adopted in Hải Thành takes root from the Party’s effort to 
project a socialist national image on Vietnamese women’s attire in the 1970s. Vietnamese 
women, while warned against the immodesty of Western beauty, were encouraged to refashion 
Western styles for a modern life. By 1990s, women in Hanoi had abandoned “poor peasant 
clothes” in favor of Western dresses and skirts (Pettus 2003). Beauty knowledge and practices 
such as how to make up, how to dress, and how to choose accessories are widely distributed in 
books, newspapers, and online websites targeting women. For example, the book titled Modern 
Women of the 21st Century (Phụ nữ hiện đại thế kỷ XXI) spends almost 200 pages teaching 
women beauty tips. VNExpress, the most popular online newspaper in Vietnam, publishes daily 
on fashion.  
In the case of Hải Thành girls, not only do they put on modernity markers such as 
clothes, sunglasses, and make-up, they also carefully craft their appearance not according to 
urban Vietnamese women’s standards or Western standards, but to Taiwanese and Korean 
fashion. Facebook has become an informal market place where Hải Thành girls who have 
migrated to Taiwan and Korea sell cheaply-made Korean style clothes, beauty products, and 
accessories to those still at home. While adhering to the modern look that promotes youthful 
femininity with foreign aesthetics and commodities, the modern girl ideals in Hải Thành are 
locally recognized as embodiments of an East Asian style thanks to the huge number of 
marriages between Hải Thành women and East Asian men. Therefore, there are not as many 
varieties in the modern girl looks in Hải Thành as there are in major Vietnamese cities.   
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The Modern Girl Around the World Research Group (2008) argues that the modern girl 
needs to be examined as a style and performance that can be appropriated by women. They 
identify key features of the modern girls’ representations that I find very similar in the case of 
Hải Thành girls, including visual representations, desire for commodities, conspicuous 
consumption, and eroticism.  
Regarding visual representations, the research group argues that being seen is 
quintessential to women and men who consider themselves “modern.” Their research shows that 
women had used photography, painting, drawing, and literary representation to stage the self 
since the 19th century (Weinbaum et al. 2008). Likewise, Vu Trong Phung depicted the modern 
Vietnamese in the 1930s as they frequented public places such as city streets, offices, department 
stores, beaches, ballrooms, tennis courts, and café clubs (Zinoman 2002). Hải Thành girls also 
make sure that they are being seen publicly. They dress up and ride scooters along the main 
street of the commune every night before going into night clubs, cafes, and street shops. Hoa 
explained to me that there is a significant difference between staying home and going out: once 
she goes out, she has to put on her best look because she is seen. Local girls often go out at night 
so that they can wear dresses and skirts without worrying that the hot sun during the day makes 
them tanned. Having a light complexion is an important component of Vietnamese beauty.23 
Besides public appearances, selfies and photos are taken and posted everyday (sometimes several 
times a day) on Facebook with sentimental, self-focused titles, often with grammar mistakes,24 
and are almost always posted with a public setting.  
                                                
23 The importance of light skin and the social hierarchy it creates is especially poignant for those 
who do not have light skin. I will discuss the conflation of race and ethnicity with social class in 
chapter VI on translocal women. 
24 Examples of their titles include: this place is unusually peaceful (nơi này bình yên đến lạ 
thường), hi beautiful September (chào tháng 9 sinh tươi), selfie of me today (em của ngày hôm 
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More than simply being seen, it is important for the girls in Hải Thành to be seen 
beautifully as mentioned in Hoa’s explanation to me. The girls dress up when going out. Their 
pictures are usually photoshopped using photo-editing apps such as Photo Wonder before they 
are uploaded on Facebook. This practice is not simply individualistic but also follows the 
dominant ideology promoted by the Vietnamese state: đẹp khoe, xấu che (show the 
beautiful/good, hide the ugly/bad) (Hien 2012). Hien’s study of the beauty regime and photo 
studios in Vietnam demonstrates that beauty is regarded as something that must be 
manufactured, through acts of edition that remove the ugliness. The digital photo businesses has 
been booming in Vietnam thanks to the mission of making beautiful (làm đẹp) or turning the 
impossible into the possible (biến cái không thể thành có thể) (Hien 2012). Their service used to 
be exclusive to affluent urban consumers, but with the availability of smart phones, rural girls in 
Hải Thành can possess self-enhancement tools (like the Photo Wonder app) to create their 
desirable look.    
Barbara Sato, in her writing on the Japanese Modern Girl, asserts that visual 
representations of modern girls in popular women’s magazines made it possible for less 
privileged and rural women to partake in their appeal (Sato 2008). I believe that Facebook plays 
the same role in allowing Hải Thành girls to participate and transform themselves into modern 
girls. Pictures of Hải Thành girls dressing fashionably in Korea and Taiwan after their marriages 
are posted daily, proudly, and abundantly. Moreover, the advertisements that sell clothes and 
commodities in Korean styles on Facebook enable Hải Thành girls to learn, buy, and dress like 
                                                                                                                                                       
nay, tự xướng), cold, tired but why still feeling happy (lạnh, mệt nhưng sao lại thấy vuj), feelings 
that can’t be expressed into words (cảm xúc không thể giễn tả bằng lời), post a picture to 
remember the sweater torn apart by the dog (đăng cái ảnh để tưởng nhớ cái áo bị chó cắn), look 
at me and (can’t) say you don’t need me :’) – feeling cute (nhjn` em và nój không cần đj :’) – 
feeling cute).  
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Korean women despite their rural location. Facebook has become a place to teach them the 
cultural practices of modernity.25 In these Facebook advertisements, English terms are used to 
describe the clothes (set, vest, cardigan, crop top), yet they are often spelled incorrectly 
(cagygan, hót, ctoptop). They indicate the extent to which Hải Thành girls have been integrated 
into the Western/modern fashion world. The spelling mistakes in both English and Vietnamese, 
however, reveal their limited formal education26 and might be interpreted by other Vietnamese as 
indicators of their social class. A gap, unfortunately, still seems to exist between the girls’ global 
aspiration and their local reality.   
 
Figure 2.4 – Facebook advertisement for clothes 
                                                
25 Of course, Hải Thành girls also learn from observing and interacting with transnational women 
who are back in Hải Thành for a short time visiting their families.  
26 This fact is unsurprising because most of the girls in Hải Thành only finish high school before 
they marry foreign men and migrate. 
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These advertisements also show the importance of commodities to the creation of the 
modern girl look. Besides clothes, there are lipstick, nail polish, face cream and powder, skin 
lighteners, hair styling products, perfume, and high-heel shoes. As the Modern Girl Research 
Group notices, these commodities are corporeal, thus able to work on the bodies to transform 
them. Being technologies of the self, they allow women to change into modern figures as they 
join together novelty, modernity, bodily autonomy, and sexual desire (Peiss 1998). The identity 
of a modern girl is crafted by the clothes she wears, the cosmetics she puts on, and what she buys 
and does not buy. It is impossible to imagine the modern girl without these commodities and 
consumption (Burke 2008). Here lies the crucial difference between the modern girl (for whom 
appearance is emphasized) and the traditional one (for whom virtues are underlined). This is true 
in Hải Thành, in Vietnam, and in many other societies in the world. 
 
Beauty and Identity: From Narcissism to Self-Fashioning 
The material culture of clothes and cosmetics is an important factor in women’s life and 
identity. Indeed, Dyhouse observes that “much of women’s social history is embedded in clothes, 
cosmetics, and material culture” (Dyhouse 2010, 7). However, this aspect of women’s culture 
has usually been obscured and denigrated. Interests, even academic interests, in clothes and 
fashion raise the risks of narcissism and triviality, two qualities traditionally assigned to women 
(Twigg 2013).  
In Hải Thành, the girls’ focus on appearance has drawn similar criticisms.27 The girls are 
often mocked by many groups of local people as vain, shallow, or fearsome. One young 
translocal woman who married Uncle Tú’s neighbor complained to me that rural women are the 
                                                
27 Besides criticisms, there are also admiration of and appreciation for beautiful girls locally (see 
chapters III and V) 
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most proper (chân chính) but these Hải Thành girls are more fashionable than even city girls. She 
implied that by being so fashionable, Hải Thành girls fail to live up to the moral standards of 
decency.28 Some older people think that the girls are young and uneducated, that is why they are 
only interested in beauty and themselves: “The girls do not know how to use their brain; they 
only want to indulge themselves. They like to make themselves beautiful rather than do 
housework.” Because the girls are seen as narcissistic and improper, their perceived vanity 
“terrifies” people. One day, right before our dinner at Uncle Tú’s house, the power went out. As 
soon as the fans stopped running, mosquitoes buzzed around us. I told everyone that I was bitten 
by mosquitoes and Uncle Tú said the same. Mơ, on the other hand, claimed that she did not see 
any mosquitoes and was not bitten. Uncle Tú immediately lampooned her: “You wear such heavy 
makeup that even the mosquitoes are afraid of you.” Mơ did not say anything in response even 
though she was singled out as being different and “scary.” Notably, the critiques of beauty in Hải 
Thành are not necessarily about beauty per se but about what many see as the sole focus on 
beauty at the expense of the other three qualities in the four virtues: usefulness (công) because 
they do not like to do housework, articulation (ngôn) because they lack education, and morality 
(hạnh) because they are not decent. Viewed that way, the girls in Hải Thành have failed to live 
up to the ideal construction of Vietnamese womenhood.  
While many Hải Thành residents regard the exclusive focus on beauty as vain and 
narcissistic, feminism in the past regarded fashion as oppressive to women. They were very 
critical of fashion and beauty and how they affect women: 
 
It distorted the natural body through subordinating practices like high heels and corsets, reducing 
women to objects of a sexualizing gaze, rendering them unable to act effectively in the world. It 
                                                
28 The issue of morality will be further explored in the next chapters. 
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diverted women’s energies into trivial questions of appearance and reinforced negative 
stereotypes of women as ever-changing, inconstant, and narcissistic (Twigg 2013, 17) 
 
However, the latest shift towards postmodernism and its emphasis on identity and agency 
as well as the rise of cultural, material and visual studies have brought new perspectives on 
beauty and fashion. Fashion and beauty are not simply areas where patriarchy and capitalism are 
produced but also where self-creativity and joy are expressed (Entwistle 2000). The Marxist 
approaches used to perceive consumption (including clothes and commodities) as manipulation 
of capitalism because consumption was assumed to rest on false needs and unauthentic desires. 
Not surprisingly, feminism viewed fashion as inauthentic and distorting (Twigg 2013). However, 
new studies on materiality show that objects, besides having use values, possess cultural values. 
Therefore, customers, rather than being victims of capitalism, are recognized as active agents 
who fashion their selves and identities through material objects (Miller 1998b). Clothes, in 
particular, offer a possibility of constant self-renewal and this is where personal creativity and 
excitement arise. It explains why people shop to enhance themselves and their mood (Twigg 
2013).  
More importantly, clothes and cosmetics are now seen to have performative aspects that 
are essential for self-(re)fashioning. Inspired by Judith Butler’s (1993) work on the 
performativity of gender, clothes are theorized as a tool for self-realizing and self-presenting 
identities. No culture leaves the body unclothed and consequently, clothes are one way where 
bodies are made social and given identity (Hansen 2004, Entwistle 2000). For example, military 
uniforms represent embodied masculinity and heels and skirts signify sexualized femininity 
(Twigg 2013). Clothes allow people to engage with crafting their identities in a concrete and 
material fashion. Dressing has an almost Hegelian quality, according to Miller, as the self is 
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discovered and created in ongoing processes of self-actualization. When the identity is 
successfully created by clothes, the process of ‘objectification’ is accomplished (Miller 1998b).  
The focus on clothes and beauty reveals that the (self) presentation of the body is never 
‘natural’ but naturalized by dress in ways that are political, cultural, and material. For example, 
dress remains a major way in which gender is reproduced. Clothes reproduce gender differences 
through styles and materials and play a critical role in the interplay between sexed bodies and 
gendered identities. Through clothes, norms of femininity and masculinity are created, played 
out, contested, and understood (Twigg 2013). Tomboy, sexualized, flamboyant, militarized, 
lumber sexual, or conservative dressing indicates different notions and practices of femininity 
and masculinity. Therefore, a focus on dressing allows us to understand how gender operates at 
an embodied level (Twigg 2013). Fashion has long been considered the domain of women and 
men and women are judged very differently when it comes to dressing. Men usually are not 
called “sluts” because of the way they dress. Women, on the other hand, face a much harsher 
moral judgment and scrutiny over their dressing. This is more evident with regards to women 
who do not fit with the normalized beauty standards of youthful femininity (Twigg 2013), as we 
shall see in chapter VIII in the case of Mơ, Uncle Tú’s second daughter, who passed the youthful 
age and in chapter VI in the case of translocal women in Hải Thành who generally belong to a 
different social class. In this sense, clothes have the power of naturalizing as well as challenging 
social differences, including gender, age, and social class, an important topic to which I will 
return in later chapters.  
Since clothes are central to how we present ourselves at the individual and social levels, 
especially for females, it is important to look past the notion of narcissism and ask what kind of 
gendered identity Hải Thành girls re/produce with the way they dress. Their modern look reflects 
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sexualized youthfulness, which is what feminists have long argued to be the norm of 
contemporary femininity (Twigg 2013). From the exposure of the body with short dresses to the 
sexual and fashionable claims with heels and Korean-styled clothes, the girls in Hải Thành have 
become a terrain where modernity, femininity, youth, and social class (represented by 
consumption) merge.  
Additionally, the act of crafting a modern girl look and taking many selfie photos that are 
posted on Facebook indicates the increasingly common expression of individualism in Vietnam. 
Arguably, this expression of individualism is not necessarily narcissism but reflects neoliberal 
notions of self-governance (Schwenkel and Leshkowich 2012, Hien 2012, Ong 2008). Regarded 
as governance from afar (Zhang and Ong 2008), the ‘free’ consumer-citizens internalize certain 
desires and longings (Rofel 2007) and cultivate strategies of self-fashioning. In the case of 
Vietnam, the Vietnamese state’s management of aesthetic practices through the mass media 
(including soap operas, television shows, magazines, newspapers, and Facebook) constitutes a 
system of expert knowledge that encourages expressions of self and pursuits of self-
beautification (Hien 2012). Such a system of expert knowledge communicates to Vietnamese 
females, including Hải Thành girls, proper and desirable ways of self-representation that centers 
on middle-class practices of consumption and modern, youthful ideals of beauty. Through the 
practices of beauty, the girls express their hopes and dreams and construct themselves as 
beautiful, and thus desirable, Vietnamese subjects. In other words, Hải Thành girls’ beauty 
practices can be seen as techniques of self-fashioning.  
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The Lack of ‘Inner Beauty’: Self-Indulgence, Education, and Futureless Youth 
The difference of Hải Thành girls from other rural girls comes not only in their looks but 
also, supposedly, their lifestyles and particularly, their sexual behaviors. All the criticism that I 
heard during my fieldwork can be summarized as: they like to make themselves beautiful more 
than they like to study, they like to play more than to do housework, and they are too uninhibited 
with their sexuality. At first glance, it is true that many Hải Thành girls spend a lot of time and 
money on becoming beautiful and most of them finish only high school (or even lower levels of 
education). And it is true that the streets at night are dominated by youngsters frequenting loud 
bars, cafes, and discotheques and that many relationships between the local girls and boys are 
broken up before the girls marry foreign men. However, these critiques of the girls’ behaviors, 
lifestyles, and characters that are seen as unacceptable for rural girls cannot be divorced from the 
unusual historical and social conditions in Hải Thành that make those practices and choices 
possible in the first place. 
Hải Thành, compared to most rural communes in Vietnam, is quite prosperous. Its 
prosperity also arrived recently, resulting in a significant difference in finance between the 
older/parents generation and the younger/children generation. For the first time, many parents in 
Hải Thành feel that they can sufficiently provide for their children so that their children will not 
have to suffer in poverty like they did, growing up. This mentality often results in overcatering 
and overcompensating for children. Many of the girls I know do not know how to cook, which is 
very uncommon for Vietnamese women. Hoa’s mother, for example, shoos her away when she 
goes into the kitchen and her mother’s philosophy is: when Hoa gets married to a Korean man, 
she will pay for Hoa to take a cooking class on Korean cuisine and Hoa will be all set. One of 
uncle Tú’s distant cousins used to call her mother everyday when she first got to Taiwan to ask 
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how to cook and what to cook for dinner. Many girls grow up with few expectations of them, 
espcially with regard to household chores, because their parents hope that they will have more 
time to focus on their education.  
As I discussed in chapter I, there exists in Vietnam an assumed association of rurality 
with low level of education, and lower class. Many Hải Thành people understand the important 
role of education as they constantly compare themselves with the people of Hải Đức, a 
neighboring commune which is much poorer yet is respectably recognized as an educated 
commune. In fact, all but three of 50 teachers at Hải Thành schools are Hải Đức people. Hải 
Thành residents, especially the older generation, think that if they were educated like Hải Đức 
residents they would be respected more as they would be able to stand up to local authorities and 
would have a more ‘civilized’ lifestyle. At the same time, they hope that education would help 
their children get good and stable jobs, preferably in the cities, so that sons would not have to 
work hard as fishermen and daughters would not need to marry foreign men.  
Bourdieu (1984) distinguished between different kinds of cultural capital: 
institutionalized cultural capital (education), objectified cultural capital (ownership of consumer 
goods), and embodied cultural capital (manner). Hải Thành people are aware that they do not 
have institutionalized and embodied capital. In their forays into the cities, they often speak of 
feeling embarrassed for not knowing how to speak and comport themselves, comparing this 
experience to a countryside crab going to the city (cua đồng ra tỉnh). Chung, a translocal woman 
who is a mother of a twenty-year-old son in Hải Thành, explained to me the social respect 
education brings. When I asked Chung how she would describe her vision of an ideal woman, 
Chung made a detour and talked to me about Ngọc, the most famous and successful 
businesswoman in Hải Thành:  
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An ideal woman to me has to be educated and knows how to articulate eloquently. 
Besides having a good husband, she has to have well-behaved children who have stable jobs in 
state-owned companies. Doing business well like Mrs. Ngọc only makes her rich, but education 
is more important. In the cities, educated people might make as much as a fifth of what Mrs. 
Ngọc does but they are still better. Education brings brighter futures, generates steady incomes, 
enables traveling, and garners respect. They are educated so they get to go to meetings, 
discussing matters of political and social importance. When will Mrs. Ngọc get to do that? Plus, 
doing business has an element of luck and there is always a risk of loss and debt. Education 
makes your future a lot more secure.  
Chung’s opinion resonates with many Hải Thành residents that I know. Education is 
presumed to bring everything that a person wants: steady income, traveling, respect, and a bright 
future. The imagined security and steadiness created through getting education is understandably 
significant for most rural people who usually do not have pensions when they become old 
(because they do not work for the state) and whose occupations (agriculture, fishing, and 
business) have a strong element of luck. Hải Thành people also view education as one element 
that separates the ‘backward’ rural people from their ‘better’ urban counterparts. In a sense, 
Chung, like many other Hải Thành residents, idealizes education as a way to jump the social 
class barrier between the rural and the urban, the working class and the middle-class. 
This respect for education is perhaps a residue of Confucian ideology that regards 
education as enlightenment and an important instrument for social advancement. It indicates that 
education still plays a significant role in creating social value and hierarchy in Vietnamese 
society. The emphasis on education also aligns with Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital 
(Bourdieu 1984) and what Gary Becker termed ‘a human capital theory’ which claims that 
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people can increase their human capital through education and training (Becker 1964). This 
theory works really well when heavy industries drive economic growth, which was the model of 
the post-war Vietnamese economic system until the emergence of the neoliberal economy in the 
2000s (Schwenkel and Leshkowich 2012). Until then, job and status, especially in Vietnamese 
state-owned sectors, were generally commensurate with education and experience.  
A neoliberal economy, however, operates very differently with regards to labor, 
especially for youth. Characteristics of a Vietnamese neoliberal economy include “market 
economic and free trade discourses proffered as a means to achieve a higher quality of life; 
discourses of privatization and self-regulation for optimization; and the moralization of logics of 
efficiency, quality, and accountability as models for correct, modern, or civilized personhood” 
(Schwenkel and Leshkowich 2012, 382). Lukacs (2015a) argues that youth are particularly 
susceptible to exploitation by the neoliberal market. Neoliberalism operates on the principle of 
flexibility and requires workers to be able to adapt to mobile and precarious working conditions. 
Not only are young people flexible, they are also a cheap source of labor, mobility, creativity, 
and innovation. According to Lukacs (2015a), youth are a segment of the population that is 
uniquely capable of cheaply accommodating the neoliberal demands of flexibility and mobility. 
This phenomenon can be seen across East Asia. In Japan and South Korea, employment has 
become nonstandard and young people are forced (or should be ready) to move from one short-
term job to another. In China, like Vietnam, the state promotes urban development and rural 
youth are compelled to migrate to cities and industrial zones in search of employment 
opportunities (Lukacs 2015a, Earl 2014, Taylor 2004b). Arguably, “[i]n the processes of 
capitalizing on the structural flexibility of youth, East Asian governments are effectively locking 
young people into a state of perpetual mobility” (Lukacs 2015a, 388). 
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The perpetual state of mobility and the lack of steady employment produces growing 
anxiety and despair for young people, a situation that Anne Allison calls futureless youth 
(Allison 2009, 90). Neoliberal economies, by excluding youth from job security in increasing 
numbers, have also denied them what Castel calls ‘social citizenship,’ that is, a recognized and 
useful position in society (Castel 1996). Castel explains that socially recognized work still 
largely means wage employment with a stable career, rights, and benefits (Castel 1996).29 In this 
regard, it makes sense that Hải Thành residents admire Hải Đức people because their children 
have an easier time getting salaried jobs in the cities and towns. Hải Thành people believe the 
difference between the two communes lies in education. However, while education is still 
idealized in Hải Thành, many residents recognized the structural changes in the economic system 
in which education does not always deliver the promise of socially upward mobility. A small 
number of them experience the disappointment in education when their children, after graduating 
from college, have an extremely hard time finding employment.30 And the Hải Thành youngsters 
who are directly affected understand their precarious future in the Vietnamese job market well 
enough that many have given up trying to follow the path of education.  
Hoa told me that she had wanted to become a policewoman. But her hope was stamped 
on relatively soon:  
When I brought my application materials to a Community College that trains Vietnamese 
police, I was asked if I had any relative who was “in the system.” When I answered no, they told 
                                                
29 The anxiety and despair are amplified more for young men than women because of gender 
expectations. Educated unemployment often results in difficulties of leaving home, getting 
married, fulfilling the role of male providers, achieving ‘masculine’ success. Public discourses 
often portray unemployed young men as ‘louts’ or a violent ‘threat’ to society (Jeffrey 2010).  
30 The problem of educated unemployment is, by no means, limited to Vietnam. Studies in Papua 
New Guinea, Ethiopia, Morocco, Peru, East Africa, and Asia have shown the steady rise in 
underemployment and educated unemployment among youth (Lukacs 2015a, Jeffrey 2010).  
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me to withdraw my application. I was told it cost 300 million VND to get into the Police 
Community College and 500 million VND for the Police University, but those prices were only 
for those who had insiders. People like me are simply rejected. Worse, even if I had been 
admitted, I still had to bribe the teachers for every course I would take. Then if I graduated, I 
would have had to bribe even more so that I would not be assigned to mountain posts. Very 
cruel. So much money.  
Hoa voiced the biggest concern that most rural people have about education and 
employment opportunities in Vietnam: the lack of insiders or social connections. This lack is 
amplified in Hải Thành because people’s main occupation, fishing, takes many parents out to sea 
and reduces their capacity to make social connections on land. Therefore, it is doubly difficult 
for Hải Thành people to cultivate social connections: they are not only rural but also fishing 
people. Moreover, Hoa’s comment shows, even if she got into the education system, how costly 
it can be in Vietnam to graduate from an attractive school and get a decent job. This cost is often 
out of reach for most rural students and still for some in Hải Thành. The Vietnamese saying that 
it takes money to make money (tiền đẻ ra tiền) is apt in this case to describe how difficult it is 
for rural (and also poor) Vietnamese to break into an urban, middle-class life with stable jobs 
through education. Consequently, many Hải Thành children are discouraged enough to not even 
try. Hoa was not the only exception. A number of girls I know made an effort to learn foreign 
languages (Chinese or Japanese) after high school to apply for tour guide or secretary positions 
but could not find any job. After a year or two, they worried that they had become too “old” (for 
marriage) and abandoned their learning to marry Korean and Taiwanese men. The lack of job 
opportunities for Hải Thành youth means that most boys will end up being fishermen and most 
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girls will marry foreigners if they want to have fincially comfortable lives. Neither requires a 
high school diploma.31  
There are other reasons besides employment precariousness that contribute to the 
disinterest in education among the youth in Hải Thành. For example, the absence of parents at 
home due to their fishing occupations leaves many children in the care of their grandparents who 
are unable to provide supervision and guidance. But  according to what many Hải Thành 
residents told me, wealth is the other main factor. They believe that wealth correlates directly 
with the lack of education among the youngsters. Unlike the stereotypes of many rural children 
unable to pursue education because of poverty, Hải Thành children do not care for education, 
mostly because they see no need for education. For example, Mr. Cường, the owner of a popular 
cafe in Hải Thành, explained to me:  
“Because many families here have good finances, the youngsters do not want to be in 
school. Let me ask you this: if my parents have a two-storey house, if my aunts and uncles were 
boatpeople and now live in Canada, why should I go to school from morning to evening? Then I 
have homework to do till midnight. Outside, my friends are waiting for me to go out, to go to a 
bar or cafe, to relax and have fun. Why should I bother with school? It’s like that here. In the 
city, even rich kids have to go to school.”  
Mr. Cường’s argument is that Hải Thành children can rely on the finances of their parents 
and overseas relatives and therefore are not motivated to learn. However, he also said that there 
is a difference between rural and urban people with regard to education because rich urban 
                                                
31 The fact that most of these girls just stay at home idly waiting to marry foreign husbands 
contributes to the local criticism of them as being lazy. For example, Ngọc, a classmate of mine, 
told me her daily schedule: “My mom is home so I don’t have to do anything. I wake up at nine 
or ten in the morning then I have breakfast. After breakfast, I can do whatever I want, even go 
back to sleep. Then lunch. After that, I will take a nap. Then I play games on the computer or 
surf Facebook.”  
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children still have to go to school. He implied that rural people are myopic compared to urban 
people. This implication was clearer when he continued:  
“City people who have monthly salaries, five million or 10 million ($250 or $500), have 
to calculate every month what to spend. Their children will not have much to go out with friends. 
Their spending is very sensible. Hải Thành people who have foreign remittances spend 
differently. Here, parents do not have to work; their daughters send them monthly stipends. Or if 
they need anything, their daughters will send them $1000. All of a sudden, they have a huge 
amount of money; of course they will give to their son or daughter at home one or two million 
VND (around $50 to $100) to spend. Of course they will go to bars, buy drugs, go shopping for 
nice clothes but clothes with little fabric (quần áo ít vải), put on make-up, get to a hotel room 
and do it! Parents spoil their kids because they don’t think about the consequences, unlike city 
people.”  
Mr. Cường claimed that rural people, unlike urban people, do not understand the 
repercussions of their parenting practices. In the context of the stereotype that urban people are 
supposedly educated and rural people are not, we can infer that Mr. Cường indicated a vicious 
circle that rural parents are uneducated so their children are spoiled and uneducated and the 
cycle, as well as the stereotype, continues. What is more interesting in Mr. Cường’s explanation 
is his observation of the nature of wealth in Hải Thành and how it is different from other places. 
Hải Thành’s wealth mostly comes from people who move away (fishermen’s earnings and 
overseas Vietnameses’ remittances). The absence of people and presence of money, 
unfortunately, results in the perception, especially among the youth, of money as desirable and 
easily made. When money is seen as easily made, it also becomes easily spent in self-indulgence.  
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The devaluing of education is often blamed for everything that is wrong with the local 
youth because, simply, “they don’t know any better.” During a Nguyễn lineage’s annual ancestry 
dinner, I asked the parents what they thought of young women in Hải Thành and immediately 
they focused on how problematic they are:   
− Girls in the city are well educated. Here, most of them are uneducated (vô học). They 
only finish grades 6th or 7th; that’s quite unusual already. They don’t know anything 
about the society. So when they see that other people dress nicely, they imitate. 
− Women and girls now, even having slept with men like spouses today, are ready to say 
goodbye tomorrow to marry foreign men. Romeo and Juliet do not exist anymore. 
− They want money enough to be willing to marry men as old as their parents. There is no 
love in these marriages. But if they want to follow the call of cash, they have to sacrifice.  
The older generations believed that the problems of youth lie in the lack of education. 
They are poorly educated and that is why they marry so young. They are corrupted in 
debauchery because they do not spend time studying. They do not cultivate good values because 
they are not educated. All in all, Hải Thành people reason that a commune of rural people who 
are poorly educated but suddenly wealthy and mostly absent will produce a new spoiled 
generation that enjoys self-indulgence, consumerism, and sexuality. Even though the criticism 
applies to both boys32 and girls, I noticed that the condemnation on girls is a lot harsher and more 
pronounced in Hải Thành. That is understandable because Vietnamese females are considered to 
be the symbol and moral keeper of the nation. Their appearances and behaviors are always 
heavily scrutinized, as reflected in the above critiques.   
                                                
32 The young men in Hải Thành face disapproval on their drinking, gambling, and overspending. 
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The young girls themselves internalize and reinforce the rural-urban hierachy based on 
education. For example, my classmates often said they might be prettier than city girls but “city 
(girl) is still urban, and by comparison, better than rural (girl).” Hoa explained to me that city 
girls have the city label while she has the rural label. Rural women, according to Hoa, cannot 
speak and articulate as eloquently as city women. Hải Thành girls are tart and sharp-tongued 
(chanh chua, đanh đá) while city girls are sweet and wise (ngọt ngào, khôn ngoan). Vietnamese 
people often stereotypically use the phrase “chanh chua, đanh đá” to describe female small 
traders whom they perceive as uneducated and thus, behaving and speaking in ways that are 
unpleasant. Hoa applied that same phrase to herself and other rural women in contrast to the 
wisdom and pleasantness (sweetness) of urban women. It indicates once again how education is 
seen to shape behavior, distinguish between social classes, and separate the urban from the rural.  
The importance of education means an emphasis on the mind over body, quality over 
appearance. Therefore, the critiques of Hải Thành girls on their obssesion with beauty is more 
than skin deep. While Vietnamese women are encouraged and taught in the media to make 
themselves beautiful, they are also told the main reason for their beauty is to attract men and 
become their capable wives. As such, even though the book Modern Women of the 21st Century 
(Phụ nữ hiện đại thế kỷ XXI) spends 200 pages on beauty tips, it devotes as many pages telling 
women how to please their partners. Similarly, the book on four virtues of Vietnamese women 
titled Four Virtues of Vietnamese Women Now and in the Past reminds readers that the goal of 
keeping up female appearance is to charm men, but women have to work on their behavior to 
keep their men and make them happy (Le, Nguyen, and Hoang 2012). The Readers’ letters 
column (Tâm sự) on VNExpress is full of women’s stories of not being able to create a happy 
family or the guilt of breaking a happy family by being the third person. It can be concluded that 
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marriage is still considered the destiny for women who are then responsible for making it work. 
Therefore, when Hải Thành girls are viewed as caring only for their beauty and not for virtues 
(such as diligence, faithfulness, chastity, and self-sacrifice), their behaviors are heavily criticized 
and morality questioned by local people.  
However, Hải Thành youth’s repudiation of education is a critique of the popular view of 
development institutions and certain scholars such as the Nobel Prize winner Sen (1999) that 
education is an unproblematic social good that improves people’s life opportunities. In fact, the 
uneducated unemployment in Hải Thành and around the world (see Jeffrey 2010) shows that 
education can increase the inequality gap for those, typically the poorer population, who invest in 
education but lack social connections to achieve employment. Hải Thành girls have chosen not 
to pursue education but focus more on beauty because, as I explain in the following chapter, 
beauty, unlike education, elevates their social status that is often denied and enables them to get 
married transnationally. The importance of beauty for Hải Thành girls with regards to class and 
life chances is the focus of my next chapter.  
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Chapter III 
The Desire to be Pretty: Youthful Beauty, Gender Power, and Social Class 
 
Beauty, Sexual Capital, and Hope 
Beauty as Sexual Capital 
Scholars studying beauty have noted that for women who work in government offices 
institutions, schools, companies, and stores, the modern look is a necessity (Edmonds 2010, 
Dong 2008). Therefore, when the young women of Hải Thành who do not hold any public job 
become preoccupied with their appearance, they are deemed to be vain and narcissistic. They are 
also seen as superficial, focusing on the surface at the expense of “deeper” self-development. 
 Such moral charges, deeply rooted in many cultures across the world, do not explain the 
appeals of beauty. To confound us even more, early feminists, focusing largely on Western 
societies, simply rejected beauty as they argue that beauty practices are a patriarchal tool to 
discipline and control the female bodies (Jeffreys 2005, Bordo 1993, Wolf 1991, Chernin 1981). 
This framework was based on white, middle-class, and heterosexual women. Recent scholarship 
on beauty has shown that women of different race, class, and sexuality have very different 
relationships to beauty and bodies rather than just oppression (Kang 2010, Burke 2008, Dong 
2008, Edmonds 2007, Hill Collins 2005, Brownell and Wasserstrom 2002). How such 
relationships are interpreted and evaluated depends much on sexual and gender norms and ideals 
for women (The Modern Girl Around the World Research Group 2008, Pettus 2003, Farrer 
2002). Finally, studies on beauty, including those from anthropology, tend to emphasize the 
political aspects rather than its aesthetic values (Edmonds 2010). These three factors (morality, 
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patriarchy charge, and focus on politics) have made it difficult to develop a more nuanced 
understanding of the multiple roles and effects of beauty. 
Alexander Edmonds, in his study on plastic surgeries in Brazil, argues that attractiveness 
is an “objective form of value” (2010, 20) and the appeal of beauty lies in its function as a 
distinct form of power. As such, it can have a valuable democratic value in redistributing social 
power and affecting social hierarchy (2010, 2007). Terming it “sexual capital,” Edmonds adds to 
the Bourdieu’s framework of how economic, cultural, and social capitals inter-convert and 
naturalize the class system. Bourdieu did notice the special power of physical beauty as he wrote 
in Distinction, “[Physical beauty is] sometimes fatally attractive, because it threatens the other 
hierarchies, and . . . denies the high and mighty the bodily attributes of their position, such as 
height or beauty” (Bourdieu 1984, 190).  
According to Edmonds, more than threatening other hierarchies, beauty can minimize or 
cancel class and racial stratification. In a free market economy, beauty is a form of sexual capital 
that can be exchanged for other kinds of social and economic capital in marriages, romances, and 
sex-for-money encounters: 
  
“The normal symbolic and material markers of status (speech, fashion, education, and so on) can 
be partially suppressed in situations where sexual exchange is based primarily on physical 
qualities.” (Edmonds 2010, 247). 
 
In Edmonds’s study, beauty, youth, or exotic differences can be converted into material 
gains in sexual relations, or function as a promise of fame and life possibilities for aspiring 
artistas in Brazil. The appeal of beauty, especially for the poor, is understandably significant 
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because sexual capital can be an important resource to attain better lives in situations of poverty, 
hardship, and scarcity (Edmonds 2010).  
The power of beauty speaks to the often neglected biological aspects of human beings. 
More than being social creatures immersed in political constructions, humans also have needs 
and desires. As such, sexual capital has the potential to override the soco-political structure such 
as when a beautiful person exerts power, however rarely, against class or racial privileges: 
 
“There is always the possibility that the attractive person will not return the love of the powerful 
and unattractive social superior, providing a moral lesson about the limits of privileges” 
(Edmonds 2010, 251). 
  
Thanks to the booming of technology, medicalization of beauty, and consumer culture, 
physical beauty, if not possessed already by individuals, has become more attainable for the 
masses. Consequently, beauty can function as a form of egalitarian capital that opens the door for 
social mobility yet is less dependent on birth, education, or social connections (Edmonds 2010). 
The connection between beauty and social mobility is particularly revealing when we consider 
how many beauty pageant contestants have successfully developed political careers afterwards. 
In the United States alone, nearly 12 percent of female governors elected since 2000 participated 
in pageants. Examples of beauty queens entering politics are available worldwide. Angelina 
Sondakh (Indonesia), Eunice Olsen (Singapore), Tanja Saarela (Finland), Mara Carfagna (Italy), 
Gemma Garrett (Great Britain), Maria Kalaw Katigbak (Philippines), and Yolanda Pulecio 
(Colombia) are a few well-known examples of this phenomenon (Hinojosa and Carle 2016). 
Viewing beauty as sexual capital and a crucial resource for the unentitled provides a 
different and more understanding perspective on the “vain” and “superficial” young women of 
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Hải Thành. Their preoccupation with the modern look reveals both their privileges compared to 
other rural Vietnamese girls and the obstacles for social mobility still faced by rural women. 
Their beauty power certainly has brought forth more equalities in their relations with local men, 
yet here lies an irony: the global capitalist market that allows them to exchange beauty for power 
in transnational marriages also takes them out of Hải Thành to another country, leaving the local 
gender hierarchy largely intact.  
 
Beauty, Sexuality, and Social Class in Vietnam 
In order to understand the unique way in which local girls desire to be beautiful, we first 
need to contextualize the burgeoning visual economy33 in Vietnam to examine how Hải Thành 
girls’ social positions are highly shaped by the dichotomies of urban/modern/mobility and 
rural/backward/immobility. In her study on photo restoration in Vietnam, Nina Hien (2012) 
shows that visual representation used to be highly controlled by the Vietnamese state. During the 
high socialism period before Đổi Mới, the state censored all public visuality in order to create 
visions of a new socialist state. The totalizing control was exerted over the visual (film, 
television, visual arts), audio (radio, loudspeakers), and text (newspaper, books).  
With Đổi Mới and the opening of the market, foreign ideas, images, goods, and values are 
now competing with the state in the public domain. The shrinkage of the state and the 
prominence of a free market economy have also given rise to a consumer culture in which social 
class and citizenship are increasingly defined by consumption (Earl 2014, Leshkowich 2012a, 
Nguyen-Marshall, Drummond, and Bélanger 2012, Higgins 2008). Combined together, new 
                                                
33 I use Deborah Poole’s definition of the visual economy as a comprehensive system of the 
production of images, their meanings and uses, their circulation and exchange as “goods,” and 
the cultural and discursive values through which they are appraised and interpreted (Poole 1997).  
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visions of modernity in Vietnam are now conveyed through images of glamor, materiality, and 
upward lifestyles, linking consumption with status and mobility. These glamor visions reign over 
national media and public spectacles, from foreign soap operas and movies that craft images of 
First World modernity, daily coverage and photos of celebrities and hot girls in newspapers, 
fashion columns that update and guide readers on the latest international trends, to numerous 
beauty contests on television and uncountable beauty pageants happening year round. They help 
prescribe visions of a good life and modern desirable subjects, nicely packaged and sold to 
millions of viewers. In this new visual economy defined by a celebration of modernity and 
beauty, cosmetic and beauty techniques become tools of self-governance (Hien 2012) and class 
identifications are translated as differences in beauty and life styles (Edmonds 2010). 
It is no wonder that people in Hải Thành differentiate between themselves and those who 
live abroad and in cities in terms of beauty. Hoa expressed her desire to become beautiful by 
going away: “I just hope that if I go abroad, I will be lighter (in skin color) and no longer have 
acnes. The water here does not suit me. When I go to Hải Phòng, I don’t need to put anything on 
my face or drink any juices, my face is still pretty.” Similar to Hoa, many Hải Thành residents 
consider transnational women to be as beautiful as angels (đẹp như tiên). In fact, every person in 
Hải Thành who migrates overseas has been said to transform into a figure of beauty: lighter 
complexion with pinkish cheeks, long and shiny hair (tóc dài thướt tha), and fashionable clothes 
that are very different from Vietnamese clothes. The stories of transformation from commoner-
looking to angel-looking are predominant and widespread in Hải Thành. People reason that 
transnationals are beautiful because they have good lives. The gap in basic living needs (such as 
clean water as Hoa remarked, or as implied by people who have “good lives”) between a rural 
place like Hải Thành and cities or foreign countries is conceptualized and romanticized here as 
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differences in beauty. The connection between appearance and social status is so strong in Hải 
Thành that most people did not believe me when I told them I had been living in the United 
States for about ten years. How could I have when I did not have light skin, shiny hair or stylish 
clothes? Beauty, while being a form of social capital, also indicates the socio-economic gap 
between the rural and the urban, the domestic and the foreign. 
Beauty practices and performances have proven their potentiality to bridge or embody the 
social gap in a country that is increasingly stratified. It is precisely this desired promise that 
allows the visual economy to thrive by producing myths of leaping over the gap, both 
geographically and economically. For example, through those numerous beauty contests, such as 
the popular Vietnam-based Next Top Model television show, viewers are presented with stories 
of contestants from humble backgrounds transforming from rural modest women to beautiful 
models and shooting to fame in Vietnam and globally. The images and stories of glamorous 
women from modest upbringing on television and in the public sphere act as hope of a beauty 
myth where women can imagine themselves and their life aspirations through such images. 
Viewers are also taught the necessity of consumption in crafting beauty, which can lead to life 
possibilities and transformation. As Burke (2008) remarks, consumption has considerable 
symbolic authority in everyday life because of its capacity to create social relations and statuses. 
In other words, unlike the ideological construction of the Vietnamese state, a modern 
Vietnamese woman is shaped by the market as one that has the ability for transformation, 
aspirations for social mobility, and possession of beauty and sexual power.  
The embrace of glamorous beauty is refashioned as much by the consumer culture as the 
broad changes in sexuality and gender relations in Vietnam. The dismissal of arranged 
marriages, the ending of the Vietnamese state’s approval of life partners, and the socialist 
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ideologies of equality have reopened the door in intimate encounters for free choice and romantic 
love (Phinney 2008). However, the withdrawal of the state also subjects love and sexuality to the 
logic of the market. While the older generation in Hải Thành laments that Romeo and Juliet do 
not exist any more, the youngsters refuse to accept the premise of “one poor cottage with two 
golden hearts” (một túp lều tranh hai trái tim vàng). The mingling of sexuality, love and the 
market is seen as well in the marketization of sexual pleasure and how common it is for 
Vietnamese men to form social and economic connections through the consumption of female 
bodies (Nguyen-Vo 2008). Most notably, VietJet Air, Vietnam’s only privately owned airline, 
has created a buzz globally for its young, attractive, bikini-clad flight attendants. This marketing 
strategy has earned the company huge profits and VietJet Air, dubbed the bikini airline, is 
expected to surpass the national Vietnam Airlines as the biggest domestic carrier in Vietnam this 
year. Its CEO, after the company holds its IPO this year, will become the first Vietnamese 
female billionaire (Nguyen, Ha, and Wong 2016). Female bodies and beauty have an increasing 
value in the Vietnamese free market economy. 
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Figure 3.1: VietJet Air Advertisement Photos (Source: http://www.elitereaders.com/vietnams-
bikini-airlines-set-create-countrys-first-female-billionaire/) 
 
The visual economy also pushes the public domain towards more emphasis on 
appearance, which is often framed as the contrast between rural/ugly/uncivilized and 
urban/beautiful/civilized. A recent etiquette video clip shown in Megastars Cineplex theaters in 
Vietnam depicts an urban man talking on his cell phone during a movie as “uncivilized” as a 
rural man.34 The underlying message is rural people do not fit in with the urban, “civilized” 
space. “Rural” is also an adjective to express how badly one looks (trông quê quá). Rural people, 
assigned with stigmas of backwardness, are now excluded from the national visions of glamor 
                                                
34 https://youtu.be/qg7nX0HfvL0 
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and modernity. Yet, the myth of self-metamorphosis is nurtured by the promise of beauty and 
consumption practices. It is a myth because consumption, while increasingly crucial, is also 
beyond the reach of the majority of the Vietnamese. Consumption, undeniably, has a tremendous 
political power of producing social exclusion and inclusion (Miller 1998a).  
Hải Thành girls, unlike most rural Vietnamese girls, have more material resources to 
participate in not only the consumer culture but also the medicalization of beauty. They are 
lucky. Besides buying clothes and cosmetics, the girls also go to salons for whole body 
whitening or bleaching that my teacher Nga told me cost eight million VND (around 400 USD) 
for two hours. My classmates openly admired Ngọc Trinh, a famous Vietnamese celebrity who is 
said to be more afraid of the sun than the ghosts (sợ nắng hơn sợ ma) (Đức Trí 2016), for what 
they called her “angel-like fair skin” (trắng như thiên thần). Also, it has also become more 
common for Hải Thành girls to have nose surgeries if they think their noses are flat. One time, 
during our discussion of beauty in class, Nga complimented how sharp Hoa’s nose is and how 
important a sharp nose is for beauty by telling a story of her former students going to Hanoi for 
nose jobs: 
The three of them [students], their noses were so flat that if you looked at them from the 
side, there was nothing sticking up. The noses made them ugly. Thus they went to Hanoi; they 
told me that, “[w]e go looking for beauty now” (đi tìm sắc đẹp). They came home the next day, 
moaning and and groaning “[o]h mother, it was so painful. We lay in bed for five days.” It took 
them ten days to start feeling a bit better. One of them has a girl and everytime the girl touched 
her mother’s nose, she exclaimed in worry: “[o]h my goodness, you’ll flatten my nose.” Ha ha. 
But painful as it might be, it was worth it. Because on a face, the nose is the most crucial. If you 
don’t have nice eyebrows, you can draw them. If you have small eyes, you can wear enlarging 
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circle lenses. But a beautiful nose will enhance your whole face. Like Hoa here, all she needs to 
do is to put on some lipstick and she’s pretty. 
Nga is reiterating one of Vietnamese prevalent physical beauty standards for women: fair 
skin, big eyes, sharp nose, and V-line chin (kenh14.vn 2016). Thanks to the popularity of 
cosmetics surgeries, more Vietnamese women, including the girls in Hải Thành, can go through 
the procedures to lighten the skin, fix the flat nose, and create double eyelids and dimples. It is 
clear that beauty practices are works (such as putting up with the pain of surgeries as well as 
learning about what to wear). For many Hải Thành girls, they include both work on the physical 
body as well as enhancement by clothes and commodities. However, it does not simply mean 
that Hải Thành girls are vain or superficial victims of consumerism. Beauty practices speak to a 
desire to create an identity that is included in the modern world. As Edmonds argues, when 
education is limited, the body, relative to the mind, turns to be a more important foundation for 
identity and a source of power. Being the only part of self-definition that the girls have control 
over, beauty, with its sexual capital, has become “a popular form of hope” (Edmonds 2007, 378) 
for those socially excluded.35  
 
Beauty as Self-Maintenance and Hope 
Rural people, assigned with stigmas of backwardness, are now excluded from the 
national visions of glamour and modernity. Yet, the myth of self-metamorphosis is nurtured by 
the promise of beauty by migration to the city or abroad and consumption practices. Rural 
people, particularly women, are not pretty yet but they will transform once they get to the city or 
                                                
35 Beauty, of course, works differently for women and men. While it allows local women to cross 
the class boundary for upward mobility, it has the opposite effect on men. The physical 
appearance and clothes of fishermen ironically marks them as working class despite their 
economic capital.  
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abroad and buy clothes, makeup, accessories, etc. For example, I went out for drinks with a 
group of local girls at a cafe when one girl pointed out to me a transnational woman who was 
sitting at the nearby table. When the transnational woman left, the girls immediately delved into 
a discussion about her appearance and how going away can turn someone as hideous as a devil 
into one as beautiful as an angel: 
- Oh my goodness, she is so beautiful; how can I bear that? Like a Korean actress.  
- They all come back looking like angels with fairer skin and wearing beautiful clothes. 
- My friends used to be uglier than me, but now they have gone to Korea, they are 
beautiful like angels while I am in Vietnam, as hideous as a devil.  
Beauty for Hải Thành girls helps facilitate their transnational marriages. It can be seen as 
an investment in the future that is located geographically somewhere else. Ironically, even 
though they are regarded locally as pretty, the belief in self-transformation once they marry 
abroad means that the girls do not think they are pretty enough for here and now and they are 
preparing with their beauty practices so that they can truly blossom in Korea in the future. I 
argue that beauty in the case of transnational marriages in Hải Thành is what Lauren Berlant 
(2007) calls an act of self-maintenance and self-preservation in order to invest in the future. 
Berlant claims that people who are worn out by the socio-economic structure (slow death) 
engage in acts of self-maintenance, that is activity toward reproducing life not to make it better 
but to get through the day, the week, and the month. Hải Thành girls, similarly, face the hostile 
social structure that oppresses rural. As discussed above, being rural is synonymous with lower 
class (see also Nguyen-Marshall, Drummond, and Bélanger 2012, Harms 2011). Moreover, there 
are almost no job opportunities that provide social mobility. Since the cutback of subsidies for 
farmers, agricultural work has barely been sustainable (Taylor 2007, 2004b, Luong 2003). A 
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small number of Hải Thành girls who have a college degree struggle to find jobs in the city 
because they lack the social connections. The majority of Hải Thành girls, most only with a high 
school diploma, end up staying at home, unemployed. They have, therefore, chosen to practice 
beauty as a form of self-preservation in the present, amid all the criticism, to get through the 
present while cultivating the hope of transnational marriages and transformation in the near 
future.  
Beauty fulfills the aspirations to become a modern glamorous subject as well as being the 
sexual capital to help Hải Thành girls participate in the market economy although being on the 
margin. Beauty and fashion hide their rural background, turn them into the sexy, pretty ones who 
are admired and envied. The modern girl look helps blur the class boundaries that are defined 
along the rural/backward and urban/modern binary. Moreover, their beauty power is used to 
attract East Asian men, paving the way for transnational marriages and migration. The girls dress 
up very nicely when they go to the matchmaker’s place for selection. Similarly, they refuse to 
say yes to those who, according to their words, dress like rural men. Unlike marriages with 
Vietnamese men, transnational marriages promise not only economic capital, but also the allure 
of First World modernity and glamour. That way, the rural girls of Hải Thành have even 
bypassed the city girls to join the rank of the global cosmopolitan. Beauty and youth,36 in this 
case, have subverted the class structure and the rural/urban/cosmopolitan hierarchy.  
There are, of course, limits to their beauty power in crossing the class boundary. Hải 
Thành girls, while having more material resources from their families than most Vietnamese 
rural girls, are not rich. Especially when they are unemployed, they do not have much money to 
spend on clothes or cosmetics. They end up buying cheap imitations of brand names, which are 
                                                
36 The close relationship between beauty and age will be discussed later in this chapter.  
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difficult to discern. Only if one is fashion savvy can one recognize the fake goods. When I 
showed my fashionista friend Annie those photos of Hoa (figure 4.1) and asked what she thought 
the social class of Hoa was, based on her outfit, my friend responded, “middle class at most.” 
“Why?” “Because the purse looks cheap and the sunglasses are not real aviator.” My friend was 
able to tell Hoa’s economic capital based on the imitations she wore. However, Vann (2006) and 
Earl (2014) show that mimic goods are common in Vietnam and offer the aspiring middle-class 
the opportunity to employ cultural literacy and taste to make up for their weaker economic 
power. Therefore, despite her imitated purse and sunglasses, Hoa was still able to project a 
sophisticated look of a modern girl. 
 The cultural sophistication also enables many Hải Thành girls to become trendsetters. 
They do not simply imitate the behavior of city girls but generate new trends (Korean style) that 
are recognized for their symbolic value in the local context. The Korean style, with its 
association with glamor and beauty populated by K-Pop culture, is seen as highly attractive and 
desirable in Hải Thành. Similar to how young Japanese women in the 1990s drew on the cute 
culture to express their growing power as trendsetters (Lukacs 2015b), Hải Thành girls used the 
Korean style to exercise their power and cultural capital, however limited.  
 
Beauty Talks: Social Status and Recognition 
The girls understand very well from a young age the power of beauty, thanks to the 
admiration and preferential treatment they receive in their lives from teachers, peers, and boys. 
One of my classmates, Ngọc, said boys “stood up in a line” for her since high school. They all 
offered her, “[y]ou must be tired going back and forth from home to school; let me give you a 
ride on my bike.” Ngọc told me only pretty girls were treated that way because “[b]eauty means 
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prominent, prominence means special.” Hoa added that, being as pretty as Ngọc, even teachers 
fell for her, let alone students because she was like a rose that everyone wanted to pick. Ngọc’s 
high school (female) teacher publicly complimented Ngọc in class for her beauty and gentleness: 
“A (male) teacher told me that Ngọc is really beautiful, unbelievably beautiful, probably the most 
beautiful of the class. I am very proud that I have a student who is both beautiful and gentle that 
receives praise from other teachers. I hope all other female students will be like Ngọc.” In fact, 
male teachers often offered to pay for Ngọc’s phone account so that she could respond to their 
texts.37 Ngọc’s beauty has earned her both social recognition and special treatment. In the 
teacher’s compliment for Ngọc, beauty is singled out here as worthy of commendations and a 
goal for others to follow. Of course, it is important to note that the kind of desirable beauty, 
according to Ngọc’s high school teacher, is gentle beauty, a safe, feminine, and innocent kind, 
not the sexy kind of beauty. As long as Ngọc was seen as a “good, beautiful girl,” she should be 
admired. The compliment happened in a classroom setting where the supposed purpose was to 
develop inner beauty: knowledge and virtues. It indicates how beauty has become an important 
social value and capital that the girls in Hải Thành are told to cultivate.  
Stories of how pretty girls in Hải Thành were treated by foreign men further cement the 
impression that beauty can bring one social status and free stuff. Both students and the teacher 
circulate these stories quite frequently in my Korean classes. For example, Quyên, a classmate of 
mine, said her friend was so pretty that the Korean husband of her friend did not allow his wife 
to breastfeed for fear of ruining her breasts. Our teacher Nga once told us the tale of a pretty girl 
named Nhung: 
                                                
37 Ngọc said she did not take any of the offers from either her teachers or male peers.  
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I used to have a student named Nhung. She is incredibly pretty. Her friend already 
married a Singaporean man. The friend of the Singaporean guy saw Nhung’s photos on 
Facebook and had a crush on her. He told Nhung’s friend that he would pay for Nhung’s trip to 
Singapore to meet with him. When Nhung came, he told Nhung he had a house and a car and 
many things else. But I am not sure why, maybe fate, she did not agree to marry him and 
returned to Vietnam. He still loved her. She ended up marrying a Korean man a few months later 
but the Singaporean guy still texted her. Nhung told him she had hepatitis B. In Singapore, if 
they know you have hepatitis B, they won’t marry you. Yet this guy said no problem; he would 
pay for her to have the disease treated in Singapore. See, he loved her that much. Because her 
photos on Facebook are so beautiful. How lucky for her. Her beauty is incredible. She is tall (5.3 
ft.), her skin is white, her face is pretty; she is like a doll. Then she dresses so well. He looked at 
her photos and he loved her, paid for her whole trip to Singapore. How many men on earth are 
like him? Yet, she still did not marry him.  
In this story, beauty alone was romanticized as being able to give a woman total 
admiration from a man, from love at first sight to generosity and devotion. This Singaporean 
man was said to go above and beyond to get Nhung to marry him just because she was beautiful. 
Yet, by turning down such an exceptional man (“How many men on earth are like him?”), 
Nhung, a poor Vietnamese girl, exerted her power over a richer man who is a Singaporean with a 
house and a car and proved that she was even more exceptional herself. Like Ngọc’s high school 
teacher, my Korean teacher reinforced the message that beauty gives the girls power, a special 
form of power that is available to women and should be aspired to by other women. Nga then 
opened her Facebook account to show us photos of Nhung and my classmates were in awe. They 
praised Nhung’s cheeks, her full lips, her dimples, and her beautiful clothes that made her look 
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like a queen even when she was pregnant. After a while, Hoa pleaded to Nga to stop showing 
Nhung’s photos because she got too jealous and swore that when she migrated to Korea, she 
would never wear Vietnamese clothes anymore.  
This kind of beauty talk or stories where the girls discussed, complimented, and 
evaluated other girls or gave tips on beauty practices is very common whenever the girls met 
with one another. These talks reinforce beauty as a form of capital and as a salient criterion for 
social ranking and recognition in Hải Thành. They often include praise for those who have 
migrated to East Asia and transformed themselves (like Hoa’s admiration for Nhung), rating the 
beauty of their peers, and contempt for translocal women (see chapter VI). This kind of 
evaluation came up frequently in my Korean classes.  
Nga:  Three years ago I had a student called Nữ and she was so pretty. I could not help 
looking at her while teaching. She was very famous; people called her Nhất Nữ. 
All pretty girls leave for Korea.  
Ngọc:  Thuý from hamlet Three also studied with you?  
Nga:  She is not that pretty.  
Quyên: Without makeup, no one wants to look at her. Very mediocre, not even average. I 
often wondered why she was said to be hot, hot, hot. Then one day I saw her with 
makeup on. Wow, her eyelashes were curved, her lips were red, then her clothes 
were like loose and sexy (hững hờ đợi chờ), and she looked pretty. With makeup, 
she is pretty. Then there’s Vân.  
Hoa:  Vân is fat. She is not that good-looking. She looks decent lately but in the past she 
is ugly.  
Ngọc:  Have you seen Hưng’s wife?  
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Nga:  Oh my god, her face is as dark as steel (mặt sắt đen sì). He has money; how come 
his wife is so ugly and fat?  
Quyên: she is as fat as an urn (bù lù quai lai). She accompanies him everywhere; I would 
be ashamed if I were him. She looks disgusting.   
In this conversation, my teacher and classmates reaffirmed the importance of beauty for 
many girls in Hải Thành. With beauty, one can become famous like Nữ, or with beauty 
enhancement and style (makeup and clothes) one can move from being mediocre to being hot 
and noticed like Thuý. On the other hand, if one does not fit with the beauty standards (such as a 
thin body and fair skin) like Vân or Hưng’s wife, the judgment is harsh. Not only is Hưng’s wife 
judged to be “disgusting,” she is also said to bring shame to her husband. This sense of shame is 
similar to how Mạn’s wife felt, described in the poem at the beginning of this chapter, because 
her physical appearance subjected him to being ridiculed. More importantly, the sense of shame 
is not just personal (that one should feel ashamed if one does not measure up) but interpersonal 
(that one makes the spouse disgraced for being ugly). Perhaps the shame comes partly from what 
Jimmy Soul sang in his famous 1963 song that “[i]f you want to be happy for the rest of your 
life, … get an ugly girl to marry you. Don’t let your friends say you have no taste, go ahead and 
marry anyway.” In other words, an ugly wife indicates that the man has no taste, thus reflects 
poorly on him. There is also an assumption of the relationship between money and beauty when 
Nga questioned why a wealthy man like Hưng has such an ugly wife. Nga linked beauty with 
social class, suggesting that with money one should beautify oneself (such as through clothes, 
accessories, facials, or plastic surgeries). She treated beauty as an indicator of social class: being 
beautiful makes one belong to the middle or upper class and being ugly signals lower class. 
Therefore, an ugly wife will, presumably, lower the social status of the husband and shame him.  
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The connection between money, status, and beauty is further revealed in how Hải Thành 
girls evaluate their potential foreign spouses. For example, Ngọc and Hoa described a couple of 
Korean men they met: “Some of them look like duck farmers (chăn vịt). Unbelivably ugly. Some 
dressed so ugly. The pants have faded and were way too long while that particular man was 
short and petite. His pants were flared like the fashion in the old day and looong; the hems were 
torn. He also wore a shirt, an ugly shirt, not a nice one. Old pants, old shirt. We wonder how 
much money he makes to dress so ugly like that. If he dressed so badly, how could he find a 
spouse? Some men have a face as round as a (round) cake; we wanted to vomit.” In this 
description the girls repeat the same perception that those who dress ugly are rural (duck 
farmers) and probably do not make much money. These men are seen as not attractive both 
financially and physically and sure to have difficulties finding spouses.  
The beauty talk while establishing the importance of beauty for many young girls in Hải 
Thành also shows how they demonstrate their values and superiority. By judging how ugly 
others look, some girls imply that they are better-looking and thus socially worthier. The “ugly” 
other becomes a yardstick to show the betterness of beautiful girls. Toni Morrison summed up 
this gender and class prejudice as follows: “All of us – all who knew her – felt so wholesome 
after we cleaned ourselves on her. We were so beautiful when we stood astride her ugliness ... 
We honed our egos on her, padded out characters with her frailty, and yawned in the fantasy of 
our strength” (Morrison 1970, 205).  
There are, of course, young girls in Hải Thành who question the beauty culture or refuse 
to participate in it. A small number of girls have chosen to pursue education and marry 
Vietnamese men. They go to college in the cities and do not engage much with the beauty 
culture. Among those who stay, some voiced that beauty does not necessarily translate into a 
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better life. For example, Quyên asked everyone in class one day “Can you make a living out of 
being beautiful?” (xinh có đào ra ăn được không?). I also knew girls who are not very beautiful 
according to Vietnamese standards but marrried kind and handsome foreign husbands. There 
exists a counter narrative in Hải Thành that “ugly” girls can still marry foreign men and that 
many mediocre-looking girls end up with good-looking men while plenty of pretty girls marry 
“ugly” husbands. Beauty, in other words, might be an investment in the future for some girls but 
it does not necessarily always pay off. Yet, the value of beauty is still significant. First, beauty 
can be seen as a form of capital, shown especially in the Vietnamese langage in which beauty is 
sometimes referred to as a commodity (hàng) and showing beauty equals showing a commodity 
(khoe hàng). Second, beauty is appreciated and admired for its own aesthetic quality. Indeed, 
Nga, our teacher, answered Quyên’s question by saying: “Can’t make a living but you can 
admire/look at beauty till your eyes wear out; it’s nutritious for the eyes” (không ăn được nhưng 
ngắm nó mòn mắt; nó bổ mắt). Together, they give those who possess beauty sexual capital and 
admiration, lifting up their social statuses even though that does not always translate to a better 
life in the future.  
 
Too Old to Compete: The Aging of Beauty 
The girls in Hải Thành can engage in beauty practices as well as harsh judgment partly 
because they are youthful. Age plays a crucial role in shaping and understanding not only beauty 
but also power and social hierarchy. Twigg (2013) argues that age is often omitted from the 
debate on intersectionality and yet, like gender, race, class, and sexuality, age functions as an 
ordering principle in society and indicates power and status. For example, individuals and groups 
are accorded identity and status based on their age. Age groups (such as youth, teenagers, the 
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elderly, etc.) also prescribe obligations and behaviors. Age allows people to embody relations of 
power and domination in which groups gain identity and power in and through their relations 
with others (Twigg 2013). In Vietnam, the age hierarchy is embedded in social practices of 
respecting those older than you, reflected in the saying “kính lão đắc thọ” (if you honor the 
elderly, you will live longer) and in the language itself. Vietnamese, like other Eastern Asian 
languages such as Korean, Japanese, and Chinese, has words and pronouns that distinguish based 
on age. While the senior members in Vietnamese society are often given social dominance, it is 
youthfulness that is desired when it comes to beauty. As with class, gender, and race, worth is 
hierarchically distributed. Regarding beauty, youth is prized so that we are not judged by how 
old we are but how young we are not (Woodward 1991).  
The intimate relationship between youth and beauty is seen across cultures in fashion, art, 
and modern media. Pollock (2003) examines the female nude in Western art which represents an 
ideal of timeless beauty. Pollock argues that the female nude is timeless in both senses: first, that 
the ideal does not change in time and second, that the ideal denies time – the idealization of 
women in terms of perpetual youthfulness. In modern media, we are intensely surrounded by 
images and representations of youthful beauty and perfection. Advertisements send women 
messages of combating ageing through beauty work. Feminists such as Susan Bordo and Naomi 
Wolf have long criticized the damages done to women by making them dissatisfied with their 
bodies (Twigg 2013). Fashion further reinforces the importance of youthful beauty by placing its 
design and ideals in the hands of the young, enabling more direct expression of sexuality.  
Industrial fashion today is oriented primarily towards the young, as remarked by Diana Crane: 
“Instead of the upper class seeking to differentiate itself from other social classes, the young seek 
to differentiate themselves from the middle-aged and the elderly. As trends diffuse to older age 
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groups, younger age groups adopt new styles” (Crane 2000, 198). All of these factors (fashion, 
art, and media) feed into the cultural understanding of female bodies, shaping the ideal of 
youthful beauty. It is no different in Vietnam. Images like those VietJet Air photos above 
entrench beauty standards: women have to be young, thin, fashionable, and sexy.  
The girls in Hải Thành clearly felt the importance of youth for beauty in their race to get 
married before becoming “old.” I once asked Hoa, then 21, why she dropped out of college to go 
back to Hải Thành, learn Korean, and aim to get married to a Korean man.  
Linh: Why do you have to marry this year instead of waiting till you are 22, 23, or 24?  
Hoa: Then I will be old. Marrying a Korean man at my age is already old. Now, if I go to 
a selection place, all I see are younger girls like Ngọc (18 years old). If I get old, I will end up 
marrying an old man. If I don’t marry now, one or two years later, I will be really old.  
Linh: But I thought that Korean men, most of them in their late 30s, would prefer 
potential spouses closer to their age than eighteen year olds?  
Hoa: Korean men, many of them think that if they have to cough money to find spouses, 
why not marry young women, beautiful women. Lots of them think that way. I am two years older 
than Ngọc. Her age is a beautiful age. My age now is already an old age (tuổi đứng bóng). In 
short, I feel really old.  
Quyên added to our conversation: A few years ago, I waited for my cousin in Korea to 
find a man for me so I did not go to the selection place. But now, at this age (then 22), I have 
aged and have to close my eyes in choosing my husband (nhắm mắt bỏ qua lấy thôi). At my age, I 
don’t have the right to be choosy anymore.  
Hoa: Yes. Like you and me now, we are old already.  
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Our teacher, who is the same age as mine, then joked: Like Linh and I, if we get to the 
selection place, they probably would say: I am begging you old ladies, please go home (lạy bà đi 
về cho con nhờ). 
In our exchange, everyone basically confirmed that “old age” is fluid and relative. 
Twenty years old, among Hải Thành girls who want to get married to Korean men, is already 
considered old. When the bar for “old age” is so low like this, it often indicates that the stakes for 
and values of youth are very high.38 Indeed, as Hoa and Quyên explain, older girls have to marry 
older men, which are of course regarded as unattractive. Moreover, being young means being 
beautiful because (Ngọc’s) young age is the beautiful age. Therefore, thirty-something-year-old 
women like Nga and me are so old that we have no values, should not even try to marry Korean 
men, and should hide at home to avoid embarrassment. We will see even more clearly the grip of 
age on older women in Hải Thành in chapter VIII in which I discuss the struggle of Uncle Tú’s 
thirty-nine-year-old daughter to remarry to a foreign man. The message, essentially, is that 
youthfulness is vital to women’s beauty, social visibility, and cultural worth. Moreover, 
youthfulness also enables the girls to have power, materialized as the right to be choosy when 
selecting their future spouses. Quyên had to marry an “old, ugly, and poor” (her word) husband 
because she was already old then. Youthfulness then contributes to social hierarchy by providing 
certain groups of younger women with opportunities for better marriages and life transformation. 
Age, in its partnership with beauty in Hải Thành, operates as a structuring principle in the society 
that ranks women, limits or enables their development and experience, and shapes how they are 
evaluated and judged. This is highly significant for the complex ways in which gender and class 
interact in the issue of power.  
                                                
38 For more research on youth and anxieties about time, see Jeffrey (2010), Ralph (2008), and 
Mains (2007).  
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The power of the girls in Hải Thành is reflected not only in their beauty and youthfulness 
but also in their relations with boys and men in town. The last part of this chapter turns to discuss 
this topic and the gendered tension between desiring subjects and objects of desire.  
 
Beauty and Gender Relations 
There exists a tension between the girls and boys in Hải Thành. The girls’ sexuality 
makes a particularly hot topic in Hải Thành. On the surface, Hải Thành girls, with their modern 
look, eroticism, consumerism, and prospective transnational marriages, blatantly defy the ideal 
Vietnamese femininity and loyalty to patriarchy. In 2012, Hải Thành was swept by the sudden 
popularity of karaoke songs about local girls. As the commune became more prosperous, many 
people were able to buy karaoke sets to sing at home or go to karaoke bars to sing and relax. A 
handful of local young men had the ingenious idea of rewriting the lyrics of popular songs to 
reflect the social situation in Hải Thành. That idea took off quickly and for months I could hear 
these songs in public places from morning to evening. The popularity of these songs proves that 
their lyrics, even though written by a few men, reflect widely shared sentiments about local girls. 
The songs, as men’s interpretations of gender relations, shed light on how the local girls are 
perceived and how they affect local gender relations. For example, one song goes like this:  
Too many young men in my rural community are still single, unable to marry. 
The girls are greedy, quit school, and migrate to Taiwan. 
You (the girl) love for fun but never talk of marriage. 
… 
No more spending on (your) food or clothes. I save money by not going into cafés and 
restaurants 
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I swear to have nothing to do with women. 
Quá nhiều thanh niên quê giờ vẫn ế, vẫn chưa lấy vợ 
Gái quê tham tiền, thôi học em đã bước sang Đài Loan 
Em yêu cho vui chứ đừng nói chuyện về đám cưới 
…. 
Không ăn không quần áo, cũng chẳng tốn tiền vào quán xá 
Thề không dính vào đàn bà 
 
In this song and many others that I have heard, in addition to critiques of consumerism 
and greediness, the girls’ intention is depicted as only having fun with Vietnamese men and not 
becoming their wives. Local men claim that they are now the victims of changing gender 
relations in Hải Thành, such as now becoming women’s playthings. Consequently, the girls are 
accused of violating the social rules for women and becoming a threat to the patrilineal 
households. Their behaviors, lifestyles, and transnational marriages seem to challenge both the 
constructions of gender (masculinity and femininity) in Vietnam and the patriarchal system that 
sustains such constructions. Interestingly, transnational marriages between Hải Thành girls and 
East Asian men are compared, locally, to the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong and Taiwan that 
affected Vietnam significantly. They liken women wanting to marry East Asian men to women 
infected with the SARS syndrome (con gái mắc dịch cúm gà Đài Loan/dịch cúm lấy chồng Đài 
Loan). Local girls are equated with an animal (a chicken) and their actions (of marrying 
foreigners) are like a disease that harms the country. In other words, the girls are regarded as 
indecent, shallow, lazy, and stupid like an animal as well as dangerous and contagious and are 
doing harm to the community and the country at large.   
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However, this kind of criticism implies that females are objects of desire and when Hải 
Thành girls refuse to follow that standard they become depraved. In Lukacs’s study of net idols 
and the culture of cuteness in Japan, Toyomi stands out as a sexual net idol. Many of her photos 
show her naked or wearing flirty lingerie. Toyomi argues that self-exploration (and, by 
extension, self-improvement) should have no limits. She does not construct herself as an object 
of desire; instead she presents herself as a desiring subject (Lukacs 2015b). I suggest that the 
same phenomenon is happening in Hải Thành. Many Hải Thành girls I know see themselves as 
desiring subjects but the males see them as objects of desire, which is the source of the men’s 
frustration. On the one hand, the boys claim that the local girls use their sexual capital to seduce 
Hải Thành boys, turn them into sexual playthings, and have the boys lavish money on them 
without having any intention of marrying them. On the other hand, the girls themselves do not 
seem to be much preoccupied with these accusations. Instead, many of them seem to pay more 
attention to beauty practices and hanging out. The following story illustrates this clash:  
One night in June, I came home after having dinner, deciding to call it a day because it 
was too hot. That night the sky was so clear that the stars blanketed the sky. As I quietly pushed 
my motorbike into the dark house, I could hear my landlady asking from her bedroom, “Linh, 
are you home?” She was always worried when I got home after she went to bed at 9:00 p.m. 
because the front door had to be left open for me (it could only be locked from the inside). I 
thought I could give her a good night sleep today by coming home early. All of a sudden, my 
phone rang, echoing through the whole dead quiet house. I looked at the number and wondered 
why Mai, a local girl I knew, would call me at this hour. “Can you come pick me up at the 
Hướng Dương motel?” she asked. “Sure, but what happened?” “Can you please come now?” “Of 
course.” She hung up the phone on me and I was quite confused, unable to figure out what she 
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was doing there. I opened the door again to walk the motorbike out, and I could hear my 
landlady’s question in surprise, “Are you leaving again?” I apologetically said yes and quietly 
walked my motorbike for five minutes before turning on the engine. Nine P.M. in rural Hải 
Thành and many people were already in bed. When I got to the motel, Mai was sitting outside on 
a back seat of a Honda scooter, arms folded in front of her chest. She was wearing a cute white 
dress with makeup on. I knew that she must have been with friends because she usually dressed 
up when going out. Not far from her was a young man, standing next to the scooter. The moment 
Mai saw me, she got off the scooter and onto the back of my motorbike, telling me, “Let’s go, 
sis.” “What happened?” I asked when we were well on our way. “I went out to have a drink with 
a group of friends, including this boy. At 8.30, I asked him if he could take me home because it 
was getting late. Instead, he took me to the motel. When we got there, he told me to get off the 
bike. I said no. I told him: either you take me home or I will call my friend to come pick me up. 
Then I called you. Can you get me home? My parents might be worried.” Mai remained so calm 
and nonchalant about the whole affair that it surprised me. Her voice did not change. She did not 
express any anxiety, nervousness, or fear. Later on, I found out that it was neither the first time 
this happened to her nor was she the only girl in Hải Thành to be harassed by local boys. Hoa 
and Ngọc had told me similar stories.   
These stories reveal different expectations when it comes to gender interactions among 
the youth in Hải Thành. The girls claimed that they dressed up because they wanted to be pretty 
and they went out with friends, including boys, because it was fun. The boys, on the other hand, 
interpreted it as sexual attraction and believed that if they spent money on girls, they could 
expect something sexual in return. There are indeed girls in Hải Thành who have premarital sex, 
which is still a taboo in rural Vietnam, with boys in Hải Thành before getting married to Korean 
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men. However, assuming that local girls’ beauty practices serve only the purpose of getting 
attention and favors from local boys and men (and turning themselves into sexual objects) misses 
the significance of beauty towards self-worth and social status for local girls. Being pretty, as I 
discussed earlier, also reflects aspirations for social recognition and praise.  
When writing about modern Shanghai girls at the turn of the 20th century, Dong indicated 
that the modern Chinese girls cultivated new behaviors, undermined the patrilineal household, 
changed gender relations in interactions with men, and established new expectations for marital 
relations. The modern Chinese girls, even though unable to revolutionize or abolish marriage, 
could negotiate a better marriage and hold promise for transforming women’s social positions 
(Dong 2008). On the surface, similar claims can be made that Hải Thành girls are democratizing 
local gender relations to the extent that the local boys now believe they are victims. Most men in 
this community believe that girls now act like boys because they have the privileges generally 
only entitled to men: freedom in having sex, self-indulgence, and power over the other sex. Local 
men have declared to me that they have to treat their wives better now for fear of them leaving 
for Korean men. Some bemoan that life in Hải Thành is chaotically upside down.  
In reality, Hải Thành girls’ power comes and goes like their own physical movement. 
They can act like boys and exert their power over boys because no matter what the consequences 
are, they will marry transnationally. Yet, once they have migrated to other countries, their power 
at home is also gone and leaves behind a worse situation for their fellow women in the 
community. Hải Thành men look at the transnational girls as a cautionary tale and tighten their 
control over their wives. As we shall see in chapter VI, translocal women are closely restrained 
and prevented from being like transnational women. The relation between the two groups of 
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women, transnational and translocal, is another example of how the liberty of one group of 
women is at the expense of another group.    
Hải Thành girls’ beauty practices are best understood as a form of weak power (Fiske 
1993). It is a localizing form of power where the weak can exert their control without necessarily 
transforming the larger structure. Hải Thành girls, through beauty practices, navigate the system 
of gender and class inequalities to assert their agency and achieve their individual life 
transformation thanks to transnational marriages. Yet, when they leave the country to marry 
foreign men, they also leave intact the cultural and gender scripts in which they are caught.  
It can be concluded that the beauty backlash against the young girls in Hải Thành ignores 
the drastic social changes, including economic and cultural disparities, that impact rural women’s 
choices and practices. These girls are not simply vain, mindless, and lazy. They are also desiring, 
disappointed, judgmental, and confident. Critics of the local girls tend to overlook their agency 
and strategy through beauty practices for defining themselves and for gaining self-worth, 
financial stability, and hope in a society that is increasingly stratified and structurally hostile to 
rural women. 
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Chapter IV 
Why Not?: Transnational Class and the Normalization of Transnational 
Marriages 
 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on young girls in Hải Thành and their marriages to East Asian men, 
especially as they navigate the plurality of moral norms and transnational social classes. I 
explore the lives of local girls in Hải Thành before most of them migrate to Taiwan or South 
Korea after marrying East Asian men. By carefully unpacking the girls’ journey of transnational 
marriage that marks them as Việt Kiều, I show how physical movement is profoundly shaped by 
gendered ideologies as well as imagination and experience of migration. Moreover, I argue that 
the normalization of their marriages to foreign men highlights the need to conceive social class 
beyond the confine of the nation-state.  
 
The Phenomenon of Transnational Marriages in Hải Thành 
Hải Thành is well known nationwide as the commune that sends a remarkably high 
number of its local women to marry Taiwanese and Korean men. The phenomenon of 
transnational marriages in this commune has been covered in many Vietnamese newspapers. One 
of them even called it “the place where men cannot find spouse,” implying the lack of local 
women for marriages. In Hải Phòng city, Hải Thành has earned the reputation of “a village of 
overseas Vietnamese” (làng Kiều). The high number of marriages between women and foreign 
men, exemplified in Hải Thành, however, is not entirely unusual both within and outside of 
Vietnam. 
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In Vietnam, marriages between young rural Vietnamese women and Taiwanese and 
South Korean men are quite common. Transnational marriages, despite popular opinion, are not 
a new experience. Historically, mail-order brides were sent from Europe to male-dominant 
migrant communities in the United States in the 20th century. East European brides were 
introduced to men in Western Europe and North America in the last few decades (Kawaguchi 
and Lee 2011). What is different in more recent cases of Asian transnational marriage is its 
unprecedented size and level of geographical diversity. The more recent Asian transnational 
marriage phenomenon occurs across the continent and marriage migration from mainland China 
and Southeast Asia to more developed East Asian countries has risen dramatically since the early 
90s (Hugo and Nguyen 2007). In Vietnam, statistics from National Statistics Offices show that 
Vietnamese women are the second largest group of transnationals, after Chinese women, to 
marry Taiwanese and South Korean men (Bélanger 2010). The Vietnamese Ministry of Justice 
estimated that from 1995 to 2010, there were 300,000 Vietnamese women marrying foreigners, 
most of whom were Taiwanese and South Korean (Mai 2011). Transnational marriages have 
become a significant social trend (phong trào) in Vietnam. They happened in two waves: the first 
wave began in the mid-1990s and includes mostly transnational marriages between Vietnamese 
women and Taiwanese men. The second wave occurred a few years later in the early 2000s and 
is marked by the predominant marriages between Vietnamese women and South Korean men. 
Even though the two waves are almost ten years apart, there are striking similarities between 
them.  
Scholars have pointed out similar socio-economic changes in Taiwan and South Korea 
that have affected demographic and marriage patterns. In both countries, there are more males 
than females, but this marriage squeeze factor plays only a minor role (Bélanger, Lee, and Wang 
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2010). The main push for transnational marriages is how contemporary young Taiwanese and 
South Korean women are less willing than their mothers to enter marriages that require more 
traditional female roles (e.g., staying at home and looking after their in-laws). This is especially 
true in rural communities where heavy outmigration of young women to the cities has 
exacerbated the shortage of females (Bélanger 2010, Hugo and Nguyen 2007). Consequently, 
working-class males, many from rural Taiwan and South Korea, with unattractive jobs (farming, 
construction, etc.) and conservative views on marriage have had to look to Southeast Asia and 
China for their prospective spouses. They resort to match-making services or interpersonal 
connections to facilitate transnational marriages.  
The similarities between Vietnamese culture and Taiwanese/Korean culture also 
encourage transnational marriages. Equally important is how marriage migration is embedded in 
the transnational network of business that links Taiwan and South Korea with Vietnam through 
expanded investment and interchanging flows of people, finance, media, and ideology. Taiwan 
and South Korea were the top two FDI investors in Vietnam from 1990 to 2010 (IntellAsia 
2011). Thus, it is not surprising that the majority of transnational brides are from the rural south, 
particularly the Mekong Delta Region, because 1) it is very close to Ho Chi Minh City, the 
economic capital of Vietnam, and 2) it is home to some of the poorest communities and poverty 
may provide incentives for transnational marriages. As these young rural women approach legal 
marriageable age with no job prospect in sight, they opt for transnational marriages in hopes of 
better lives. Most of the transnational brides are very young (under 20 years old) while their 
husbands are much older, creating an age gap of 15 years or more (Bélanger 2010, Hsia 2008, 
Sheu 2007). 
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The number of transnational marriages with Taiwanese men peaked in 2002 and has been 
declining ever since. The Taiwanese government passed laws limiting transnational marriages in 
the early 2000s because Taiwanese public opinion decried that transnational marriages were out 
of control (Bélanger 2010). As the number of transnational marriages with Taiwanese men 
started to drop, transnational marriages with South Korean men multiplied, largely due to 
simpler legal paperwork and low-cost marriage fees (Tien 2006). Transnational marriages with 
Korean men increased by 28% per year since 2002 but began to decline gradually since 2007 
after a series of Korean government’s regulations and restrictions on marriage visas and 
matchmaking agencies (Kim 2015a). Nevertheless, marrying a Korean man is still an option that 
many rural Vietnamese women have. The popularity of marriages with Korean men in rural 
Vietnam is captured in the following picture taken by Người Đưa Tin newspaper in 2014: it was 
a marriage advertisement hand written on a wall by the road: 
 
Figure 4.1   (want to) marry Korean man (?). Call: 01676755344 
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Hải Thành stands out as the rural commune that has the highest number of transnational 
women nationwide, estimated to be around 2500 (Duong 2013). In a community of only 12,000 
people, 2500 women is a significantly high number. Transnational marriages between local 
women and East Asian men started in Hải Thành in the early 2000s with only 12 marriages. 
Since 2005, the number of transnational marriages has escalated yearly, peaking in 2008 when 
600 local women migrated to Taiwan and South Korea, according to Ms. Ngọt, the chairman of 
the local Women’s Union. The statistics from the Hải Thành Youth Union in 2013 show that the 
number of Hải Thành single women over 18 (thus legally marriageable) who remain in the 
community is fewer than 20 (Duong 2013). In fact the number of transnational marriages is so 
high that since September 2012, the city of Hải Phòng has decided to ban transnational marriages 
in several communes, including Hải Thành, after facing increasing complaints that local men 
could not find prospective wives. This ban, however, has not succeeded in limiting transnational 
marriages in Hải Thành as Hải Thành people just pay to have their residential status (hộ khẩu) 
transferred to different provinces on paper without actually moving. After the marriages are 
finalized and migration completed, they transfer their residence back. 
In these transnational marriages, most of the girls’ age range from 16 to 20 and their 
husbands are 35 to 55 years old (even though there are a few exceptions when the couples are 
both older). There are various reasons why the girls get married so young. One is their youthful 
desire to get out of Hải Thành to explore the world. Second is the feeling of being left behind 
when almost all the friends have married and migrated. The girls I know often talk of reuniting 
with their friends abroad and even having class reunions in Taiwan and South Korea. Third, their 
parents are concerned that their daughters having nothing to do at home might get into all sorts 
of trouble and, therefore, want to get them married as soon as possible. Finally, young age acts as 
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a risk minimizer. Hoa, my Korean classmate, explained to me that in case their marriages do not 
work out in the end, they are still young enough to get married again. These various reasons 
concerning age reflect how youth, for many women, has a transformative power: it can bring 
life-changing options like transnational marriages. But they have to utilize it before they get 
older and lose the opportunities.  
 
The Normalization of Transnational Marriages: Gender, Imagination, and Experience 
Gendered ideologies 
Movement is often gendered: how, where, and whether or not one moves is different for 
men and women. For example, women are often judged in Vietnam if the way they move is 
graceful or not because graceful women attract men (yểu điệu thục nữ quân tử hiếu cầu). In this 
community, women are excluded from long offshore fishing trips, which are consider to be 
men’s domain. Similarly the commonality of transnational marriages and migration of women 
from Hải Thành is shaped by gender. In particular, it reflects the cultural belief that women are 
outsiders and men are insiders with regards to family and lineage. Vietnamese women, once 
married, are considered to belong to her husband’s lineage. Because men are the foundation that 
prolongs the lineage, they are the root and rooted in the home. Women, on the other hand, are 
seen as moving from one family to another family, from one lineage to another lineage. 
Moreover, traditional Vietnamese marriages were often arranged and women had little say in 
whom they married. Traditional literature in Vietnam has long compared women to an object 
that cannot control its own fate:  
Thân em như hạt mưa rào 
Hạt rơi xuống giếng, hạt vào vườn hoa 
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Women are like the raindrops 
Some drops fall into the wells, some into gardens.  
Thân em như thể bèo trôi 
Sóng dập gió dồi biết tấp vào đâu? 
Women are like the water fern 
Tossed by the waves, blown by the wind, where will they end up? 
Those folk poems indicate a common past reality of Vietnamese women venturing out of 
home in uncertainty because of marriages. If they were lucky, they would land in good families. 
If they were not, there was nothing anyone could do about it. This cultural attitude about the 
‘uncontrollable’ fate of women came up many times when Hải Thành parents explained to me 
why they agreed to let their daughters marry foreigners and move to distant lands. To them, their 
daughters did not belong at home and they were destined to make that journey, even a long one, 
to a new home. The success of that journey is determined, more or less, by their daughters’ luck.  
The cultural ideology of women as outsiders and men as insiders, women as floating and 
men as rooted, however, has an interesting twist with regards to gender preference and family 
contribution in Hải Thành. There is a local inclination of sending daughters overseas over sons. 
Not only because men should stay home to take care of their parents and lineage, but also 
overseas men do not send as much money home to their parents as overseas women. Nga, my 
Korean language teacher, made it intelligible for me: since men are the roots, they have to take 
care of their own family first. Women, on the other hand, are already taken care of by their 
husbands and therefore can send more money home to their parents. I knew a number of wealthy 
families in Hải Thành, including the three owners of a local discotheque, a big café, and a 
furniture store, who sent their daughters abroad (not through transnational marriages) while 
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keeping their sons at home. It is the cultural ideology on gender that has played a role in enabling 
local women’s transnational movement. This feminization of remittances is not limited to Hải 
Thành. Studies show that Asian women send more money home in China, the Philippines, Hong 
Kong, and Vietnam (Fleischer 2010, Pinches 2001, Jackson, Ho, and Na 2013, Marx and 
Fleischer 2010). Daughters are viewed as more responsible and reliable to send parts of their 
incomes to their families (Earl 2014).  
As I discussed above, local women’s transnational marriages are culturally related to the 
concept of luck (and, thus, risk). It does not mean, however, that Hải Thành parents just blindly 
send their daughters away or that the girls have no say in their marriages like in the past. The 
decision of a transnational marriage is also tied to a dream of life transformation made possible 
by overseas migration. These dreams are sold to the girls and their parents through matchmakers 
like Duyên, through the media like Facebook and movies, and through other girls who have 
successfully migrated. They demonstrate the importance of imagination to movement.  
 
Imaginations of movement 
Scholars of movement studies have long pointed out that culturally and historically laden 
imaginaries are at the root of movement because they produce the motivation and desire to move. 
Imaginaries, enmeshed in global circuits of mediated images and narratives, inform how people 
envision the world and identities and their mobilities in it (Salazar and Graburn 2014, Salazar 
2011). Such imaginaries are different from individual imaginings in their being widely shared, 
expressed in binaries (nature-culture, here-there, local-cosmopolitan, traditional-modern) and 
often reflecting socio-cultural and political stereotypes (such as orientalism, colonialism, or 
cosmopolitanism). Therefore, imaginaries of other places and people are highly molded by 
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power and hierarchy, resulting in both horizontal (geographical) and vertical (economic-
financial, social-status, cultural-cosmopolitan) values (Salazar 2011).  
In Hải Thành, people’s imaginaries of ‘the West’ and capitalism clearly demonstrate how 
meanings and values are ascribed to form a hierarchy of binaries. Local people view Western 
societies as better and more desirable because they are associated with cosmopolitanism, 
industrialism, cleanness, freedom to move, human rights (particularly women’s rights) and 
welfare, and opportunities for social mobility. The myth of social benefits in Western societies is 
especially appealing as countless Hải Thành residents believe only in the West can a person stay 
home without any need to work because they receive monthly support from the government. In 
Vietnam, the opposite is perceived: rurality, agriculturalism, pollution, restriction of movement, 
domestic violence, and lack of welfare benefits and social advancement. Moreover, the 
superiority of the West is seen in its family structure: nuclear families vs. Vietnamese extended 
families where one has to live with the in-laws. These binaries reflect what Carling (2008) calls 
‘transnational resource inequalities’: asymmetry in the distribution of different forms of 
resources: not only material and cultural resources but also movement resources (legal 
entitlements to international movement based on citizenship and residence status).  
The appeals of ‘the West’ lie in more than just differences in resources but also 
differences in lifestyles, especially for the younger generations. Our discussion in Korean class 
illuminates this point:  
Linh: I know some of the girls who chose to marry locally. They have quite a leisure life; 
I saw that they spend a lot of time playing cards with each other.  
Nga (teacher): Playing cards but [they] do not get to see beautiful scenery, travel, or go 
on airplanes, or take pictures of cherry blossoms and flying snow.  
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Classmate 1: They don’t get to go out every weekend, go in cars. People over there, they 
work and play, here they only work and do not play.  
Linh: but people here are quite well-known for knowing how to play. 
Classmate 2: Yes, but they don’t travel very far; they only limit themselves to local 
places. Only going to the karaoke places, aren’t they sick of it already? There, 
they travel.  
Nga: See, the autumn leaves are falling, see the red color? Where do you get that in 
Vietnam? Where do you get an incredible wedding photo album like this? 
Classmate 1: There are some magically beautiful wedding photos, especially those taken 
by the sea. Teacher, you just push my blood of desires (máu thèm khát) to the 
climax.  
Both my teacher and classmates expressed their desires for certain lifestyles such as 
owning cars, traveling, having leisure, and self focus. In that sense, they aspire to an urban 
lifestyle and the globalized cultural practices associated with elites and middle classes (Earl 
2014). They indicate that even though some Hải Thành residents might have money, they still 
remain working-class because of their limited experience and rural way of living. As such, the 
gap between Hải Thành and the foreign countries is not only in resources and the ability to 
accumulate them but also in lifestyle and social class, proving that social class is better 
conceptualized transnationally than nationally, a point to which I will return later in this chapter.  
There is also a hierarchy between capitalism and socialism. Hải Thành people praise the 
economic boost brought about by the country’s economic reform. They compare the communist 
economic system of the past in which the closed command market brought forth extreme poverty 
and hunger (nghèo đói) with the capitalist system now in which the free market economy 
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provides a better standard of living. It is precisely because of the extreme poverty in the 1980s 
that many Hải Thành people left Vietnam as economic boat refugees. This comparison reveals 
the local people’s relief that they are no longer so financially desperate to have to flee the 
country like boatpeople in the past, but also a sense of regret that they missed out because they 
perceive “Western” capitalism as so much better than “Asian” capitalism, illuminating the 
existence of alternative capitalisms. Similar to how tourism to developing countries depends on 
three myths: the myth of the unchanged, the unrestrained, and the uncivilized (Echtner and 
Prasad 2003), Hải Thành people’s imaginaries of the West sustain three myths: the myth of the 
new/modern, of the orderly, and of the civilized.  
According to this logic, it is hardly surprising that Hải Thành residents rank the 
attractiveness of foreign destinations according to where they can migrate: Western countries 
(like Canada, Australia, Sweden, or the UK) rank first, followed by East Asian countries (Hong 
Kong, South Korea, Taiwan). Indeed, this ranking usually indicates social prestige in Hải Thành, 
not only in terms of the successful migration to more desirable destinations but also in terms of 
how much money one has available to realize such migration. A well-known fact in Hải Thành is 
that it takes much more money to send your children to Western nations than to East Asian 
nations. Migration through marriages to Taiwan or Korea costs almost nothing in Hải Thành. On 
the other hand, in order to migrate to Australia, for example, there are only two extremely costly 
ways: self-supported education or fake marriages, both amount to at least $50,000. That does not 
include the very high risk of visa denial and loss of all the money.  
It does not make sense, therefore, for many people in Hải Thành when certain Hải Thành 
girls have the opportunity to migrate to “the West” yet turn it down in favor of marriages with 
  
152 
East Asian men. For example, a Hải Thành girl puzzled two successful local men, the owners of 
a discotheque and a café who both sent their daughters to Australia, with her choice: 
C:  Let me ask you this: the daughter of Lan Cường has everything; why does she still 
need to marry a Korean man? 
Q:  it’s just a fad she follows.  
C:  I don’t understand. Her sister is in Canada. She lives here with her brother, both are 
provided well by the parents. Even the Korean man she marries was shocked to see 
how huge her house is, questioning if she is so rich, why she still marries me? See, 
even the Korean man was perplexed. And she is very pretty. Both she and her sister 
are extremely pretty. And she can totally go to Canada. Instead, she marries a 
Korean. What the hell?  
Q:  She doesn’t know any better.  
It is easy to assume that transnational marriages are caused by poverty or the lack of 
knowledge on the girls’ part. Such an assumption fails to explain the choice of Lan Cường’s 
daughter who is neither poor nor uninformed because it misses the important role of imaginaries 
in producing Taiwan and especially South Korea as desirable destinations. Studies have 
demonstrated the power of modern media and people’s experiences in producing and circulating 
representations of other places and people. Films, literatures, and arts can lend ‘authenticity’ to 
the imaginaries (Salazar and Graburn 2014). For instance, the K-pop culture has created an 
Asian-wide sensation, manufacturing very favorable perceptions of South Korea. Viewers of 
Korean television dramas believe that South Korea is a country of modernity, urban glamor and 
women-centeredness (Chua and Iwabuchi 2008). In Vietnam, Korean and Chinese soap operas 
occupy most of the total drama time on television, to the extent that Vietnamese authorities are 
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concerned with young Vietnamese being Koreanized (Viet Van 2012). What makes Korean soap 
operas especially popular is how Korean masculinity and femininity are produced to allure 
viewers: The men are masculine but tender and sensitive as well as extremely romantic while the 
women are beautiful, glamorous, and always manage to find the right men that will change their 
lives from humble background to elite status (Creighton 2009, Chua and Iwabuchi 2008). Vu and 
Lee (2013) summarize the appeal of K-dramas: “Korean dramas feature handsome, meticulously 
dressed men and beautiful women. … The extravagant display associated with the stars and 
fashion in Korean serials blatantly presents pictures of a dream world that many women in the 
region want to have, but only a small proportion can afford” (Vu and Lee 2013, 3). Their study 
shows that Vietnamese women who watch Korean soap operas frequently hold a less accurate 
and more positive perception of Korea. They also have stronger desires to marry Korean men 
and are more willing to contact matchmaking services to make it happen (Vu and Lee 2013).  
The fascination with everything Korean (and to a lesser extent, Taiwanese) is the same in 
Hải Thành. Many girls religiously follow Korean fashion trends. They dream about going to 
Korea to transform themselves into beautiful women, or having romantic love like in the movies, 
or seeing the beautiful scenery like the pretty white snow blanketing landscapes and the golden 
foliage of fall, which, according to my classmates, cannot be bought even with much money in 
Vietnam. In Hải Thành, thanks to the high number of transnational women already migrating to 
Korea and Taiwan, these imaginaries are strengthened not only by soap operas but also by 
Facebook where Korean lives are represented in romanticized ways. For example, Bình showed 
me a photo of her friend on Facebook with an exclamation: “I’m so jealous of her.” I noticed that 
within hours of being posted, this cutesy picture of a happy romantic Hải Thành-Korean couple 
received almost 300 likes and much admiration in the comments.  
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Figure 4.2    A Facebook photo of a happy transnational marriage 
Hoa, even before her marriage to a Korean man, had proclaimed on Facebook her love 
for Korean romanticized sceneries: 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3   “How could I live without it … Beautiful beyond imagination. I want it now.” 
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The appeal of Korea and Taiwan goes beyond just the media. It is redoubled by stories 
told by Hải Thành people who have been to Korea or Taiwan. Many parents, after visiting their 
daughters, come home and profess their awe: Korea is like heaven, the air is pure without a 
single grain of sand, the buildings are tall and modern, and people are so clean and beautiful. 
Transnational women who visit home also put a lot of effort into their looks to prove that they 
are now Kiều.39 People would automatically point out to me when we went out who the Korean 
or Taiwanese transnationals (Kiều Đài Loan, Hàn Quốc) were even among the crowd because of 
the way they dressed.  
The romantic allure of East Asian countries produced and circulated in Hải Thành is very 
different from the imaginaries of the West. The latter is about having a good and (financially) 
stable life. According to many Hải Thành girls, those who have migrated to Western countries 
may have more money but they have to work and they don’t look as fashionable40 or are not 
pampered by their husbands, who are usually Vietnamese. When we talked in our class about the 
differences between third country Kiều and Korean Kiều, Hoa said:  
I notice that third country Kiều do not dress up as stylishly as Korean Kiều. My aunts are 
in Canada and they dress exactly as they did back in Vietnam. It is said that you have a better 
life there and the dollar is worth more, but I don’t like it. I don’t like it at all. There, the husband 
does not provide for you. You have to work to earn money to buy clothes. In Korea, the husband 
takes care of you from a to z.  Even if he is poor, he still has to find a way to provide for you, 
maybe not as much as other people but still half as much as others. 
                                                
39 Thai (2014) explains that Vietnamese migrants, when faced with limited economic 
opportunities in the countries they settle, feel the need to turn to consumption in the homeland as 
a source of power and self-valorization.  
40 Of course, beauty and aesthetics in Hải Thành are very much shaped by Korean standards. 
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I then asked them about the common notions of ‘ploughing’ (cày) (i.e working hard) to 
make money when Vietnamese migrate abroad, Ngọc responded:  
No, I won’t plough. My job is to eat, sleep, and be beautiful. I will wake up and cook for 
my husband in the morning. After he leaves for work, I will go back to my bed and continue to 
sleep. My husband will take care of me with everything else.41  
Hoa and Ngọc both expressed the desire to be taken care of financially rather than the 
desire of having opportunities to work and earn money. Interestingly enough, in Vietnam the 
notion of a better life abroad is mostly associated with more opportunities, resources and 
resource accumulation (Small 2012b). Hải Thành residents, especially those who are older, 
convey this sentiment very clearly along with the belief in gender equalities that enable women 
to earn more money and protect themselves from domestic abuse. Many of the girls in Hải 
Thành, on the other hand, find the patriarchal family model in Korea more attractive. They 
believe and like that in Korea their husbands have the responsibility to provide for them no 
matter what. They do not want to work; they would rather be pampered housewives and focus 
more on themselves (such as their beauty), desires they think cannot be achieved in the West. 
Interestingly enough, many East Asian women struggle with their roles as housewives and the 
loss of their independent identities (Lukacs 2015b) and scholars argue that the continued 
tradition of men having productive roles and women reproductive roles reinforces patriarchal 
inequality in the distribution of power and authority in East Asian societies (Kaku 2013, Kong 
                                                
41 Ngọc also added that when she moved to Korea, she would not get a job to send money home 
for her parents. Instead, she would get pregnant and then sponsor her parents to Korea so that 
they could work and earn money for themselves. My teacher Nga responded “[t]hat fits the 
policies of our nation and the Communist Party” (Đúng chính sách của Đảng và Nhà nước). By 
joking about the approval of the state and the party on Ngọc’s choice, Nga implicitly confirms 
the increasing acceptance of individualism in Vietnam and the notion of citizenship as self-
responsible.  
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2013). But in the case of Hải Thành girls, many consider being provided for to be a desirable 
privilege. It is understandable that these romanticized imaginaries of Korea are appealing to 
young women because Vietnamese women frequently shoulder much hard work both inside and 
outside of the house and they are not indulged in Vietnamese society (Khuat, Bui, and Le 2012). 
Therefore, many of Hải Thành girls choose to follow their dreams in East Asia rather than the 
more “advanced” West.  
Moreover, it should be noted that places are not evaluated simply in terms of being 
“behind” or “ahead.” Jansen (2009) shows that places are often ranked by their movement 
through time. That is, for a place to become home, the place must bring a sense that it is going 
somewhere. Hải Thành people rank the destinations in terms of how “far” they imagine a place 
could go, or, in other words, how many opportunities for social advancement that place can 
provide. Such consideration and ranking affected the choice of Thu, a daughter of a well-off 
family in Hải Thành. Thu’s aunts were boatpeople who had resettled in Canada. I met Thu 
because she wanted to talk to me about study abroad. Thu applied for a college in eastern Canada 
but could not get in because she failed her IELTS test. Thu indicated she would probably take the 
test again. In the meantime, her aunts in Canada tried to facilitate a fake marriage for her but she 
was concerned about the difficulty of getting a Canadian visa. According to Thu, it was easy to 
have a fake marriage to go to France or Sweden but she did not want to go because there was no 
job for her in France or Sweden. When I asked her what kind of job she would get in Canada, she 
replied: nail. Her cousins had told her she would make 70 million VND (3,500 USD) per month 
doing nails. Minus the living expenses, she would save 30 to 40 million per month. Her cousins 
said after work Thu could go shopping and she should buy an expensive brand-name purse so 
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people cannot look down on her. Thu believed she could not achieve such a life in Vietnam or 
France, where she would probably be a stay-at-home wife.  
There is not only ranking among countries in the West but also between the West and the 
East. Surprisingly, the West does not necessarily come out ahead. Even though it is still firmly 
believed in Hải Thành that the West is “real” capitalism (tư bản thật) where “true” happiness 
dwells, the West does not open its door to family members in Vietnam. It is almost impossible 
for parents or siblings to visit their children or sisters who have migrated to Western countries. 
What makes Korea particularly attractive to many Hải Thành girls is the effortlessness of getting 
visas for their parents to visit. The visa is valid for six months and can be renewed easily. Thus, 
many Hải Thành parents have been able to visit their daughters when they have babies and, more 
importantly, work under the table to earn money. The abundance of low-wage jobs in Korea and 
the ease of getting them for Hải Thành parents reduce the pressure on transnational women to 
support their parents tremendously. Many Hải Thành girls prefer Korea to Canada because they 
see it as a win-win situation: lives are better for both them and their parents without them having 
to work too hard.  
The imaginaries of Taiwan and Korea are then translated into desires: desires to go on 
airplanes, to dress like actresses, to wear sunglasses, to stop being rural, to find quick money and 
happiness, etc. Many Hải Thành people see those desires, which act as the motivation for 
transnational marriages, as foolish because they believe their imaginations are unrealistic. It is 
common to hear people mock transnational women: they think they will find heaven but when 
they get there, they will see it is worse than Hải Thành. The implication here is that the girls are 
young and brainless and they will pay the price for either being greedy or being naïve.  
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Experiences of movement 
While imaginaries might contribute to the popularity of transnational marriages in Hải 
Thành, it is only part of the story. Decisions to marry foreign men involve not only desires of a 
better future but also considerations of past experiences. Acts, especially ethical acts, are 
temporalized. Many anthropologists have argued that time is not a coherent flow from the past to 
the present and to the future, where causes lead to effects in a predictable manner. In fact, if we 
think about how we act at the moment (the Now), it often involves speaking, thinking, 
remembering what happened, and hoping what will happen. In other words, we weave together 
specific past events and specific future anticipations to make sense of the current moment (the 
Now) so that we can be informed of possibilities and act at that moment. Unlike a notion of time 
as flowing coherently, this creation of the Now is pragmatic (a selection of specific having-beens 
and could-bes that sheds light on the act at the moment) and the past events and future hopes can 
be disjointed rather than unified (Zigon 2014b, Miyazaki 2003, Munn 1992). By creating a 
particular temporal relation to a singular ethical moment, one is able to create particular 
possibilities to act in that unique moment (Zigon 2014b).  
Considering transnational marriages as a moral experience in Hải Thành, the act of 
getting married transnationally is shaped in the moment by both the specific could-bes and had-
beens. The imagination of a better life in Taiwan and Korea are not groundless but solidified by 
the experience of their friends’ life transformation. Here’s how Hoa explained to me her decision 
to get married: 
At first, I was very much against that idea: I thought it was like marrying my father 
because most Korean and Taiwanese men who came here were so old. But then I saw how happy 
my friends all had been with their (transnational) marriages so I changed my mind. I too wanted 
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a husband  who would treat me nicely and take care of me. I also wanted to make money so that I 
could send it home for my parents. 
Hoa talked about how her friends’ marriage experiences changed her opinions and in so 
doing, created the possibility for her own marriage. We often think of experience as historical 
and past-oriented (Scott 1991). However, in this case, it is experience as lived-through that 
enables future possibilities. Or as Zigon (2014b) argues, experience is oriented toward the 
creation of future possibilities of acting and being. Through the experience of other transnational 
women, the particular possibility of getting married transnationally was realized and acted on, 
instead of closed off, for Hoa. 
The recurrence of transnational marriage experiences also highlights the central role of 
repetition in opening up possibilities for acting. Zigon (2014b) speaks of repetition as the chance 
for change – for acting and being different because one cannot expect a different outcome if one 
keeps doing the same things. So repetition, for people in Zigon’s study, opens up a possibility for 
differences: a new way of being and living. 
In the case of transnational marriages, repetition does not lead to a possibility of change; 
instead, repetition is a way of ensuring the same possibilities. Hải Thành residents say that the 
majority of transnational women they know are happily married, so if they or their daughters or 
sisters marry transnationally, they are likely to find happiness too. Thus while repetition, in 
general, makes possible different ways of acting (as people often way, “just stop doing the 
same”), repetition in Hải Thành makes people go: “just keep doing the same.” The act of getting 
married transnationally is, arguably, shaped in the moment by the repetition of the had-beens 
(successes of other transnational marriages) and the could-be (hopes and anticipations their own 
marriages and their families). 
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Repetition also plays a role in making transnational women disregard negative could-bes 
and had-beens as hopes of a better future outweigh fears of an uncertain future, and stories of 
successful marriages outweigh stories of divorces. Thanks to repetition, hope is transformed into 
confidence.42 In this sense, the past experiences and future hopes, that are pulled in the 
temporalization process, make the act of marrying transnationally possible, are not necessarily 
coherent but selective and disjointed.  
Transnational marriages are, therefore, not a fad mindlessly followed by young naïve 
girls in Hải Thành. The decision to get married with East Asian men arises out of the hope for a 
better future as well as the likelihood of realizing what many other girls who have left achieve. 
Hoa summarized this expectation as follow: “I look at all my friends who have married Korean 
husbands and in general, they are stable, good. I don’t understand how but anyone who has 
gone to Korea has money to send home for building a house for her parents. In the first year, 
they send enough to build parts of the house like a kitchen or a bathroom. Then after three to 
four years, or five to seven years if longer, they can send enough to build brand new houses.” 
Hoa expressed that if all her friends had been doing well conjugally and financially, she probably 
would too.  
 
The Infrastructure of Transnational Marriages 
The popularity and feasibility of transnational marriages in Vietnam relies in no small 
part on the family networks and the private matchmaking agencies that facilitate transnational 
encounters and subsequent marriages. Vietnamese women who have successfully migrated 
through marriages can act as a go-between to find husbands for their sisters or cousins. 
                                                
42 Even though such a sense of confidence is, of course, never complete.  
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Transnational marriages through family networks often provide more security and trust for 
people involved than marriages made possible through a matchmaker agency. The matchmaking 
agencies, however, are able to bring many Korean and Taiwanese men to Vietnam, allowing the 
women to have more choices and lessen the time they have to wait for potential matches. They 
are, consequently, more popular than family networks in orchestrating transnational marriages. 
The men usually have to bear most of the cost for transnational marriages. A Taiwanese man 
seeking a Vietnamese wife has to pay a fee of between $7,000 and $10,000 that will cover 
everything: his flight to Vietnam, expenses for the selection, wedding, and paperwork (Wang and 
Chang 2002). 
When a Korean or Taiwanese man visits Hải Thành, he is shown and introduced to a 
number of potential women at local hotels. All potential brides are brought together in a room 
and he moves from one woman to another to consider them. With the help of a translator, he asks 
a few questions to whomever he finds attractive. If there are many women, he will pick a number 
of them for the next round until he finally selects a bride. Depending on the number of women 
attending for that day, this whole process can take from half an hour to three hours. After he has 
selected a woman, the matchmaker will arrange the wedding in the next days and start preparing 
for the wife’s migration paperwork. In order to have a smooth process, the matchmaking industry 
includes sub-agents in both Taiwan/Korea and Vietnam that handle recruitment and paperwork. 
My fieldwork indicates that the transnational marriages between Vietnamese women and East 
Asian men now cost around $10,000.  
The transnational marriage network that facilitates the huge number of marriages 
includes agencies in South Korea or Taiwan and their partners in Vietnam. In Hải Thành, these 
partners started out in the early 2000s as handling only the paperwork and legal procedures. 
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However, when the business started to bloom, they took on the role of brokering. They rely 
heavily on local recruiters referred to as cow herders (người chăn bò). This term implies that the 
girls are like clueless animals (cows) that needed to be herded and guided. There are about seven 
or eight major matchmaking agencies (mối) in Hải Thành but many cow herders. Cow herders 
are usually local women who know all the young girls in their hamlets. They go directly to their 
neighbors to persuade the girls and their parents, using their status as neighbors or relatives to 
create trust. When the matchmaking agencies bring Korean men to Hải Thành, the cow herders 
get the girls to the hotels for selection (đi tuyển). One cow herder can work for many agencies, 
taking one girl to many agencies until she is selected. Similarly, if a Korean man cannot pick 
from the girls the cow herders bring in, the agency will ask different cow herders for more girls. 
A cow herder is paid $350 (7 million VND) by the agency for each selected girl.  
To recruit more girls for “selection day,” cow herders pay each girl 50 cents (10,000 
VND) just for showing up or pay for motorbike taxis (xe ôm) to come pick up the girls and 
transport them to the selection locations. Local people liken the image of a guy riding a 
motorbike and two or three girls dressing up with heavy make-up in the back seat to the picture 
of a farmer transporting a couple of pigs on his motorbike (chở như chở lợn). The local slangs 
that refer to the girls as “cows” and “pigs” fit with the rural context, but are striking in their 
degradation of the girls. In these linguistic utterances, the girls are not even regarded as humans 
but animals who have no agency and are prone to the guidance and manipulation of (other) 
humans. This blatant ridicule of the girls is part of the moral backlash they face for challenging 
national loyalty and traditional femininity, a topic I will discuss at length later in the chapter.  
In addition to incentivizing the girls, cow herders also tell them to wear nice clothes, 
wear make-up, and teach them appropriate answers to Korean men’s questions to enhance their 
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chances of being selected. Cow herders even maximize their pool of girls by taking pictures of 
local women and posting them online for Korean men to select (tuyển qua ảnh). Once a girl is 
selected by a Korean man, the cow herder will convince the girl to meet him. Their methods are 
so pervasive that almost all Hải Thành girls have been courted or photographed by cow herders.  
I met with a cow herder when I accompanied Bình, a twenty-seven-year-old girl I knew 
from my Korean class, to discuss a potential man for Bình at a café. Bình asked me to come with 
her because she was rather nervous and was not sure what to expect or to ask Duyên, the cow 
herder. Bình told me in advance that Duyên had married a Korean man before but ended up in a 
divorce. She worked illegally in Korea for a few years before she got caught and deported back 
to Hải Thành. Now Duyên worked as a cow herder and an interpreter for a matchmaking 
company. Duyên came to the meeting almost half an hour late and said that she was so busy at 
work because her company had brought many Korean men to Hải Thành lately. Duyên was 
probably in her late 30s and looked very polished in a short and tight-fit yellow dress with black 
shiny heels. I noticed that she put on much gold jewelry: a chain, week bracelets, dangling 
earrings, and a ring with a big stone. As soon as she sat down, she started talking: 
You know, after I had gone to Korea, I did not want to come back to Vietnam. Here when 
you go to Metro supermarket in Hải Phòng city, the workers there are so haughty. In Korea, they 
bow down to greet you. If you marry a Korean man, you can also work there. Remember then to 
convert the money you earn in Korea into Vietnamese money to give you more motivation. If you 
just said, “oh, that’s not much, just enough to buy a dress” then you won’t be motivated to work. 
You will have to work hard to earn money in Korea; in Vietnam you can play but you won’t 
make any money. Anyhow, you should get married no matter what. When you are sick, just to see 
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your husband’s shadow will make you feel better. Moreover, a woman without a husband in 
Vietnam will be subjected to gossip.  
After painting the general picture about work, marriages, and overseas life, Duyên turned 
to warn Bình: 
My company does real work with real people, no cheating here. But because of that, we 
are strict. Any potential bride that causes trouble won’t be tolerated. We will stop doing business 
with her immediately. If you agree, the fee is ten million VND (500 USD). We will return the fee 
to your parents if you still stay with your husband past a three-month period.  
Duyên then proceeded to talk about the man she chose for Bình:  
He’s 50 but he looks very young, like 40. Let me show you his photos. He does not have a 
big house like this café, but in Korea you never starve and you never have to borrow money. 
Vietnamese have big houses but they are empty inside and we are in debt. This man is rich: he 
makes $6000/month compared to the average of only $2000. He owns a restaurant chain plus a 
farm with 2000 cows, not 2 cows. He went to Vietnam once but could not select any woman. 
Were it not for the problem that I can no longer get a Korean visa, I would marry this man 
myself.  
Duyên asked Bình for photos so that she could send them to the Korean man. Bình gave 
her two photos she took at a studio last year: she wore a black and white dress with bare feet in 
one photo and jeans with boots in another. As soon as Duyên saw the photos, she exclaimed:  
Why were you barefoot? If you go to see this man, or any man, you need to put on 
makeup. Korean men like women with makeup on. Korean people, from the moment that they 
wake up, look for lotions and skin products. They put on all kinds of stuff; that is why they are so 
white.  
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Finally, Duyên assured Bình that this man was a good man and she was doing Bình a 
favor by introducing him directly to Bình. Bình then could avoid the risk of not being selected 
because she had no competitors.  
In this example, Duyên exhibited the common characteristics of a cow herder. First, she 
dressed up expensively with nice clothes and jewelry, sending an implicit message that 
association with foreigners enables Vietnamese women to be beautiful and rich. Then she 
cleverly mentioned the social class issues that rural Vietnamese women face: from being looked 
down upon when visiting the city to not having money and employment. Both of these issues, 
she argued, could be resolved once a woman married a Korean man. Moreover, according to 
Duyên, a woman needs a husband to protect her physically (from sickness) and socially (from 
gossip). A Korean man is a real deal and does not deceive you with a façade like Vietnamese 
men. Duyên then downplayed the negative quality of age and put an emphasis on his money. 
This particular man was better than other Korean men because he made more and he was picky. 
Therefore, if Bình succeeded in marrying him, she would be  special (better than many other 
women who failed to attract him). However, if Bình wanted to realize this dream, she had to be 
disciplined: she had to follow the company’s rules, had to work hard, and had to dress her body 
in ways that Duyên considered to be modern and attractive: no bare feet (because bare feet mean 
‘primitivity’) and with makeup.  
It is very difficult to verify the information that Duyên or other cow herders provided to 
the potential brides. Many Hải Thành girls face the risk of false information. The girls that I 
befriended usually had a realistic outlook (one can only believe half of what the cow herder says) 
and relied on gut instinct after meeting their husbands in person. In this case, Bình told me that 
the story Duyên gave her seemed inconsistent: if a man made that much money and owned a 
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restaurant chain, it was strange that his house was small. Nevertheless, Bình did not hear from 
Duyên again despites her promise. After I left the field, Bình successfully married a Korean man, 
also through a matchmaking agency but not Duyên’s company.  
Besides cow herders, agencies also need translators, teachers of Korean language43, and 
paperwork people. They are paid around $1000/month, which is very high in a rural Vietnamese 
context. These individuals all participate in persuading (and sometimes recruiting) the girls to 
marry East Asian men. The higher the number of girls, the more money they can make.  
The popularity of transnational marriages in Hải Thành has dramatically changed the 
nature of the marital transaction. Since the majority of transnational marriages happen in 
southern Vietnam, until the mid-2000s there were not many Taiwanese/South Korean men 
looking for wives in the North, where Hải Thành is located. As the supply of willing wives-to-be 
surpassed the demand, Hải Thành families had to pay a large sum of money ($1,000-$3,000) to 
the matchmaker agencies to make sure that their daughters were introduced to Taiwanese/South 
Korean men and that the paperwork went smoothly. It is a common saying in Hải Thành that 
local women bought their husbands. But the situation has now changed: since 2007 the number 
of transnational marriages in the South is declining, while it is gaining momentum in the North, 
especially in the city of Hải Phòng (Trung Kien 2013). The supply of Taiwanese/South Korean 
men has exceeded local demand and local women do not have to pay money to the matchmakers 
anymore. The East Asian groom pays for all the costs of the marriage (wedding, legal 
paperwork, language classes, airfare). Moreover, the girls have a lot more choices in deciding 
                                                
43 In 2014, the Korean Ministry of Justice revised the Immigration Control Act and all foreign 
brides have to pass the TOPIK test (they must be able to speak Korean beyond the basic level) as 
one visa requirement (Kim 2015). 
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which men they want to marry. This situation applies to transnational marriages arranged by both 
agencies and family members. I once witnessed a conversation between Hoa and a cow herder: 
Cow herder: I know this thirty-one-year-old guy that is very handsome. 
Hoa: I will only marry a handsome man.  
Cow herder: I’m being serious. This guy is extremely picky.  
Hoa: Oh, I am serious too. Whoever my husband is, he has to be handsome.  
This exchange indicates how the girls have a lot more say in their marriages now, even 
though this fact might surprise the matchmaking people. When I asked the girls in my Korean 
class what their criteria for their Korean spouses included, they listed the following: monthly 
income over $2000, good-looking, living in urban areas, not living with (Korean) parents, and 
younger than their own parents. One of my classmates, Ngọc, often complained to me how her 
own father thought she was too picky: [My father said] Why do you always go back [from the 
selection places] empty handed and shaking your head (đi không về lắc)? The old guy, the young 
guy, the hairdresser guy, the working guy, the short guy, the tall guy, you said no to them all.  
Ngọc faced quite a bit of pressure from her father who wanted her to get married to a 
foreign man so that he did not have to worry about her future any more. He felt that his 
responsibility as a father would be completed if she married a foreign (i.e. richer) man. He 
explained that Hải Thành girls who married locally usually did not do well financially and ended 
up asking for help from their parents. He agreed to let Korean men come to his house to meet 
Ngọc. He also queried about marriages with Japanese, which was very new at the time in Hải 
Thành, in case Ngọc could not select a Korean man. But Ngọc took her time. By Vietnamese 
standards, Ngọc is a very attractive girl. At 18 with light skin, big dove-like eyes, tall and thin 
figure, she had rejected many Korean men who saw her photos online and came knocking on her 
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door. She waited for almost two years before she eventually met her Korean husband. Similar to 
the opinion of Ngọc’s father, it is known these days that Hải Thành girls have become a lot 
“pickier” (kén chọn). 
 
The Wedding Ritual of Transnational Marriages 
The weddings between Vietnamese girls and their East Asian grooms, especially if 
arranged by matchmaking agencies, happen quickly and differently from regular Vietnamese 
weddings. Traditionally, before the wedding begins, the bride’s and groom’s families go to a 
fortuneteller to pick the “good and lucky” date for the wedding. They visit each other’s family, 
give bride price, and kowtow before the ancestors’ altars. Then they invite all the family 
members, friends, and coworkers to a wedding reception. Guests are supposed to bring gifts or 
money for the newly wed to cover the cost of the wedding and help them start a new life 
together.  
In transnational weddings between Vietnamese girls and East Asian men, the wedding 
date is set as the day after the successful selection day (ngày trúng tuyển) no matter if that date is 
traditionally understood as good or not. All the girls who are selected on that day will have one 
wedding ceremony together. The agency uses the money the groom pays them to cover the cost 
of the wedding, the rings, the location and the number of guests for each girl’s family (the 
number is usually 30 people for the bride. The groom may or may not have any relatives with 
him). The girls and their families have no say in their weddings. The guests who attend the 
weddings are exempt from bringing gifts or giving money because the girls’ families do not have 
to pay anything. Unlike the orderly and celebratory traditional wedding ritual, the transnational 
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wedding appears like a strange and confusing experience for those attending. My landlady, 
Uncle Tú’s sister, described to me her experience of attending her distant cousin’s wedding: 
It’s different. They first announced who married whom, names, hometowns, etc. Then all 
eight of them came to the front. We clapped. That was it. Then the food was served. We were 
eating while someone was singing at the same time. Dance music was on, loudly. Those who 
sang kept singing and those who ate kept eating. The agent people themselves sang, but not 
professional artists, because the grooms paid for the music. Then it was over. There was no 
ritual at all and nobody was speaking on behalf of the bride’s family or the groom’s family. 
The haphazard nature of these weddings with East Asian men, captured in Ms. Hy’s 
comment above, contrasts with the complicated ritual of traditional Vietnamese weddings. As 
such, it seems to make light of the important life-long commitment that most Vietnamese take 
seriously. Coupled with a wide age gap between the Vietnamese girl and her foreign husband, 
the wedding creates a sense of pity and sorrow for the girl’s parents and those attending. Even 
though many Hải Thành girls will have proper Korean or Taiwanese weddings later on in Korea 
or Taiwan with the grooms' families, the weddings in Vietnam are the only ones of which their 
own families could be a part. Their weddings raise a question about the nature of their conjugal 
relationships and contribute to the critiques on transnational marriages that the girls and their 
parents frequently face.  
However, if the girl finds her husband through a relative of hers instead of an agency, the 
wedding will happen at the girl’s house, not at the hotel. Even though the girl’s family cannot 
pick a date because it has to be done soon before the groom goes back to his country, at least the 
girl will not have to share the ceremony with any other girls. The groom still pays for all or 
almost all the costs of the wedding. Mơ, Uncle Tú’s second daughter, was married for a year to a 
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Taiwanese man whom she knew through her sister Châu in Taiwan. At my request, Mơ gave me 
photos of her wedding at home in 2012.  
 
      
 
 
Figure 4.4    Photos of Mơ’s wedding with her Taiwanese ex-husband at home 
 
Her husband came to Vietnam alone, accompanied only by Châu, to meet Mơ. After 
spending a few days together, they agreed to a marriage. Their wedding happened five days later 
and followed a traditional Vietnamese ritual with the bride and groom kowtowing before the 
ancestor altar. Mơ’s family also invited their relatives and neighbors to a wedding feast in their 
front yard. Mơ rented her wedding dress but bought the second dress (the black and polka dot 
dress) at Parkson, an expensive and upscale shopping mall in the city of Hải Phòng with her ex-
husband’s money. She was particularly proud of the three-tier wedding cake that her ex-husband 
specifically asked Châu to order for him. Mơ believed it showed she was special to him; 
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otherwise he would not have gone through all the trouble to buy it. Also noted in the photos was 
the display of their love in public (they kissed each other in front of everyone, which is generally 
still taboo in rural Vietnam), perhaps implicitly aiming to counter the moral accusation that 
transnational women regularly face: that they married for money rather than love. I will return to 
this morality topic later in the chapter. 
After the quick wedding (at home or hotels), the foreign husband often stays for a few 
days or a week before returning to his own country. The wife remains in Vietnam to take 
language classes, wait for the paperwork to be completed, and go for a visa interview at the 
embassy. Once all these tasks are completed, she can board a plane to Taiwan or Korea and start 
her new life there. This whole process takes about six months. The time period after the wedding 
and before the husband leaves is considered the couple’s honeymoon in Vietnam. The foreign 
husband is expected to take his new wife to a vacation spot (the beach or the capital), pamper her 
with gifts, clothes, food, etc. to show that he loves her. For instance, during Mơ’s honeymoon 
with her Taiwanese ex-husband, he took her and her family to a big supermarket in Hải Phòng 
city to shop for food (even though there were many local markets), to a couple of restaurants also 
in the city, and to go fishing in a nearby province (see figure 5.5). All of these activities could be 
done locally but the multiple trips to the city and other places sent a message to Mơ that she was 
special and he was willing to go the extra mile, literally and figuratively, and pay more for her. 
This material expectation is another factor in people’s perception that transnational marriage is 
based on money, raising more questions about the morality of the practice (see the next chapter).  
Yet despite what many in Hải Thành see as the showy material aspects of transnational 
marriages as well as its commonality, numerous local residents have openly questioned the 
benefits of transnational marriages. In particular, they ask: why marry a working-class man just 
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so one can go abroad? Where is the social mobility? Their questioning indicates how social class 
is still viewed within the boundary of the nation-state even though people’s lives are now lived 
across nation-states.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.5    Activities that the Mơ and her husband did together after the wedding 
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The Case of Transnational Social Class 
Transnational marriages are often portrayed in the media and in popular opinion as 
marriages of underclass or ‘inferior’ people in Taiwan, Korea, and Vietnam (Bélanger, Khuat, 
and Tran 2013, Tsai 2011, Hsia 2007, Lee, Seol, and Cho 2006). Moreover, Bélanger, Khuat, 
and Tran (2013) remark that Vietnamese women in transnational marriages are depicted as low-
quality citizens making poor decisions and such representations serve to distinguish the rural 
(women) as lower-class in contrast to the urban middle-class. Popular opinion considers it an 
irony that while Vietnamese women marry East Asian men in the hope of jumping the class 
hierarchy, they actually experience downward class mobility after their marriages in Taiwan or 
South Korea. In Hải Thành, it is common to hear people discuss the illusion (tưởng bở) of the 
girls and how their lives will be just as difficult in Taiwan and South Korea as in Vietnam.  
This framework for understanding social class is till confined within the boundary of the 
nation-state even though transnational women live their lives across two countries. It fails to 
explain the extravagant consumption patterns of Việt Kiều during home visits or their high social 
status in Vietnam despite their socio-economic situations in the countries to which they migrate. 
As Thai (2014) argues, we often conceptualize social class and status within nations. The 
Weberian tradition see class division among different social groups within the same society. The 
Marxist tradition in development studies, even though focusing on global differences, tends to 
see them in terms of first and third world countries, core and peripheries. This binary approach 
obscures the anlysis of class across nation states (Thai 2014, Radhakrishnan 2011). 
According to Thai (2014), a framework to study social class transnationally is critical to 
understand the situation of low-wage migrants because their income takes on very different 
social and economic meanings in the homeland: “migrants … find opportunities in the homeland 
  
175 
to transnationalize their framework for identity, competence, esteem, worth, and status 
associated with their class position. The homeland thus serves as a powerful (and perhaps the 
only) social space for expressing meaningful social citizenship” (2014, 194). The contrast 
between invisible labor and visible spending in the homeland allows migrants to change their 
social class in the dual frame of reference (Thai 2014, Smith 2006, Espiritu 2003, Goldring 
1998). Social class, when viewed transnationally, is different from the nation-bounded 
conceptualization because it shows that migrants can belong to two different social class systems 
(working-class in the migration country and upper-class in the home country). Therefore, 
standard measures of social class such as income and education are not always applicable to the 
transnational social class (Espiritu 2003).  
Seeing social class transnationally rather than nationally offers a different understanding 
of the relationship between social class and physical movement in Hải Thành. In spite of all the 
criticisms and doubts, Hải Thành girls, once having migrated to East Asia, join the rank of Việt 
Kiều. No matter how they fare socially and economically in Taiwan and Korea, they still enjoy a 
higher status in Hải Thành as transnationals. As many of my classmates said, if nothing else, 
they have the label (mác) of being Kiều. Their higher social status is seen even more clearly in 
the next chapters as I show how transnational women are constantly compared as better than 
translocal women, who also engage in physical movement but not globally. Understanding social 
class as transnational serves to challenge the assumption of downward mobility in transnational 
marriages. Transnational social class underscores the power of transnational migration in shaping 
social stratification across nations and highlights the need to understand social class beyond 
nation-states in the era of global movement and connections.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter described the phenomenon of transnational marriages in Hải Thành and the 
impressive infrastructure that sustains and promotes them. Moreover, instead of emphasizing the 
economic factors that are usually cited as the roots of marriage migration, I highlight the roles of 
gendered ideologies, imagination, and experience of migration in encouraging and normalizing 
transnational marriages. As migrants, including transnational women, live their lives across 
nations, I also argue that it is important to view their social class as transnational. In the next 
chapter, I discuss another important dimension of transnational marriage, morality, to 
demonstrate the ways morality helps us understand the relationship of migration, gender, and 
social class in Vietnam.  
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Chapter V 
“Good” or “Bad”? The Morality of Transnational Migration 
 
This chapter focuses on the moral discourse about transnational marriages in Hải Thành. I 
argue that migration is often embroiled in class and gender tensions and such tensions are 
reflected in the morality of migration. Despite their commonality, transnational marriages in Hải 
Thành remain a hot moral issue that centers on the dichotomies between love and money, 
selfishness and altruism, and tradition and modernity. Here, I follow Zigon and Throop (2014) to 
view transnational marriages as a moral experience; that is experience qualified and organized in 
moral terms. It is also morality recognized and enacted experientially.  
 
Moral Binaries 
Love vs. Money 
Much of the criticism of Hải Thành girls and their transnational marriages displays the 
supposed tension between intimacy and money, which is then translated into issues of decency 
and greediness. When it comes to the interplay between intimacy and money, Zelizer argues that 
most people have assumed them to belong to “separate spheres and hostile worlds” (2005, 20). In 
other words, economic activity and intimate relations should be in distinct spheres because 
contact between them creates moral contamination. For example, monetization of care turns it 
into self-interested sale of services and workplaces are constructed as asexual because sexuality 
poses  a threat to the business. The binary between love and money becomes the root for the 
dichotomy between sentiment and rationality, solidarity and self-interest, family and market 
(Zelizer 2005). Because of these assumptions, moral and legal judgments abound when money 
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and intimacy overlap despite the commonplace of monetary transactions in the intimate familial 
and social lives (such as immigrants sending remittances home as symbols of love, parents 
paying college tuitions for their children, people giving money as gifts in weddings, birthdays, 
and funerals).  
In Hải Thành, transnational marriages generate much moral backlash because of the 
perception that intimacy is purchased. Parents are accused of selling their daughters for money 
(the commodification of women). Hải Thành girls are judged as gold diggers (the local term is 
money traders – đi buôn tiền). They marry for money rather than love and are willing to marry 
men as old as their parents, indicated by the local sayings such as ‘ngon thì ở, dở thì đi’ (stay if 
[the guy is] affluent, leave [for Korea] if poor’) and ‘70 có của 13 cũng vừa’ (if a seventy-year-
old person has money, even a thirteen-year-old will agree to marry that person). Therefore, these 
girls are viewed as greedy, shallow, and inauthentic. Their commodified eroticism, sexuality, and 
perceived obsession with materiality make many people regard them as prostitutes who trade 
intimacy for money. Hải Thành girls, their transnational marriages, and all people involved are 
discussed as an unfortunate human cost of the market, as examples of the dangers of modernity, 
as well as an alarm about what it means to be a good or a bad Vietnamese nowadays.  
Yet, at the same time transnational marriages have brought significant wealth to Hải 
Thành families. Most Hải Thành residents acknowledge the role of remittances from 
transnational women in helping the economy of the commune. Parents proudly show off their 
newly built two-floor houses thanks to the money that their daughters send home after only two 
to three years of marriage. People talk about having disposable incomes and enough savings for 
major events that require big spending such as funerals, weddings, and sickness. Remittances are 
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often sent as monthly stipends for parents to cover living expenses44 and as occasional support 
for siblings when they need to build houses or buy boats. In these situations, transnational 
women are considered morally good, being dutiful daughters and loving sisters. For most rural 
Vietnamese who have struggled all their lives, money does bring happiness and sending money 
home equals sending love. In fact, many Hải Thành girls view money as an indicator of love. 
Consider the case of my classmate Hoa who changed her mind about marrying a Korean man. 
Before marrying her husband, Hoa had gone every week to attend a few “selection days” but 
failed to find a man who she believed truly loved her. When I asked how she would know that a 
man truly loved her, she responded: “[H]e will buy me a lot of stuff. If he loves me, he will buy 
me clothes, jewelries, and take me out to places. That’s how I know he loves and trusts me.”45 
The stories in Hải Thành show, as Zelizer has argued, that money and love are not dichotomous 
but intertwined in complicated relationships. However, national discourses in Vietnam still link 
transnational marriages with the commercial commodification of women and consequently place 
the Vietnamese brides squarely in the tension between self-interest and altruism. 
 
Self vs. Nation 
Vietnamese women, including Hải Thành girls, engaged in transnational marriages are 
usually accused of shaming the nation. They are judged harshly as being ignorant, opportunistic, 
and poor, as prostituting their bodies for foreign visas, and being deceitful and defrauding 
(Bélanger, Khuat, and Tran 2013). Moreover, since women stand as the allegory for a modern 
                                                
44 The stipends have significant meanings because they act as social welfare for the elders. Since 
the dissolving of collectives, most rural Vietnamese do not work for the state because they are 
farmers and as such, receive no social benefits or pensions to provide for their old age. 
45 In fact, Nga made sure to teach the girls in class how to tell their Korean husbands or suitors to 
buy smartphones, cosmetics, and anything else they wanted to know.  
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nation and the vehicle to shape national identity (see chapter II), these Vietnamese women cause 
outrage for ruining the country’s reputation. SBS, a major Korean television network, in 
December of 2014 had to issue an apology to the Vietnamese people after its TV series named 
“Modern Farmers” insulted Vietnamese women. In the second episode, a Korean mother told her 
alcoholic son, “If you continue to be a drunk like this, even if you go to Vietnam, you still can’t 
find a woman to marry you.” When the series were aired in Vietnam, Vietnamese viewers were 
offended. They objected that this line was hurtful to Vietnamese women marrying Korean men 
and Vietnamese women in general. SBS apologized shortly after and explained that the intention 
was to portray the pathetic nature of the Korean farmer, not to belittle Vietnamese women (Thoai 
2014). The President of the Vietnamese Women’s Union directly addressed this “shaming the 
nation” problem in 2006. At the conference, titled “Issues of Vietnamese women marrying 
foreigners,” she denounced the women as being irresponsible towards their families, 
communities, and nation. She considered the marriages between Vietnamese women and old, 
sick foreign men as offensive to the nation, affecting the image of Vietnam (Bélanger, Khuat, 
and Tran 2013). Bélanger, Khuat, and Tran argue that these women are cast as irresponsible 
because they don’t fulfill their duty of building the country, offensive because they challenge the 
patriarchal order and bypass Vietnamese marriage traditions. Vietnamese women marrying 
foreign men are constructed as a gendered threat to nationalism (2013).  
Ironically, the withdrawal of the Vietnamese state from social services and the emphasis 
on neoliberal self-cultivation have instead fostered a strong sense of individualism. Ngọc 
reasoned to me when I asked her about the moral accusations of transnational marriages: 
Everyone wants money. Everyone wants happiness. Nobody wants hardship. If Vietnamese men 
can provide for me like Korean men, I will stay here, no questions asked. Ngọc believed that 
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there is nothing wrong with self interests because it has been normalized: everyone does it. In 
fact, self interests are necessary because everyone has to fend for themselves. It shows that 
Vietnamese women are faced with double standards that have become increasingly 
irreconcilable: on the one hand, they are encouraged to be self-responsible citizens, while at the 
same time they are expected to represent the nation and put the country’s interests first.  
It should be noted that Vietnam is not alone in policing and moralizing women and 
gender relations. Globally, young women who dare to transgress the boundaries of 
“respectability” now or in the past are accused of being “seducers, betrayers, and complicit 
pawns of a corrupt social order” (Burke 2008, 366, The Modern Girl Around the World Research 
Group 2008, Edmonds 2010, Farrer 2002). They make people nervous because they expose the 
social hierarchy, political agency, disillusionment with modernity, and contestation against 
national regimes (Edmonds 2010, The Modern Girl around the World Research Group 2008). 
The morality backlash often expresses the tensions and ambiguities faced by a changing nation, 
like the tension between tradition and modernity in the case of Hải Thành.  
 
Tradition vs. Modernity 
Transnational marriages are said to create chaos in the local community. For example, 
local men cannot find local women for marriages: as of 2013, there were around 2000 Hải Thành 
men of marriageable age who were still single (Duong 2013). Even women who are already 
married locally can always leave their husbands and children to marry foreigners and parents 
complain about losing the money they pay for the marriages. Also, a crisis of femininity has 
emerged because traditional qualities of proper femininity are disappearing: young people are 
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engaging in “inappropriate” lifestyles and women, especially older women to whom daughters 
send remittances, have become gamblers amid the sudden wealth they have.  
 
Figure 5.1 A Hải Thành woman wearing ‘inappropriate’ skin-showing shirt while gambling 
 
However, transnational women are also admired. Young men and women model 
themselves after Taiwanese and Korean fashion, creating an image of Hải Thành not as a rural 
place of backwardness, but a place of modernity. It is talked about among local people that 
transnational marriages have changed gender relations, restraining local men from beating and 
mistreating their wives, increasing the weight of women’s voice. Transnational women are also 
regarded as role models for modern Vietnamese women. 
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These are conflicting and shifting moral experiences and discourses, depending on who is 
conversing with whom. Through transnational marriages, moral qualities and criteria of good 
people and good acts are both enacted and resisted, resulting in the paradoxical ways 
transnational marriages and women are morally regarded. Therefore, traditional concepts that 
often view morality as totalizing and unifying what counts as a “good” woman are unable to 
explain the conflicting moral positions occupied by Hải Thành people because the assessments 
of them change with time, people, and contexts.  
 
Morality as relational  
I follow Zigon (2014a) to argue that we can only account for the problem of 
intersubjectivity and shifting perspectives of moral experiences and values if we recognize the 
self as fundamentally not rational and autonomous but relational and affective. Accordingly, 
what counts as moral should not be viewed in terms of judging (good or bad) but in terms of 
making, repairing, and bettering relationships. Focusing on morality and ethics as relational and 
situational rather than totalizing provides insights into how the care of relationships is  central to 
the praise, criticism, and evaluation of gendered movement. It also provides a way for us to 
understand how seemingly incompatible moral discourses and dispositions can coexist. 
It is important to note that conceptualizing morality in this way moves beyond the 
binaries of good and bad. Because living morally in the world means first and foremost a 
morality concerned with dwelling comfortably within already established and important 
relationships, what one does in maintaining a relationship that is essential to oneself, even if it 
means negatively affecting other relationships, need not be considered immoral (Zigon 2014). 
Thus, the act of marrying transnationally is a moral act for Hải Thành women despite negative 
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accusations of being greedy and spoiled, because it betters the relationships crucial to their 
identity: relationships with their parents and relatives. “I marry for my parents” is less a common 
justification than a way of attunement and fidelity to the relationships that constitute the 
women’s subjectivity.46  
Indeed, family remains one of the most important facets for Vietnamese individuals and 
society. The downsizing of the welfare system and the restoration of the household as the unit of 
production and consumption have made families central to Vietnamese life. Following Đổi Mới 
and the implementation of the market economy, the Vietnamese state cut most of its social 
welfare programs (entitlement programs and universal benefits) by the end of the 1980s. 
Consequently, family, for most Vietnamese, has become the main provider of social security as 
individuals rely on their families to buffer the vulnerabilities of the free market (Barbieri and 
Bélanger 2009). Even though the economic restructuring has made it possible for many 
Vietnamese to venture beyond the family to get good jobs in other social institutions, it often 
requires education, social and political networks, and financial accumulation, all of which are 
beyond the reach of most rural Vietnamese. Korinek et al. (2006) shows that decisions regarding 
work still serve the best interests of the families rather than the individuals in Vietnam. In fact, in 
many developing societies, the family has acted as an agent that mediates social changes and 
resources because life chances are still highly shaped by family background, networks, and 
values (Edgar 2004).  
                                                
46 At the same time, Lukacs (2015a) argues the importance of care and care work for youth in 
Asian neoliberalism for bringing a sense of self-worth when faced with the condition of unstable 
and unsatisfactory salary and job security. Arguably, marrying foreign men and caring for their 
parents and family brings local girls a much-needed sense of pride and worthiness when they are 
bound in Hải Thành by unemployment and the inferior status of rural women.  
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Understanding the central role of the family helps us realize why so many Hải Thành 
girls say they like to marry foreign men so that their parents do not need to paddle the boat till 
they die (đi cho bố mẹ không phải chèo thuyền đến chết) and why many parents claim they want 
only one daughter to marry transnationally, preferring the others to have local marriages to keep 
them close to home. Transnational marriages are deeply tied to families’ well-being and their 
strategy to get ahead. The link between individuals and their families is very strong, and in Hải 
Thành it is particularly salient in the deep concern of transnational women with how financially 
well off their families are considered to be because it reflects on their own  status in the 
community.    
 
Morality as gendered and classed 
In writing about neoliberalism in Vietnam, Schwenkel and Leshkowich argue that the 
relationship between personal desires and family creates moral individuals (Schwenkel and 
Leshkowich 2012). On the one hand, consumption is still criticized as selfish and materialistic 
but on the other hand, personal desires fulfill a vision of family and social life that are seen as 
virtuous. In Vietnam, the individual becomes moral because he/she is embedded in the family 
and community (Schwenkel and Leshkowich 2012). For example, a woman seeking infertility 
treatment is a good woman because her family can be perpetuated; residents building extra 
stories on their houses demonstrate both conspicuous consumption and filial piety (elevating 
their ancestral altars); and social workers finding homes for abandoned children are reintegrating 
them into families and communities (Pashigian 2012, Harms 2012, Leshkowich 2012b). 
However, Schwenkel and Leshkowich show that making certain individuals and acts moral 
conceals the fact that these moral modes of being and configurations of family are also middle 
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class: “The rhetoric of morality naturalizes the middle classness as somehow reflecting desirable 
personal qualities, rather than a privileged position in an environment of increasing structural 
inequalities” (Schwenkel and Leshkowich 2012, 396-397).  
In this new vision of social and moral order, it is not surprising to see why rural (and thus 
lower class) Hải Thành girls are often excluded from being viewed as moral despite their support 
of the well-being of their families and community. Their depiction as low-quality citizens 
making poor choices with regards to their transnational marriages maintains the social and moral 
distinction between them as rural girls and the middle-class urban people.  
Not only is morality tied to class, it is also gendered. Thinking of morality in terms of 
maintaining and caring for relationships and social embededness explains why different people 
in Hải Thành regard the moralities of others (such as translocal women, transnational women, 
parents, and fishermen) differently because they have varying sets of relationships with the 
others. Thus a fisherman may praise his wife, a translocal woman, as proper and criticize a 
transnational woman as trashy while a transnational woman may criticize both the translocal 
woman as greedy and the fisherman as abusive. However, the debate about the morality of 
women is much more pronounced among Hải Thành residents than the debate about local men’s 
behaviors and practices. This is consistent with the fact that Vietnamese women have always 
been held as the morality keepers of the nation.  
The new era of market reform and global capitalist integration and the shifting demands 
on Vietnamese femininity explain why migration for marriages in Hải Thành is such a heated, 
conflicting, and personal issue. The common reason for transnational marriages, to be dutiful 
daughters, reflects the changing loyalties from the nation during the wars to the nuclear family in 
the post Renovation era and the Confucian virtues of current Vietnamese femininity. Yet, at the 
  
187 
same time, these marriages are associated with female deviances, namely greed, ambition, and 
promiscuity, that represent the corruption of the free and global market. Hải Thành girls are 
caught in the double standard of being both markers of modern transformation and symbols of 
cultural dangers and loss. Their embodiment of contradictions evidences how they are morally 
judged. For example, one of the local fishermen and one of my main informants, thirty-nine-
year-old Hiệp, did not hold back from condemning the transnational marriages: 
It’s a fad thing (phong trào). Everyone wants to do it. They go to Taiwan and Korea for a 
while; things do not work out as they thought, they return. I recently noticed that a few women in 
my neighborhood left for Taiwan and Korea but came back after only a year. Then they left 
again. It’s like they married Taiwanese men; oh my god, did not like it; returned; married 
Koreans; left again. So ridiculous. It’s their lifestyle (that’s problematic). It’s like “keeping up 
with the Jones” (đua đòi). Our community is (financially) great. If they stay and get married 
here, they will have great lives. But they all go, all fly off. Because their friends who married 
Taiwanese go home on airplanes and wear sunglasses. Nobody wore sunglasses before, but now 
they are Koreans, they have to wear sunglasses. So all the girls who are not married have to get 
married to Koreans. They don’t know anything about lives in Korea nor do they care, as long as 
they can become Koreans. I went to one of the hotels where the girls were introduced to the 
Korean men. There were 5-7 girls sitting waiting. Two Korean men came to see them, just looked 
at them for a minute, said a couple of nonsense sentences that were translated, then one of them 
pointed at the girl he liked. The matchmaker asked if she agreed to marry him. She nodded and 
shook hands with him. Done. That’s it. The wedding was held the next day. What kind of love is 
that? What kind of husband is that? You don’t even know anything about him. What kind of 
happiness is it that can come so quickly? Your parents have raised you for so many years, how 
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can you just throw your life at the hands of random men like that? I don’t understand. They (the 
girls) are so young; they don’t know any better. Then good men here just cannot find anyone to 
marry because they are not Koreans. 
While Hiệp admitted that transnational marriages allowed rural women to be members of 
modern society (fly in airplanes and wear sunglasses), he also criticized their deviance and its 
consequences. Transgressing the rules of femininity through greed, ignorance, lack of devotion, 
and filial impiety, according to Hiệp, results only in the loss of happiness (in marriages with 
local men) and divorces (in marriages with Korean or Taiwanese men because these marriages 
have no substance). Implied in Hiệp’s criticism is also the repeated theme that the girls are naïve 
and ignorant, making poor choices with their lives. Together, they consolidate the negative 
stereotype of rural women in Vietnam as uneducated and greedy and reproduce the class 
hierarchy between the rural lower class and the urban sophisticated middle class.  
Later, in our conversations, Hiep surprised me when he said: “I told all my female friends 
that are still not married to marry Korean men.” “Why?” “Because Korean men have money. 
Their lives will be better than living here.” His surprising comment exposes the constrains and 
contradictions of Vietnamese femininity that requires women to retain traditional values in the 
context of social and economic flux yet fails to acknowledge the necessity for women’s 
economic striving in the pursuit of modernity.  
Additionally, his comment reflects how morality should be conceptualized as relational 
because it sheds light on this rather confusing but recurrent phenomenon in Hải Thành: 
criticizing the group but praising the individual members of that group. I encountered stories like 
that all the time when I talked to local people. Many parents that have transnational daughters 
scorn transnational women in general but say the exactly opposite about their daughters or their 
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nieces. In these stories, we see how morality is reflected through experiences of hope, anxiety, 
conflict, care, struggle, and happiness. They show that what seems from the outside as 
conflicting moral discourses and positions not only can coexist but are not necessarily seen as 
incompatible by the subjects because they are based on the cultivation of different sets of 
relationships that matter to the selves. Thus, if we use traditional philosophical and social 
concepts such as virtue, duties, rights, good and bad, as Zigon and Throop (2014) pointed out, 
we merely contribute to the reproduction and imposition of what is already considered to be 
moral than to the understanding of the morality lived by the people we work with. Moreover, 
these concepts often fail to fully capture the complexity of morality that includes hope, care, 
anxiety, and conflicts as experienced by people in Hải Thành. 
 
Beyond binaries: The complexity of morality 
I remember a month after Thanh, Mơ’s oldest daughter, got married to a Korean man, she 
got very drunk and cried “I left my boyfriend for you, mom.” Thanh’s parents divorced five years 
earlier when she was 15. She and her two siblings lived with her paternal grandmother. Thanh 
knew that her father cheated on her mother, but indirectly blamed her mother for initiating the 
divorce and leaving behind all three children. “My mother wanted a divorce even though my 
father wanted to reconcile. When she left, she said she would never come back to the house. But 
she did not think it through. If we (the children) are sick, she has to come back, right? We are 
her children. Now that she said it, she does not come.” Thanh said her father provided for her 
financially but she lacked the emotional support traditionally coming from a mother. Then she 
met her boyfriend, who was a local young boy not from a rich family but who cared for her. She 
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said he made her feel happy and sheltered. Unfortunately, she was not the only girl he liked. He 
claimed that he did not deserve her and used that as an excuse to break up.  
At the same time, Mơ, Thanh’s mother, had been trying to get married to a foreign man 
to escape her poverty, but failed repeatedly (see the chapter VIII). One day, Thanh’s second 
cousin who ran a local matchmaking agency called: a Korean man saw Thanh’s photo online and 
had flown to Vietnam to see her. Thanh agreed to meet the man and, to everyone’s surprise, 
Thanh accepted his marriage proposal on that day. When Thanh and her husband went to Uncle 
Tú’s house for dinner after the wedding, they were accompanied by a matchmaker. As Mơ came 
out to greet them, the matchmaker turned to assure her: “Don’t you worry about her. Plus, if all 
is well, she will be able to sponsor you to Korea soon.” Thanh’s husband was quiet but put food 
into her bowl during dinner. He offered to take her shopping afterwards but Thanh turned him 
down. Mơ complained to me later that Thanh was stupid for declining the offer. If Thanh had 
gone, Mơ would have been able to go shopping with them as well.  
Thereafter, Thanh no longer talked about her ex-boyfriend, but kept telling me how 
nicely her Korean husband treated her. “He always saves the good food for me. He informs me 
where he goes and what he does. He calls me three times a day to ask after me: have you eaten 
yet? Where are you? Did you do anything fun today? Did you go to class today? How is the 
weather? If it is cold, you need to keep warm.” A month later, Thanh, who rarely drank, got 
drunk and sobbed about her marriage to her mother, “I left my boyfriend for you, mom”. Six 
months later, right before departing Vietnam, Thanh posted on her Facebook page: 
Is it wrong if love still lingers in my sadness? Honestly, I don’t want us to part. Since I 
can’t choose my own dream, I am as lost as you. Time cannot turn back; please continue living 
your life as you have been.  
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A year and a half later, she gave birth to a son and was then able to sponsor a visa visit 
for her mother to go to Korea. She still posted sad messages on her Facebook: 
Lonely nights, me and nobody else … When life goes by so fast, it is perhaps this quiet 
time that makes my heart so heavy, my sadness persisting through the months and years. This 
movie of life full of tragedies slowly runs … I listened to an old love song, tried to find a peaceful 
sleep, and tomorrow will be a new day.  
Thanh’s story represents some heart-broken girls I have known who left their Vietnamese 
lovers and claimed it was a sacrifice to the happiness of their parents. In her story, she was 
conflicted between her love for her boyfriend and her love for her mother. She hoped to forget 
her boyfriend to have a new life for herself and her mother. Money was and was not important in 
this story. It was important with regards to her mother’s future but Thanh did not care too much 
about her husband’s money (she chose not to go shopping with him). She married a man she 
does not love for certain purposes, and even though he treats her nicely, she has been feeling 
lonely ever since. In this story, Thanh is both a good daughter and a bad wife, she married both 
for love (for her mother) and money, and she is both selfish and selfless.    
Thanh’s story shows that the collapse of morality into binaries (such as good vs. bad, 
money vs. love, and selfish vs. altruistic) often obscures personal stories and struggles that are 
central to the moral experience embroiled in transnational marriages. For example, the moral 
discourse that separates love from money often depersonalizes people involved in transnational 
marriages, turning them into cold calculating individuals blinded by money, while in fact 
transnational marriage is a deeply personal and loving issue.  
In other stories about transnational marriages, I was told about the pain, worry, concern, 
and excitement of parents. It was the pain of mothers worrying about their daughters living in a 
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different country. It was the concern of fathers with being accused of selfishness for preventing 
their daughters from finding their own happiness if they end their transnational marriages. Many 
parents told me that they sacrificed the love and support (that they would get from nearby 
daughters) for a better future for their daughters. They quoted a folk saying that if a daughter gets 
married close by, she will bring her parents food, even if it is just a bowl of vegetable soup (con 
gái mà gả chồng gần, có bát canh cần nó cũng mang cho), meaning that she will be able to care 
for them at proximity. A mother in Hải Thành, who sobbed when talking about her worries and 
yearnings, encapsulates this beautifully:  
I miss her a lot. When she just left, I cried like someone beat me, for weeks. If people 
mentioned her, I started crying again. When I served the family dinner during the New Year’s 
Day, tears dropped from my face because I missed her. Then I worried about her new life: 
whether she was treated well by her husband and her mother-in-law or whether  she would make 
mistakes, being so young, and they would laugh at her. For days, I could not eat, not even if they 
were to serve me a royal banquet. It was only after she called home and said her life was good 
that I could finally eat.  
At the same time, there was also relief and joy. The girls express the excitement of 
marrying the men they love and living in a different country, etc. All the accusations of gold 
diggers usually neglect the fact that many of these young girls have found love in their 
marriages. One of my classmates could not stop talking about her husband to us and would leave 
in the middle of the parties to go home and talk on the phone with him. Hoa expressed her pining 
for her husband so much that she counted the days till she could get her paperwork done and 
reunite with him in Korea: “I just want that when I open my eyes, I can see him.”  
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Unfortunately, the moral binaries have taken personal struggles out of consideration and 
reduced such complex moral experience like transnational marriages into mindless acts that strip 
women and everyone involved of their own agencies. When I asked why women from this 
commune marry East Asian men en masses, most people answered: it’s a fad (phong trào); the 
neighbor’s daughter does it so I have to do it too, sort of like keeping up with the Jones (a dua, 
đua đòi); or they marry foreign men just because they want to fly on an airplane or wear high 
heels (đi guốc cong) – the reasons are stupid. They answered as if transnational marriages 
happen without any careful thinking. What is also problematic is how these answers deny agency 
to the women, yet put the blame squarely on them rather than acknowledging their opportunities 
as well as their oppression in the society.47 
I happened to encounter a poem that was shared by many Hải Thành girls on Facebook. I 
could not find out who the author was, but the poem clearly conveys the voice and response of a 
transnational woman to moral accusations:  
Đừng bảo em tham tiền mê ngoại quốc  
Mà hãy nhìn cách đối xử đi anh 
Ai không muốn ở quê mẹ an lành  
Và có được mái gia đình hạnh phúc  
 
Lúc mới quen anh thề non hẹn biển  
Hứa đủ điều lắm chuyện để em tin 
Nhưng đến khi em cho anh cái trinh 
                                                
47 To be fair, when probed more deeply, many residents do acknowledge some of the 
problematic gender relations and economic aspirations in Hải Thành that prompt women to seek 
foreign spouses. 
  
194 
Thì anh khinh và đi rình con khác  
 
Để mình em khóc thầm trong chua chác  
Lạc lối về giữa dối trá điêu ngoa  
Làm sao em giải thích với người ta 
Ai thứ tha lỗi lầm em khờ dại  
 
Còn không thì có nên chồng nên vợ  
Hai năm đầu thì anh bợ anh cưng 
Nhưng đến ngày em nở em sinh 
Là khi anh vô tình tìm của lạ 
 
Anh đi đêm về kiếm chuyện rầy la 
Anh đánh vợ như là chơi bóng đá 
Có khi em chạy về nhà ba má 
Mặc tím bầm má nhìn cũng không ra 
 
Còn khi em về sống với người ta 
Tuy có xa và họ cũng hơi già 
Nhưng anh à họ không hỏi cái trinh 
Và không khinh biết em đã lở dại  
 
Họ cho em bình yên mỗi sớm mai 
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Họ ôm em mỗi đêm dài em ốm 
Họ lòm còm thức sớm để chăm con 
Họ cho em được những gì em muốn  
 
Thôi anh à đừng trách tiền lôi cuốn  
Tự trách mình chẳng muốn giữ người ta 
Có vợ rồi vẫn cứ thích la cà 
Không rượu bia cũng đi vào nhà trọ 
 
Hãy học hỏi những điều hay nơi họ  
Vì vợ là để mình qúy mình yêu  
Chứ không phải bị hành hạ đủ điều  
Phải chịu khổ và chịu nhiều uất ức 
 
Please don’t say that I love money and foreign men 
You should first look at how you treated me 
Who doesn’t want to have the safety of the motherland 
And a happy family?  
 
When we first met, you promised me the earth 
And swore everything to make me believe you 
But after I had given you my virginity 
You disdained me and looked for another chick. 
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I was left crying silently in bitterness 
Feeling lost among your blatant lies. 
How can I explain to other people? 
Who will forgive my foolish mistake?  
 
Even the case of us becoming husband and wife 
You coddled me for the first two years 
But the moment I gave birth 
Was when you looked for ‘novelty.’ 
 
You came home late and made excuses to scold me 
You beat your wife like you played soccer. 
Sometimes I ran back to my parents’ house 
With so many bruises even my parents could not recognize me. 
 
But when I live with a foreign man 
Even far from home and they are old 
But my dear, they don’t ask about virginity 
And don’t despise me if they know my mistake. 
 
They give me peace every day 
They hold me through the night when I am sick 
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They wake up early to take care of our children 
They give me everything I want. 
 
My dear, don’t blame it on money and greed 
Blame that you cannot keep me 
Even when married, you still like to wander 
Either into beer places or hostels.  
 
You should learn the right ways from foreign men 
Because a wife needs to be treated with love 
Not to be tortured with everything 
Making her struggle and miserable.  
 
This poem speaks about the push and pull factors of transnational marriages from the 
perspective of a woman. Unlike the stereotypical moral judgments, these factors are not simply 
based on money or naiveté. The woman in the poem acknowledges the difficulties of building a 
life far away from home, but such difficulties do not compare to the problem she encounters in 
her relationships at home. In this poem, we see a part of Thanh’s story as well as, later in 
chapters VI and IX, other translocal women’s stories as the writer expresses common problems 
Vietnamese women face in their relationships with Vietnamese men: double sexual standards 
with regards to virginity and faithfulness, domestic violence, and gendered division of labor 
(men: outside the home; women: inside the home). Therefore, she would rather sacrifice being 
close to her parents to marry a foreign man. Only then is she loved and cared for as a wife and a 
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mother. Her choice, represented also by many young girls in Hải Thành, indicates unwillingness 
to put up with gender disparities in Vietnam.  
 
Conclusion 
The pretty modern girls from Hải Thành and their aspiration for transnational marriages 
emerge from the context of recent changes in the economic restructuring of Vietnam that have 
made life very difficult for women and rural people. They are stuck between the conflicting 
demands of the state’s ideology and the market’s competitive logic and between the sharp 
division between the rural lower class and the urban middle class. Yet, binaries prove to be 
inadequate to understand their situation. The Hải Thành girls have shown that moral binaries of 
good and bad do not work as they can be both victims of poverty and calculating actors, altruistic 
daughters and materialist gold diggers, vain followers and smart manipulators. Moreover, 
connecting both imagination and experience of movement, they manage to cross the class 
division between the rural and the urban in Vietnam by acquiring a cosmopolitan status. Their 
transnational movement is highly desirable in a global world where economic differences 
between developed and developing countries are enormous. However, not all marriage migration 
results in upward mobility. In the next chapter, I discuss the marriage migration of translocal 
women to demonstrate the hierarchy between international and internal migration and to show 
that migration can also result in acute alienation and displacement right at home.   
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Chapter VI 
 Women as Fish: Internal Rural Migration, Social Displacement and the 
Morality of Personhood 
Introduction 
This chapter builds on the previous chapters to discuss the pattern of double rural-to-rural 
migration to and from Hải Thành. Particularly I look at how the internal migration of translocal 
women is compared to the international immigration of transnational women. Here I unpack this 
rural to rural pattern of movement in order to further illustrate the intimate relationships among 
movement, social mobility and displacement, and morality. By exploring the gendered, racial 
and moral elements of different migration by transnational women and translocal women in this 
community, I illustrate how different kinds of movement become coded with specific kinds of 
class status and moral subjectivities.  
In this chapter, I specifically explore the diversity of rurality, which, in much scholarship, 
is simplified and condensed as "the rural." I suggest that migration from one rurality to another 
should be understood through the lens of social mobility. Ironically, this practice engenders the 
unwelcome ramification of social displacement for translocal women and complicates the 
assumed linear, simplistic relationship between migration and social mobility. By focusing on 
the displacement of translocal women, I join other mobility scholars in questioning the 
celebration of movement as a universal benefit (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, Mai and King 
2009, Partridge 2009, Ahmed 2004, Skeggs 2004, Tsing 2002, Tesfahuney 1998, Massey 1993). 
The displacement and confinement of translocal women in Hải Thành reveals that mobility can 
produce immobility and that movement and non-movement are not fixed binaries. Instead, 
mobility and immobility are relative and constitutive of one’s life in interrelated processes. 
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Moreover, by illustrating the lower social status of translocal women compared to transnational 
women, I argue that not all migration culminates in social mobility, thereby illuminating 
important symbolic and material differences between internal and international movement. 
However, this hierarchy is complicated by translocal women who actively navigate the social 
and physical spaces of morality and gendered movement. I explore how different kinds of 
movement are realized and evaluated in moral terms, thus demonstrating that a focus on morality 
can reveal the complex relationship of class, gender, race, and migration movement in 
contemporary Vietnam. 
 
Women as Fish: Marriages in and out of Hải Thành 
The highly mobile population of Hải Thành has effectively changed the face of the once 
poor community. With the fishing industry generating wealth and the Việt Kiều sending 
remittances home, Hải Thành people always proudly say that their rural lives are equal to those 
in the cities, at least materially. They constantly remind me of that fact by pointing out that their 
incomes rival those of urbanites and showing that they have nhà tầng (houses of multiple floors), 
xe xịn (expensive scooters), quán đêm (a night life), etc. The place also receives support from the 
city of Hải Phòng to widen its local port, to build new roads connecting it directly to the center of 
the city, and to turn half of its farming land into housing projects by 2025. But the most 
noticeable change created by the sudden wealth in Hải Thành is the lifestyle of young local 
people. Hải Thành people have a reputation in Hải Phòng city for frequenting bars and 
restaurants, gambling, using drugs, dressing “inappropriately” and having carefree sexual 
relationships before marriage. Many urbanites, of course, look down on Hải Thành people, 
taking these behaviors as a proof that these rural yet financially able people lack cultural capital, 
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are uncultured and insatiable. The urbanites often use the expression “ăn chơi như người Thuỷ 
Nguyên” (dress and party like the Thuỷ Nguyên people) to mock the uncultureness of Thuỷ 
Nguyên rural people in general and Hải Thành in particular.  
The changes in the lifestyles of the young people are often used to explain the 
immigration and migration in Hải Thành: young Hải Thành women, the logic goes, choose to 
marry Taiwanese and Korean men because they don’t want to marry badly spoiled local men. 
Local men want to marry women from other places because these women are not, the logic 
continues, spoiled like Hải Thành women and they do not know of the men’s lifestyles. Thus, a 
double rural-to-rural migration pattern is created due to marriages: translocal women move from 
rural places to Hải Thành and transnational women move from Hải Thành to rural places in 
Korea and Taiwan48. In this way, the internal rural-to-rural migration happens to compensate for 
the transnational rural-to-rural migration.  
While marriages are the driving force of the double rural-to-rural migration, to the local 
people, especially the fishermen, the transnational and translocal women are viewed very 
differently. They are both described by Hải Thành men as fish, but while one can be caught, the 
other is elusive. In the local fishing tradition, fishermen, when on their boats in the middle of the 
night at sea, burn light bulbs to maximum capacity to attract squid and fish. After a while, the 
fish and squid become blinded by the lights and that is when the fishermen pull the net up to 
catch them. Many fishermen told me they use the same method to court translocal women: the 
fishermen show off their wealth and generosity while meeting the women, waiting for the 
“blinded” moment to woo them into the marriage. Of course, sometimes that tactic scares off 
                                                
48 There are transnational women who reside in urban areas and they are considered luckier than 
those in rural areas. Urban residency is an increasingly important criterion for Hải Thành girls 
when choosing their potential husbands. 
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some women, but the majority of women in my research indicated that the financial difference 
between Hải Thành and their communities is an important factor in their marriages and migration.  
Transnational women, on the other hand, are the good fish that get away. Similar to how 
Hải Thành fishermen complain that they cannot compete with the Chinese fishermen over 
fishing, they also complain that they cannot compete with Korean and Taiwan men over local 
women. Moreover, the women, like the fish, have the ability to cross national borders while the 
(fisher)men are stuck within the border. The fish that gets away, as always, is seen as better. The 
fish that the Chinese fishermen catch is said to be bigger and the transnational women that the 
Korean and Taiwanese men marry are said to be better than translocal women.  
The fish metaphor is very apt in showing that while very similar, translocal women are 
often judged to be inferior to transnational women and this comparison illustrates the intimate 
convergence of social class, migration, and displacement. To this convergence we now turn.  
 
The Rural as Destinations: The Politics of Rural Migration 
Mobilities scholars have recently noted the conceptual and cultural shift in the 
refashioning of identity in which movement becomes the basis of the new identity formation 
(Urry 2000). There is an understanding that “not only one can be at home in movement, but that 
movement can be one’s very own home” (Rapport and Dawson 1998, 27). As such, Urry (2000) 
spoke of a mobile identity, Beck (2006) of a cosmopolitan identity, and Clifford (1997) of an 
uprooted identity. Moving away from the literature on migration and diaspora that views 
movement as a form of dislocation and displacement from home, Chu (2010) argues that to move 
is to belong to a desirable world where mobility is often considered a force of social reproduction.  
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However, not all movement is the same and it matters greatly where one moves. There 
are directions of migration, especially in post-colonial countries, that are preferable and 
attractive: rural to urban and domestic to international. The latters (urban and international 
migration) are often associated with economic-financial, social-status, and cultural-cosmopolitan 
values (Salazar and Smart 2012).49 The consequences of these perceptions are twofold: first, 
rural-to-rural migration is often unnoticed, resulting in the conflation of diverse ruralities into 
homogeneity and second, people who move from one rural locality to another, especially 
internally, are often excluded from social and mobility capitals associated with more desirable 
rural-to-urban or international migration.  
Rural-to-rural migration is often ignored in mobilities studies. Scholars tend to focus on 
rural to urban migration, both internally and internationally. Vertovec (2011) claims that the city 
is the foremost setting for the anthropology of migration because of its everyday 
multiculturalism and its large scale (see also Caglar 2010, Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, Brettell 
2003, Bommes and Radtke 1996). Accordingly, the most recent research on migration and 
movement is based in big cities such as New York, Miami, Barcelona, Frankfurt, Manchester, 
London, and Beijing (Glick Schiller and Caglar 2011, Foner 2010, Però 2007, Stepick et al. 2003, 
Zhang 2002). This lack of attention to the rural as an important destination of migration fails to 
account for the significance of rural localities as accessible, desirable and transformative 
migration destinations for many rural people (for studies of rural-to-rural migration in Vietnam, 
see Carruthers and Dang 2012, Winkels 2012, Taylor 2007, Hardy 2003a). It also creates the 
                                                
49 However, the preference for international migration over internal migration is not always the 
case. Kalir’s research shows that for small business entrepreneurs in booming China, moving 
abroad as construction workers actually means “moving down” with respect to one’s social 
mobility (Kalir 2013). 
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biased assumption that only cities, and not rural places, are diverse, resulting in an unbalanced 
interpretation of migration.  
It is the diversity of ruralities as well as the hierarchies among them that open up 
economic opportunities and contribute to the transnational and translocal marriages in Hải Thành. 
Most of the fishermen’s wives are from relatively poor rural areas, ranging from the northern 
mountainous provinces (Bắc Ninh, Bắc Kạn, Cao Bằng, Hà Giang, Lạng Sơn) to the provinces of 
the mid north coast (Thanh Hoá, Nghệ An) and Central Highlands (Buôn Mê Thuột). This is how 
a woman in Hải Thành described the home place of her daughter-in-law in Thanh Hoá when she 
visited it: 
“The road was small and very dark; there were not many lights like we have here. The 
houses were sparse and surrounded by trees. I jokingly told the in-law family that if they fought 
and the wife left, the husband would not be able to find her because she could easily hide 
anywhere. Their house was as big as the house I built for my chickens. It still did not have a 
concrete exterior layer and you could see the bricks on the wall. And there was no bathroom. Oh, 
if they had had the bathroom like we did, it would have cost them a couple of hundred millions.” 
The fact that their hometowns are poorer than Hải Thành is openly admitted by the 
translocal women as well. They remark on the lack of jobs for young people and on the 
insufficiency of farming that puts rural lives in hardship and distress. Nguyệt, a woman from 
Ninh Bình, married a neighbor’s son in Uncle Tú’s hamlet six years ago. She acknowledged:  
“My hometown is very poor and the majority of people are farmers. Even though we toil 
away in the field, we barely make anything. It is a little better now, but not much. When I was 
young, we were so poor that my two older siblings did not go to school but stayed home to help 
my parents. The whole family depended on a small plot of rice field. We also raised goats on the 
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mountain, about ten. We only sold one or two of them when we were in a dire need, not daring to 
sell more in case we need money later.”  
The poverty of rural Vietnam and the insufficiency of farming have pushed most rural 
youths to the cities looking for jobs (see also Earl 2014, Hardy 2003a). Hải Thành, however, is a 
bit different. Most translocal women recognize that, compared to their hometowns, it is easier to 
make a living in Hải Thành. Although the amount of land for farming in Hải Thành is so small 
that most families do not sell their rice or vegetables, the women have access to other job options. 
Nearby the commune, within the rural district of Thuỷ Nguyên, are three textile and shoe 
factories where women can find work. Within the commune, jobs mending and fixing fishing 
nets and traps become available every time the fishermen are home. Women can also go to Cát 
Bà Island to raise farmed fish and clams or trade and sell seafood. However, these kinds of jobs 
provided by the fishing industry are often limited to local people who grew up in Hải Thành and 
know all the ins and outs of fishing. Some translocal women can set up street stalls to sell food 
and drinks because Hải Thành people, unlike many other rural folks, have money to spend. The 
profits generated by these jobs are not much, and most translocal women, even if they work, are 
still dependent on their husbands’ and their parents-in-law’s incomes. What is different, between 
women in Hải Thành and those in other rural places of Vietnam, however, is that many women 
in Hải Thành do not need to work to sustain their families. 
Not only are there differences between ruralities in Vietnam, but also between those in 
Vietnam and South Korea. Although Hải Thành is considered better than many other rural places 
in Vietnam, it trails in comparison to rural Korea. The rural in Korea is described in local 
discourses as cleaner, more beautiful, more sufficient, and more modern. Uncle Tú’s sister, after 
visiting her daughter in Changwon, Korea, said:  
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“They have a huge amount of land but they are able to work all of it because they have 
machines. That is why they can live comfortably as farmers. Unlike us here, we always struggle 
with not making enough. There are plenty of jobs even for older people like me. And everything 
is so clean, no dust. Even in the summer, the sun is not unbearable and in the winter, you work 
inside the greenhouses; you don’t freeze like you do in Vietnam. You know, my complexion is so 
much lighter after a year there and there is no dirt stuck in my fingernails even after work. It is 
just so much better.”    
Again we see how hygiene (clean vs. dirty) is used as an indicator of economic 
differences between Hải Thành and other rural places and between Hải Thành and rural Korea 
(see also chapter IV and Jiang 2014, Lai 2014, Rogaski 2004)50. In fact, it is the economic 
differences, among many other factors, that motivate translocal and transnational marriages and 
migration. They make many women willing to marry outside of and far from their hometowns. 
They draw people to Hải Thành and rural Korea, turning them into rural places of great diversity. 
In other words, the literature on migration often fails to account for the differences among 
ruralities as they are conflated into “the rural,” and in so doing, pays little attention to the rural-
to-rural migration that is motivated by economic mobility. In my interviews and talks with local 
women (before they marry transnationally) and translocal women, they express the desire of not 
having to struggle to make ends meet and having better lives for their children. Unfortunately, 
although economics are no longer much of a concern for both groups, translocal women do not 
necessarily reap the social mobility benefits that transnational women do. 
 
 
                                                
50 The hygienic distinction, as I will explore later in the chapter, is also racialized with the 
implication that white is clean and black/brown/dark is dirty.  
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Connection, Hierarchy, and the Politics of Race, Class and Gender in Migration 
King and Keldon (2010) have shown that a division remains in migration studies between 
internal and international migration and that they form two almost entirely separate literatures 
with different conceptual, theoretical, and methodological standpoints, which rarely talk to each 
other (see also Kalir 2013). And since the emergence of the “migration-development nexus” in 
the 1990s, both scholars and policy-makers have tended to focus almost exclusively on the 
relationship between development and international migration, overlooking the fact that in most 
developing countries, internal migration is equally important (King and Skeldon 2010). The 
overemphasis on international over internal migration also stems from the intellectual bias that 
views “nation” as the main unit of analysis (Wilding 2007, Hage 2005). The problem with the 
separation of internal and international migration is that it ignores many similarities in the 
migration processes between the two and provides only partial insights into the complex 
livelihoods of migrants and their communities (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, Cohen 2011, 
King and Skeldon 2010).  
In Hải Thành both internal and international migration are crucial to sustaining the 
community in terms of economics, lifestyles, and population, and thus should be studied in 
concert. Their interconnection is clearly seen in the relationship between translocal women and 
transnational women in Hải Thành: the in-migration of translocal women compensates for the 
out-migration of transnational women. More importantly, the identity and status of one group are 
defined against those of the other group.  
While transnational women and translocal women are similar in many aspects (they both, 
supposedly, marry up and both migrate from a rural place to another rural place), most people in 
Hải Thành, including the women themselves, insist that there are no similarities between the two 
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groups. The differences they cite are many. First and foremost is the amount of money that 
transnational and translocal women respectively remit to their parents. The remittances from 
transnational women can reach up to $4,000 per year and within three to five years can enable 
their parents to build brand new two-story houses, a major source of pride and social status in 
Hải Thành. After the houses are built, the remittances from transnational women are used to 
cover the living expenses of the parents and put in the bank for investment. As a result, many 
parents of transnational women stop working and stay home. They become a group of “walking 
people”: every early morning or late afternoon, they (especially women) take a walk around the 
neighborhood as physical exercise, a powerful sign of self-care and graceful, comfortable ageing. 
Some show off their comfortable lives by wearing “modern” clothes and gold jewelry on their 
rounds. Local people told me that only “walking people” have time to walk because they have 
transnational daughters; others are busy working. Therefore, wealth, in this community, is 
expressed through both the body and having leisure time. Urry wrote that “unforced ‘movement’ 
is power, … for individuals and groups a major source of advantage” (Urry 2007, 51, my 
emphasis). Walking parents, by choosing to walk around the neighborhood, show off their 
wealth and social status, thanks to their daughters living abroad. Translocal women, on the other 
hand, mostly give money to their parents only when the New Year comes. The sum they give is 
small in comparison, ranging from $50 to $100. That amount is not enough to help their parents 
build houses or stop working to take a walk everyday.  
Translocal women are also considered to be not as talented as transnational or local 
women. One Hải Thành resident summarized the commonly heard arguments:  
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“If they (translocal women) were talented (giỏi giang), they would not be staying at home 
all the time. Moreover, if they were so talented, why would they have to marry so far away from 
home? They would have been taken by local men already.”  
Both of these lines of reasoning are problematic because they fail to acknowledge in-
marrying women’s understandable lack of familiarity with the fishing industry as well as how 
common translocal marriages have become throughout rural Vietnam nowadays. As agriculture 
has become a sure way to poverty (Taylor 2004b), many young Vietnamese have migrated from 
rural to urban areas looking for jobs. This is where they meet their future spouses who most 
likely are from different hometowns. Therefore, the phenomenon of translocal marriages in Hải 
Thành is not uncommon, although I believe this community’s atypically high number of 
transnational marriages exacerbated the phenomenon. As opposed to the non-talented translocal 
women, transnational (and local) women are considered more accomplished, according to Hải 
Thành residents, because they can go anywhere (to the islands or foreign countries) and still 
manage to make a good living, sending money home for their parents and the community at 
large51. The difference in economic capacity translates into other status differences between the 
two groups. Nguyệt, now in her mid 20s and living in Hải Thành for six years, explained to me: 
Nguyệt: They have money so they are, of course, different from me. They are foreigners 
now and that is so different from us. They have money to show off; I don’t have 
money so how can I compare with them, like how dare I walk side by side with 
them. There are times when I talk to them and they don’t even bother to answer. 
They only talk to people with money. Even when they talk to me, it is just some 
                                                
51 See Thai (2014) for a study on why low-wage Vietnamese immigrants send home a large 
portion of their incomes and spend extravagantly on relatives during return trips. 
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superficial and quick stuff. They go abroad so they are high and rich (giàu sang) 
while I am low and poor (thấp hèn).  
Linh:  How do they show their differences? 
Nguyệt: By how they walk. The way they walk is so different. I don’t have money so I 
walk like a normal person. They have money so they sashay like a supermodel. 
And they talk with airs and graces, lengthening the tone. Instead of saying “I do 
this,” they will say “Iiiiiiiii do thiiiiiiiiiis.” You know, instead of just saying it 
right out, they have to say it like it is so special. Then they will add foreign words 
to their conversations and talk with a foreign accent, like a Westerner speaking 
Vietnamese. How strange, you know, because they are Vietnamese. Even the 
gestures are an effort to put on airs. For example, if they need to get something 
from their pocket, their thumb and index fingers will touch each other while the 
other three fingers extended up. Of course, not all of them are like that.  
Linh:  Are there any other ways you can tell that they are transnationals? 
Nguyệt: The most obvious signs are their clothes and their complexions. Their 
complexions are beautiful, lighter and pinkish because they do not have to work 
over there. And because they have gone abroad, they know how to dress really 
nicely. Their clothes look very different from the clothes you can buy here. We, on 
the other hand, just dress simply.  
This dialogue shows how transnational women are perceived as having a high social 
status and they actively consolidate their status by acting like they are more refined and imbuing 
themselves with qualities of foreigners. However, Nguyệt’s choice of words suggests that even 
though transnational women are evaluated as fake and pretentious owing to how they walk and 
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talk, they are still envied because they embody certain qualities associated with life abroad (cuộc 
sống Việt Kiều) that are out of reach for translocal women: fashionable clothes, nice fairer 
complexion, and an exemption from dirty, hard agricultural work that makes women less 
attractive. This tension between translocal women’s aspiration and resistance against beautiful 
transnational women as well as local women, as we will see later on in the chapter, is an 
important factor in how translocal women construct their identity and navigate the social 
structure. Nguyệt further illustrated this distinction and tension when she told me about the first 
time she went out with her husband and his friends:  
“When I first moved to Hải Thành, my husband took me out to the discotheque with his 
friends; that experience terrified me. I was poor and I dressed differently from the women here. 
Plus my hands and feet were not as clean as theirs and my legs were not as beautiful; it was 
embarrassing. They danced like crazy there, even the one who was pregnant and had a big belly, 
but I just stood like a stick and they kept looking at me. They wore nice clothes while I dressed 
funny. I felt so uncomfortable. I wanted to go home but his friends were all there so I could not. I 
just sat there and drank some water. From then on, I would go out only with my husband and 
decline to hang out with his friends.” 
What is evident from Nguyệt’s description is how social differences are revealed in more 
than just consumption (nice clothes, manicures) but also lifestyles (dancing, for example). Hsiao 
(2010) has cautioned against the narrower conception of the new middle class in Asia as 
consumers with purchasing power. He notes that a conceptualization of the Asian middle class 
needs to include self-improvement, lifestyles, social awareness, and a globalized outlook. Class 
culture involves a long process of socialization, not simply status-marking consumption. The 
transnational and local women are admired for their cultural sophistication: knowing how to 
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dance, to wear what clothes, to have their hands and feet done, and to incorporate foreignness in 
their way of talking and walking. Nguyệt, on the other hand, lacked the “ease or cultivated 
naturalness”: the familial habitus that allows the upper and middle class to “disguise what they 
have learned as what they are born with” (Jenkins 1992, 90, Bourdieu 1984). That is why Nguyệt 
felt like she was sticking out like a sore thumb for not knowing how to dance and appeared very 
uncomfortable. Bourdieu (1984) remarks that taste is a system of perception and appreciation 
that produces classifiable practices and works, resulting in distinctive lifestyles and social 
differences. Nguyệt understood that she had different tastes than transnational and local women 
and perceived her lifestyle as a sign of different, albeit inferior, class status.  
The attractiveness of abroadness, in a post-colonial society like Vietnam, is often shaped 
by not only money but also by arrangements of power such as colonialism, capitalism and 
modernities. As Gupta (1998) and Chakrabarty (2000) argued, the former colonial power 
becomes the standard against which those living in the former colony are measured, always to 
their detriment. My conversations with Hải Thành people reveal that the West stands for 
everything that is desirable and opposite of what they are unsatisfied with in Vietnam: capitalist 
(vs. communist economy), industrial (vs. agricultural), cosmopolitan (vs. rural), democratic (vs. 
totalitarian), opportunities to make money and travel (vs. the lack thereof), clean (vs. polluted). 
Even though South Korea and Taiwan do not belong to the West, they still have all the Western 
characteristics listed above. Korean and Taiwanese people are not white, but their skin color is 
still much lighter than the Vietnamese. South Korea and Taiwan, the so-called Asian dragons, 
have therefore become the Asian role models for the Vietnamese in their quest for catching up 
with the West. In such a context, it is understandable that local people often view the Vietnamese 
transnational women who have changed themselves into Korean and Taiwanese as more modern, 
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classy, and wealthy than the ‘simple’ rural Vietnamese in Hải Thành. The differences are shown 
in not only how translocal women view transnational women but also the other way around. A 
transnational woman remarked on her sister-in-law: 
“I cannot clearly say why but the way she dresses just makes her look dirty. It’s not that 
the clothes are unclean but she looks kinda dirty. She also does not have her nails done so her 
hands do not look nice. And she walks loudly; I can recognize her by the noise she makes. When 
we eat, I have the feeling that she just eats a lot. I don’t know. I just do not talk to her much.”  
The body and lifestyle, including manners such as walking and eating, are once again 
used to discuss the hierarchical statuses and classes between translocal and transnational women. 
Besides the economic differences, I believe that the translocal women also do not necessarily get 
any social capital associated with moving because of the politics of migration that favor the 
urban and the cosmopolitan. In the situation of translocal women in Hải Thành, their marriage 
migration to a rural, internal place does not relieve them of the “rural women” status. Translocal 
women, despite having mobile and uprooted identities, are still regarded as rural and backward 
and they are devaluated by what is seen and framed as unpleasant behavior and unappealing, 
unhygienic bodies. We see repeatedly the importance of dressing, maintaining beautiful hands, 
and hygiene (dirty vs. clean, the white/black binary is transformed into fairer/darker skin color) 
as markers of social classes among the women. In other words, the body and lifestyles are a site 
where social differences are articulated (Earl 2014, Jiang 2014, Kang 2010, Bourdieu 1984).  
Skin color has been an important bellwether of status in Asia for centuries. In India, skin-
color discrimination is a legacy of the mythical Aryan race theory and the British colonialism 
that associate lighter skin with upper caste status (Jha 2016). The Japanese and Korean construct 
themselves as “whiter” and “middle-class” nations above “blacker” and “lower-class” 
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immigrants and their countries. These immigrants are from “lesser Asia” who are “desperate” for 
3-D jobs (dirty, dangerous, and difficult) (Kim 2015b). A recent Thai beauty ad that claims “Just 
being white, you will win” drew a storm of criticism for racism (Chan 2016). These studies have 
shown that skin-color privileges are influences of colonialism and ideas of beauty are based on 
Western standards, especially skin colors.  
In Vietnam, Lê Hoàng, a famous director penned an op-ed in response to a popular skin-
whitening ad by Vaseline and the booming of skin-whitening products on the unregulated 
market:  
 
 
Only those who are insensitive and shallow would think that women, in general, and girls, in 
particular, are afraid of, in hierarchical order, thieves and robbers (first), mice (second), and 
mothers-in-law (third). That thinking is utterly wrong. They are afraid of having dark skin first, 
second not having light skin, and third, (if they already have light skin) their skin cannot be 
whitened more. Having fair complexion has long been a forever dream of girls, to the extent that 
a compliment about having light skin means a compliment on their beauty and instead of praising 
that they are so pretty, one only has to say they have skin as white as grapefruit flowers. Studies 
have shown that girls would rather die than learn how to swim because swimming tans the skin. If 
swimming made the skin lighter, men would never be able to find a spot for swimming (Lê 
Hoàng 2015).  
 
Lê Hoàng observed that in Vietnamese show biz, only one singer has a “chocolate” skin 
while everyone else has moved to the other side: fair skin. Apparently, fair skin has an incredible 
importance with regards to beauty and class status in Asia. In this context, it is understandable 
that going abroad is usually synonymous with having fairer skin in Hải Thành because it shows 
an upgrade in status; that transnational, and to a lesser extent, local, women’s status is reflected 
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in their fair skin; and that translocal women are seen as inferior because they do not have the 
privilege to distance themselves from manual work or to pay for skin whitening services. Skin 
color is both a product and producer of privileges and class status.  
Besides skin color, clothes, as Jones (2001) notes, are important elements of self-
presentation and as such, are significant markers of class boundaries. Clothes in Hải Thành 
indicate conformity with different ideals of femininity (dress like the Koreans vs. dress simply), 
visibly separate the two groups (transnational and translocal women), and signal different class 
affiliations (cosmopolitan vs. rural). Similarly, Jiang (2014) argues that hand fetish and hygiene 
is the new class indicator, distinguishing the higher class from the “dirty” working class. In the 
industrial time, the hands were associated with manual labor, a lower form of labor compared to 
the more advanced mechanical labor. As such, a measure of modernity is the extent to which the 
hands are freed from labor. Beautiful hands have, arguably, become the representation of 
civilization and modernity (Jiang 2014). It explains the global obsession with manicures, which, 
more than being simply a question of women’s unattainable beauty standards and oppression, is 
also a venue for women to negotiate their social statuses (Kang 2010). In her study in New York, 
Kang concludes that the reasons women have their nails done vary from having higher self-
esteem, attractiveness to partners, stress relief, bonding with other women, career advancement, 
and increased mobility (Kang 2010). Depending on their social positions, defined by race, 
sexuality, and social class, the meanings and rewards of manicures and beauty differ among 
different women. For example, airbrushed nails, while considered to be beautiful by many 
African American women, stigmatize them as belonging to a lower social class. At the same time, 
by choosing a more “boring” middle-class nail style (French manicures and pastel colors), a 
working-class woman can augment to a professional status. Nails, as Kang convincingly shows, 
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“grow out of [their] bodies but also out of social relations and circumstances in which these 
bodies are embedded” (Kang 2010: 132).  
Manicure for women in Hải Thành is a ticket to an exclusive club of women who have 
the money and time to pay attention to beauty and pamper themselves. Vietnamese rural women, 
who are subjected to agricultural work, considered both dirty and hard, and who do not have 
disposable incomes, cannot join this club. Almost all translocal women in Hải Thành I know do 
not have their nails done, yet know where the nail salons are and exactly how much each specific 
style costs. Their knowledge of manicures comes from listening to transnational and local 
women talking about manicures at home. Transnational women in Hải Thành, by having their 
manicures done and criticizing translocal women for the lack thereof, are essentially claiming 
their bodies as both special and normative, consequently reinfocing their class privileges. At the 
same time, translocal women’s failure to keep their hands “clean” and nice is read as personal 
inadequacy rather than as a re/production of marginality and disadvantages. Therefore, just like 
how the nonwhite body is the marked other against which the ideal woman is defined (Hill 
Collins 2005, Bettie 2003), the rural women’s body becomes a specter against which a 
cosmopolitan, urban ideal is defined. In other words, transnational women’s beauty and 
privileges have no meanings without the failure of rural, translocal women to measure up. The 
women’s hands express both a privileged distance from hard labor and bind the articulation of 
class with the articulation of gender.  
What is most interesting to me, however, is how the class hierarchy is mapped onto 
ethnic differences in Hải Thành. Often Hải Thành people told me that the in-marrying daughters-
in-law of their specific neighbors were very rural (quê) because they were ‘ethnic minority 
people’ (‘người dân tộc’, commonly contracted in Hải Thành as ‘toọc’). The term ‘ethnic 
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minority’ in Vietnam has such a negative meaning that it easily slides into race, loaded with 
connotations of primitiveness and savagery. Such connotations can be seen in the remarks made 
by one Hải Thành man about his own daughter-in-law, Trinh, who is an ethnic Thái woman from 
Thanh Hoá: 
“She’s very different from us here. Her true nature (bản chất) ... is that she argues all the 
time with her husband. If he says one sentence, she has to say another. If needed, she can 
physically fight her husband, unlike women here. Fight till the end! Before moving here, she 
lived in the mountain. From the road to her house on the top of the mountain, it takes more than 
an hour of walking. Their lifestyles are strange: they do not grow any food or raise any livestock. 
Instead, they just go into the woods and fetch whatever they can find for the day. Absolutely no 
long-term thinking. There is nothing to live on over there. It’s exactly like how the TV portrays 
the ethnic life. I don’t really understand her and I don’t trust what she says yet. Because of her 
background, it is very hard for me to teach her.”  
Here, the man implied that ethnic people are marginal, wild, and primitive, both in their 
lifestyles and their personality. They are marginal because they live in the mountain far from the 
center. They are wild because they are aggressive verbally and physically. They are primitive 
because they do not practice agriculture. They are also dangerous and cannot be trusted, which 
makes them difficult to restrain and discipline. This representation is in line with the dominant 
discourses in Vietnam that fortify the binaries of majority-minority, modern-ancient, and 
civilized-barbarian (Michaud 2010). 
Even though there are indeed ethnic women marrying local men, the number is small and 
many translocal women that are thought of as ethnic are really not. When I questioned Hải 
Thành people why they said these women are ethnic when they are not, they explained, “We 
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were just joking because ethnic people are very honest, thus not very smart (ngố) even though 
they like money (tham tiền). They also dress very rurally.”  I witnessed how often the term ethnic 
(tọc) is used in Hải Thành to talk about differences. When a grandmother jokingly told her five-
year-old granddaughter, “You must be ethnic (toọc) because you dress so funny,” she cried, “No, 
I am not ethnic. My mom is ethnic but I am not because my dad is not.” Her mother, a translocal 
woman, is a Kinh woman, not a minority.52 In other words, all the “bad” and “backward” 
qualities of translocal women are mapped onto ‘ethnic inferiority.’ The ethnic mapping of class 
indicates a permeating but normalized hierarchy between the Kinh and other minorities in 
Vietnam. It is so normalized that Hải Thành people can go about branding people they deem 
different and inferior to them as “ethnic.” Here we see that the categories of ethnicity and social 
class are collapsing into one. Then, this collapse of class and ethnicity/race is conflated with the 
figure of a rural woman. 
This is possible because in Vietnam, the ideologies of race and class have combined to 
shape the ideal femininity that draws new forms of inclusion and exclusion along the rural/urban 
and local/global divide. The modern Hải Thành women project their identity by conforming to a 
Western/white ideal of beauty (fairer skin color, being cosmopolitan, clean hands, and nice 
clothes) and fixate their contrastive other in the image of the “ethnic” rural other (dark skin color, 
coming from a remote place, ugly hands, and dirty clothes). As such, rural women are rejected 
because they are perceived to embody ethnic/racial regression53. 
                                                
52 In Vietnam, the Kinh are the largest ethnic group, accounting for 86% of the population (Tổng 
cục Thống kê 2010). Other ethnic groups in Vietnam (such as Hmong, Tai, Nung, Thai, etc.) are 
seen as minorities.  
53 It should be noted that the politics of race, class, and gender play out quite similarly for 
Vietnamese transnational women in Taiwan and South Korea. Vietnamese transnational women 
are also discriminated against in East Asia because they are rural women from a less 
economically developed country (Tsai 2011, Epstein 2008, Hsia 2008, Lee 2008, Hsia 2007, 
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The exclusion of rural women from modern Vietnamese society at large can be traced on 
the covers of books and magazines about women, in particular, how women can become modern, 
wonderful, and seductive. The female models on these covers are fairly similar in terms of styles 
and beauty (white stylish clothing, careful make-up, and accessories). Take, for example, the 
book titled Phụ nữ Hiện đại Thế kỷ XXI (Modern women of the 21st Century) published by the 
Lao Động Press in 2011.The modern Vietnamese woman, shown in the cover, has her hair and 
nails done, wears jewelry and make-up. Her outfit is a modernized version of a suit and she 
seems to be standing in front of a business building. It is noteworthy that she has a fair 
complexion and is wearing white, reinforcing the Western beauty standards. In other word, the 
modern Vietnamese woman is a chic “white” urban businesswoman rather than a plain, “dirty” 
rural farming woman.   
 
Figure 6.1: Covers of magazines depicting modern Vietnamese women 
                                                                                                                                                       
Sheu 2007, Wang 2007, Hsia 2006, Lee, Seol, and Cho 2006, Wang and Chang 2002). For an 
interesting twist on how Koreans experience the same racial discrimination in more 
economically developed countries, see Chun and Han (2015). 
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In the end, the perceived racial/ethnic, along with social and economic, differences 
consolidate the hierarchy between transnational women and translocal women. This hierarchy 
reflects important differences between international and internal migration, demonstrating that 
not all migrations are the same and the destinations of migration (rural or urban, local or global) 
are significant in the socio-economic values and evaluation of migration. While mobility in the 
global world is usually given positive values, the marginal status of translocal women in Hải 
Thành challenges the simplistic and assumed relationship between migration and social, financial, 
and cosmopolitan climbing.  
 
The Fish out of Water: Migration and Displacement 
Similar to the perceived causation between physical and social mobility, there has been 
much celebration of mobility in its association with freedom, liberation and resistance. The 
romanticization of mobility in the image of the nomad is evident from the work of Mackinders, 
Deleuze and Guattari, and Bachelard, all of which connect mobility with power and thus 
perceive in the nomad the ability to evade power and link mobility (of the nomad) with freedom 
and liberty (Adey 2009). However, the case of translocal women shows that they are not only 
considered inferior but also controlled and marginalized in Hải Thành. The marginalization of 
translocal women in Hải Thành is revealed, first, in their physical immobility and confinement in 
the home. Unlike those who move to the cities for jobs, translocal women who have migrated to 
Hải Thành for marriages often find themselves unemployed. The lack of jobs for rural women in 
Vietnam in general and the fact that most translocal women are under-educated make many of 
them stay-at-home housewives. They might do some seasonal farming if their families do not 
rent out their plots or hire people to do the work. However, the amount of land in Hải Thành is so 
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small that agricultural work does not take much time. Moreover, they often stay with their 
parents-in-law and are financially dependent because the parents-in-law control the family 
budget.  
Because of their ambiguous position as outsiders who are also now insiders, they are not 
trusted by the local people.54 Translocal women rarely visit their neighbors as local people and 
their parents-in-law would view these visits as occasions for gossip. “What else besides gossip 
will they talk about? They don’t have jobs; they stay at home; they don’t understand the politics 
and economics of the country or this community; what do they have to talk about besides 
gossiping?” is the answer that local people gave me. Gossiping in Vietnam generally means 
speaking ill of your own families and the neighbors, which in a small rural place like Hải Thành, 
where everyone knows and is related to one another, will spread like fire. Gossip is an unspoken 
taboo in the Vietnamese face-saving culture (Hữu Ngọc 2004). It is worth mentioning that gossip 
is often associated with gender in which the men are said to talk about national and big ideas 
(đàn ông bàn việc nước và việc lớn) while women are considered to be only concerned with 
petty talk (phụ nữ hay buôn dưa lê)55. The fear of gossip and its association with women explain 
why translocal women, when asked why they did not visit their neighbors, simply said they did 
not feel welcome. The fishermen, on the other hand, never said to me that they are not received 
warmly when visiting their neighbors or friends. It is as if men can talk outside of the confines of 
the home but translocal women cannot.  
I witnessed this lack of trust of translocal women and the worry about gossip personally 
in my fieldwork. Most translocal women whispered when talking to me for fear of their parents-
                                                
54 For studies on the lack of trust and discrimination against migrants from other provinces and 
ethnicities in Vietnam, see Winkels 2012, McElwee 2008, and Hardy 2003a. 
55 This belief is strongly linked to Confucian ideology that educated men are the leader of the 
society’s morality and formation (Luong 2010). 
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in-law overhearing our conversations. Sometimes their parents-in-law would take over and 
answer my questions on their behalf. The worst was that many of my interviews and connections 
with translocal women were cut off after I happened to meet their parents-in-law in their houses. 
After that, either the parents-in-law would say to me when I visited again that their daughters-in-
law had gone somewhere or the translocal women would text me and tell me not to contact them 
again. In some instances, I could speculate that the parents-in-law did not want me to know, 
based on what the translocal women told me, that they had lied to their daughter-in-law about 
having more money than they actually did or that their son had been divorced by his first wife 
because he was a drunk. In others, I was just clueless because I did not even have a story yet. 
Given that I never faced a similar problem talking to any other groups in Hải Thành, the abrupt 
disengagement reveals quite clearly the translocal women’s status as outsiders that need to be 
controlled.  
Besides the dreaded gossip, translocal women often feel out of place in a different kind of 
rurality and discouraged by what they perceive as lack of hospitality. Trinh, the Thai daughter-
in-law mentioned earlier, complained to me that she wanted to visit the neighbors but unlike her 
hometown, every house here had a front gate and it was always closed. She felt as if her 
neighbors did not want to welcome any visitors. Similarly, Nguyệt said she was so afraid of all 
the big dogs behind the gates that she did not dare to visit her neighbors. Nguyệt said in her 
hometown, people work on each other’s paddy field for mututal help and if the children go away, 
neighbors come and visit the parents. There is little differentiation among people. As Hải Thành 
has become more prosperous, the locals have built big houses with boundary walls and heavy 
metal gates, signs of conspicous consumption as well as of individualism. Both of them are 
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viewed as intimidating by translocal women who often come from humble backgrounds and 
have a stronger sense of communalism.  
To make the matter more difficult, local women look down on translocal women and do 
not hang out with them. One day I went out with my classmates when I ran into a translocal 
woman we all knew. While I said hi and asked her how she was doing, my classmates generally 
kept their distance. A few days later, the translocal woman came up in our conversation and my 
classmates revealed why they did not like her and other translocal women as a whole: ! They dress so ugly. ! She [the translocal woman] looks like a ghost. Ugly. She looks like a beggar.  ! The wife of Hùng is the same. ! Yep. They look ridiculous and disgusting. They look black, dirty, and drippy (đen đen, 
nhớt nhớt, bẩn bẩn). They are from very poor places.  ! Plus, they have heavy accents, just like the language of ethnic minorities.  ! And their nose is so flat.  ! Frankly, I just do not pay attention to them. With just a quick glance, I can tell that they 
are from rural places. I can’t help discriminating and looking down on them. In my head, 
I think, how can these rural people be so disgusting (kinh)? How can they wear such 
pants? Such shirts? They look like a sore in my eyes and how they are so different from 
us. But I just think that in my head. They are poor, we are not. That is what I think. ! Yeah, and when they get here, they also catch the laziness symptom of Hải Thành. The 
daughter-in-law of Ms. Trang, she is as lazy as a ghost (lười như ma). The moment Ms. 
Trang leaves the house, she goes back to her bed to sleep.   ! Oh, they are also very cheap and stingy, will never cough up anything. 
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The fact that my classmates all agreed on the “bad qualities” of translocal women using 
very extreme language (ghost, beggar, drippy, dirty, sore, stingy) speaks to how deeply translocal 
women are discriminated in Hải Thành. To my classmates, the translocal women are so “ugly” 
and “disgusting” that sometimes they are not even humans (they become ghosts), and if they are, 
the are the lowest of humans (beggars). Thus, they should be ignored. The reasons for 
discrimination are various: we don’t know them; they dress so ugly and dirty; they do not know 
how to have fun; their personalities are questionable (such as they are lazy and not generous). All 
of these “bad qualities” are assumed just because translocal women are poor, rural, and 
presumably ethnic. Even though the local girls consider themselves “rural girls” as opposed to 
“city girls” (gái quê vs. gái phố), they use the term “rural” to denote the “backardness” of 
translocal women in conversation. It shows once again that ruralilty is not homogeneous, but 
hierarchical and diverse. Moreover, in the context of Vietnam, the social class divide is often 
mapped onto the spatial divide between the urban and the rural. Being beautiful, then, is seen as 
more modern and urban while not being beautiful is associated with being rural. This distinction, 
based on beauty, occurs repeatedly in how local girls sternly judged translocal women. The 
conversation among my classmates reiterate how beauty is one indicator of social class and 
reinforces how social class in Vietnam is expressed through gender along the dichotomies of 
rural vs. urban, ethnic majority vs. minority.  
As a result of discrimination, translocal women end up being socially and physically 
isolated. Their social network consists of only their in-laws and their cousins if they have also 
married local men. Local people often say that they do not see translocal women often and do not 
really know who they are. The irony is while the local people, especially the parents-in-law, 
often boast about the “good” lives of translocal women (they really do not have to work much 
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besides a bit of farming; they only stay home and look after their kid; compared to women in 
other rural places, their lives are ten times better), translocal women often feel constrained and 
inferior.  
An, originally from Hà Tĩnh province in central Vietnam, is one of the older translocal 
women. Now 35, she has been in Hải Thành for more than ten years. She met her husband in the 
south where both were working in factories in Bình Dương, but decided to come back to Hải 
Thành after she was pregnant as they needed help with childcare. Her husband now works with 
his brothers on a small family-owned boat and he is away most of the time. An said they 
borrowed a significant loan to build the boat and it would take at least two more years to pay off. 
Tight with money and isolated at home, An found a job at a textile sweatshop in the neighboring 
commune. She said the job is very hard: she works long hours; she is not allowed to take days 
off; it’s suffocatingly hot in the summer and bone cold in the winter; and she is poorly paid. Yet 
she described how much she loves working there:  
“I go to work and I feel happy. I have friends there, you know. People who I can talk to 
during lunch, people who I can hang out with. We eat together and we take a nap together. Sure, 
it is long hours and I have to stand on my feet all day. They are sore often. Sometimes, especially 
in the winter, I come home so late that the whole house has gone to sleep. I still have to make 
dinner for myself and eat by myself; I feel quite lonely. But staying home is even lonelier.”  
This is a powerful example of the extent to which translocal women feel isolated in Hải 
Thành. Even though An works in an exploitative sweatshop, she does not mind it because that 
place has given her a much needed social network of friendship and made her happy. Despite 
having been in Hải Thành for more than ten years, An still feels like an outsider. An admitted 
that she hardly knows anyone other than her extended family-in-law in Hải Thành. Money is not 
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the main reason for her to work in a sweatshop because she is poorly paid. It is a sense of being 
in a supportive community of friends that is important to her. What is also significant is how 
work perhaps gives An a sense of accomplishment and identity in a commune where translocal 
women like her are ignored and devalued.  
 The marginalization of translocal women in Hải Thành is further shown in their 
invisibility in local discourses. There exists no term to talk about translocal women as a group in 
Hải Thành. Hải Thành people use Kiều Đài Loan, Hàn Quốc (Taiwanese and Korean 
transnationals) to refer to transnational women and gái Hải (Hải women), a short form of gái Hải 
Thành (Hải Thành women), to refer to local women. But translocal women are not assumed to 
belong to either of these two groups. If they ever get talked about, it is usually as specific wives 
of specified fishermen, never as a group. Even though translocal women often distinguish 
themselves from local women, local people do not compare local women to translocal women 
but to women in other places. In other words, translocal women rarely appear in local discourse. 
This linguistic absence indicates that translocal women have no identity outside of being defined 
by men (being local men’s wives). It seems that translocal women have no public 
acknowledgement of their life histories, struggles or identity outside of marriage. They are 
defined by heterosexual and patriarchal language that designate themselves as subject to male 
authority.  
The absence of translocal women in local discourse has other political implications. As 
Foucault noted, discourses are “practices that systematically form the objects of which they 
speak ... Discourses are not about objects; they do not identify objects, they constitute them and 
in the practice of doing so conceal their own intervention” (Foucault 1972, 49). Discourse, in 
creating the subject through marking the boundaries of exclusion, leaves us with the silenced 
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group, who because of the linguistic absence, have no way of articulating their subjecthood. 
Translocal women, in a Lacanian understanding, are a signified (a reality) without a signifier (a 
place in language) and therefore are “real” but outside of the social and discursive reality.  
Being made invisible, indeed, is one painful form of oppression as Butler illustrated: 
 
“Indeed, one can be interpellated, put in place, given a place through silence, through not being 
addressed, and this becomes painfully clear when we find ourselves preferring the occasion of 
being derogated to the one of not being addressed at all” (Butler 1997, 27). 
 
The invisibility of translocal women implies being ignored, devalued, rejected, and not 
being heard. It is also a denial of their identity as independent and desirable since translocal 
women are not seen as attractive and significant enough to even be identified. The displacement 
of translocal women is, thus, twofold: they are physically present but evacuated from language 
and they are denied a physical place in public spaces where community life unfolds. They are, in 
short, refused a place of being and of having possibilities to form human relationships. Their 
displacement is the problem of placelessness.  
In a lot of ways, translocal women are the fish that get caught somewhere else and are out 
of water once in Hải Thành. At first, I supposed that because many of them are young and 
relatively newly wedded, they are not yet integrated in the community. They have not been able 
to gain the trust and respect from their in-law families, neighbors, and people in the commune. 
They also have not made friends and social connections outside of their immediate families. 
However, An’s story proves that their isolation might be chronic. My suspicion was further 
confirmed when I met Chung, a translocal woman whom I introduced in chapter II and who has 
been in Hải Thành for more than 20 years. Her husband was an alcoholic and died of a liver 
disease a few years ago. She sold snacks near the elementary school to get by and raise her son. 
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Poor and widowed, Chung openly admired the lives of transnational women in Korea and 
Taiwan. She expressed her desire to marry a foreign man to transform her life but was hesitant 
because of her age (she is now 39 years old). When I asked her how she knew what life in 
Taiwan or Korea was like, she answered: I talked to old women who visited their daughters there 
and they told me everything about Korea and Taiwan. I only talked to old women who buy stuff 
from me; I did not dare to ask the young women (implying transnational and young local women). 
Even after 20 years in Hải Thành, Chung still did not feel accepted and comfortable. She 
considered herself to be inferior to transnational and local women and stopped herself from 
interacting with them. Chung’s and An’s stories lead me to believe that translocal women will 
probably be displaced in Hải Thành for a very long time.  
 
Figure 6.2 A plain altar for Chung’s husband in the house with plastic flowers, a plastic plate, 
and simple offerings 
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Figure 6.3 The inside of Chung’s house with bare minimum necessities. Even though she has a 
set of table and chairs, she often eats on the floor. 
The question of belonging, writes Vijayasree, “acquires an additional edge of urgency 
and poignancy in the case of female migrants, because, for them, the issue of self-definition can 
hardly be isolated from larger questions of gender” (Vijayasree 2000). Vijayasree talks about 
Indian writers in the West but her comment also illuminates the predicament of translocal 
women in Hải Thành. Their migration is a re-entry into the northern Vietnamese patriarchal 
structure that excludes women as outsiders (ngoại tộc), through tracing descent through men, 
patrilocal residence, and an emphasis on male authority (Luong 2010). Their migration, instead 
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of bringing freedom and social mobility, reinforces their female status as being displaced, 
invisible, and, ironically, immobile. 
The situation of translocal women calls for two important corrections in migration studies. 
First, while most of the literature on migration assumes the connection between displacement 
and cultural differences in transnational migration, it often neglects that internal migration also 
creates a significant source of discrimination and isolation. Second, the intensity of displacement 
due to migration is highly gendered. The translocal women’s isolation is a consequence of the 
cultural construction of women as gossipy, distrustful, backward, and not having an individual 
identity other than as someone’s wife. Indeed, they prove that one does not need to migrate out 
of the country to be displaced; one can be displaced by being right in their national home and by 
being a woman.  
Even though translocal women are marginalized and considered inferior to transnational 
women and local women, they complicate this hierarchy by actively navigating the space of 
morality. They join the local people, especially the fishermen, in questioning the morality of 
transnational marriages and transnational and local women’s behaviors and in establishing 
themselves as moral women. Their understanding, shaping, and realizing of morality reveals how 
morality sheds light on the messy relationship between gendered migration and social class. 
 
Morality in Motion: Women, Migration, and Identity in Hải Thành 
Studies on the interconnection between morality and gendered migration usually rest on 
assumptions about appropriate gender roles and gender-specific ideologies (such as meanings of 
“good girls,” “obedient daughters,” “virtuous women,” and “respectable places”) and how they 
enable and limit gendered (mostly female) movement (Sun 2009, Yan 2008, Silvey 2007, 2004, 
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2000, Ong 1991). I am less interested in this functionalist and cause-consequence approach; 
instead, following Strathern (1997), I focus on moral reasonings and practices to understand the 
construction of identity and social relations in the realm of migration.  
I explore both moral practices and discourses used by translocal women, but underscore 
the importance of moral discourses because they provide a range of possibilities for negotiating 
moral interactions and identities in everyday life (Zigon 2008). Zigon explains that “through 
such everyday, language-utilizing practices as conversation, gossip, and instructional 
interactions–for example, advice giving–and verbal performances, speaking individuals negotiate, 
construct, and come to agree on their moral ways of being” (Zigon 2008, 136). I want to stress 
that focusing on the negotiation over moral discourses is not the same as finding out shared 
assumptions of what counts as a locally moral woman or how these assumptions affect gendered 
movement. Rather than arriving at this bounded and shared understanding of morality, I aim to 
reveal how Hải Thành people interact with each other in everyday life in order to accept 
themselves, get past the moral breakdown, and charitably live together (Zigon 2012, Jackson 
1998, Davidson 1984). In other words, I am more interested in considering how local 
relationships form not on the basis of mutual understanding, but in spite of identified differences.  
Morality and moral experiences are often realized, enacted, described, and organized in 
moral discourses. Translocal women, just like everyone else in the community, privately engage 
in moral discourses, especially those concerning transnational brides, to negotiate the nature of 
interactions and stratification in everyday life because moral discourses reveal the process of 
subject formation (who we are, how we react, who we love and hate, what we desire, etc.) and 
our position in relation to others. Every time I brought up the topic of transnational women, 
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translocal women insisted that there were no similarities and dived into the differences between 
them and transnational women. For example, Nguyệt fleshed out the details: 
Nguyệt: They dress so fashionably. They wear dresses, tank tops with spaghetti straps, 
and have their toenails done. They can wear things like that because they just 
don’t have to work. Their husbands pay for everything. They have such 
debauched lifestyles, over the limits, and lose the true nature of Vietnamese 
women. Most of them are like that. For example, many are already married to 
Korean men, but when they are home, they still go on dates with men and sleep 
with them. The woman who used to live right across from us would go overnight 
with her male friend; of course she slept with him. My husband said his female 
friends are all like that. It’s the women’s fault. If they were decent, how could the 
men dare to touch them? My husband, whenever I mention women here, he would 
shake his head. And if I ask him whether a transnational woman is pretty, he will 
respond that they put on so much makeup that they look like freaks. He’s so funny.  
Linh:  So how do you dress? 
Nguyệt: You know, since I moved here, the young women dress so nicely that I have also 
started paying attention to my appearance. I don’t wear loose clothes anymore 
and choose what fits my body. But nothing tight or revealing like the women here. 
I still don’t wear dresses or skirts like transnational women because I live under 
the same roof with my father-in-law. My relatives when I came home all said I 
look a couple of years younger now.  
When I asked Trinh, the translocal ethnic woman, about the money aspect of the 
marriages, she answered:  
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“Yes, I admit that one of the reasons I married my husband is that his family is 
financially stable. But I am unlike the transnational women whose greediness has no limit. I am 
not going to marry a man who is my father’s age just because of money. They are all after money. 
Even my sister-in-law. I love my husband and my family, unlike those who marry because of 
money and leave the man when they are given citizenship status. I want a stable life, not a life 
with one husband now and another husband later (nay chồng này mai chồng kia).”  
Both of these translocal women were judging the transnational women against the 
recurrent ideals of Vietnamese femininity that is based on Confucian patriarchy as discussed in 
chapter II: filial piety, devotion, and faithfulness (Pettus 2003, Rydstrom 2003, Gammeltoft 
1999). They chastised the transnational women for being consumeristic, greedy, unfaithful, and 
debauched so that they had lost “the true nature of Vietnamese women.” Because of that, 
transnational women are no longer humans but “freaks,” as remarked by Nguyệt’s husband. 
Most of these moral issues are, unsurprisingly, conveyed through how a woman dresses and how 
love and money are related. 
 
Body and morality 
In Hải Thành, morality rearticulates itself through the gendered body of women to 
safeguard traditional femininity. Similar to how clothes produce the modern girls in previous 
chapters, clothes have also become an important marker of different femininities. Clothes 
mediate between the body and the external world by concealing what is private and personal 
(Finnane 2008, Jones 2001). As such, clothes can highlight the cultural differences between the 
people and the world they are living in, as well as the process of cultural re/negotiation 
(Chiavetta 2008). We saw in chapter IV how clothes represent a means of identification with 
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Western culture for transnational women. For translocal women, clothes represent acceptance of 
the imposition of traditional femininity as well as an attempt to rework that cultural model. Not 
wearing skirts or dresses yet choosing clothes that fit better illustrates translocal women’s efforts 
to negotiate between the “backwardness” of the rural countryside and the immoralities of the 
global capitalist market.  
It is very important for translocal women to pay attention to their clothed bodies because 
the awareness of home is “mediated by an understanding of place and its relationship to the body” 
(Crane and Mohanram 2000, x). Crane and Mohanram argue that bodies are place-specific and 
bodies are racialized if they appear unnatural and out of place. A transfer of bodies to a new 
place implies new meanings attached to the bodies within power relations of the new place. They 
concluded that “[i]t is the body that grants the subject a sense of personal identity, a sense of 
belonging to the normative group or of being the Other. Thus one carries the notion of home 
within the body by being at home with it or experiencing it as unfamiliar” (Crane and Mohanram 
2000, xi). Hải Thành is an unusual place for translocal women to make their home: it is a rural 
location but its wealth measures up to urban standards and, unlike many other rural places in 
Vietnam, it has a very large number of transnationals (Việt Kiều), making it quite cosmopolitan 
for a rural commune. Translocal women have to walk the fine line between dressing well enough 
for a modern Hải Thành, yet conservatively enough to still fit in a rural patriarchal community, 
as demonstrated by Nguyệt’s comment above. She has stopped wearing loose clothes and opted 
for jeans more often to show her youthful modernity, yet nothing too tight or revealing (like tank 
tops, dresses, or skirts) to upset her in-law family and neighbors. Failing to perform and strike a 
fine balance between these contrasting expectations of womanhood, translocal women would end 
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up being labeled by the community as “dirty” (bẩn) and “rural” (quê) and deemed as minorities 
(người dân tộc).  
 
Figure 6.4 Trinh’s wardrobe. She has a lot of denim clothes, which are considered modern in Hải 
Thành. The red dress is the only dress she has but it was a gift her sister-in-law in Korea gave her. 
Trinh said she had never worn it. 
Love and morality 
While Nguyệt discussed morality via a woman’s body, Trinh is concerned with how 
morality is also expressed through the discourses and practices of love. Love becomes an 
important criterion for translocal women to contrast themselves to transnational women. Trinh 
implied that “I marry for love is better than I marry for money” and many other translocal 
women I spoke to agreed with this sentiment. This binding of love and marriage is a rather new 
phenomenon for the Vietnamese. Scholars of Vietnamese studies have noted that, even though 
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love is not a new concept for Vietnamese, conceptualizations of what love is, who is loveable, 
and when love is appropriate are malleable and shaped by changing historical, political, and 
social contexts (Phinney 2008, Pettus 2003, Soucy 2001). Love has always been used throughout 
Vietnamese history for the purposes of governing the population (Phinney 2008, Pettus 2003).  
In the 1920s and 1930s, Vietnamese intellectuals under the influence of French 
romanticism viewed individual romantic love as an important component of the modern self. By 
the 1940s and 1950s, romantic love was condemned as “bourgeois” and replaced by 
revolutionary calls for love of the country. From the 1960s to the mid 1980s, before Đổi Mới, the 
Vietnamese Communist party promoted socialist love in the construction of a socialist subject 
that was progressive and free from feudal rules. Phinney (2008) remarks that this was the first 
time in Vietnamese history that love became a legal basis for marriage. Socialist love was also 
strictly governed by the state that set new criteria for desirable and appropriate mates based on 
class labeling (Phinney 2008). Since Đổi Mới (Renovation) in 1986, the Vietnamese state 
focused on nulcear families as the foundation of the society. Vietnamese people are told to shift 
their object of affection from building a socialist nation to taking care of their own families and 
themselves. The happy, healthy, and wealthy families will ensure the success of the nation as a 
whole. As such, the Vietnamese state, as many states elsewhere, has appealed to the essentialist 
notions of maternal love and put the responsibilities of creating happy, healthy, and wealthy 
families on women (Phinney 2008, Pettus 2003, Soucy 2001). Ironically, the essentialization of 
maternal love reinforces the gender inequalities that the Vietnamese state worked hard to 
eradicate during the previous period. Soucy aptly summerizes the problematic notions of love in 
Vietnam:  
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“To put it bluntly, women no longer serve their man because that is what women are supposed to 
do under the patriarchal system. Women now serve their man because it is an expression of their 
love” (Soucy 2001, 41).  
 
Love has become a pivotal concept that marks a break from arranged marriages and 
patriarchal feudality. More importantly, as shown through the shifting notions of love in the last 
100 years, love has come to be an essential component of a modern self, be it a “bourgeois” 
intellectual, revolutionary, or socialist self. The discourses of romantic love are often directed at 
younger women with rampant representations of romantic love in the media and pop culture. 
Soucy (2001) documented how the magazines, music CDs, and karaoke songs in Vietnam take 
love as the main theme and reinforce how love is integral to marriage and happiness. Moreover, 
the unprecedented rise of South Korean soap operas throughout Asia, including Vietnam, has 
explicitly connected love and youth culture through romantic love stories between young, good-
looking Korean couples (Creighton 2009, Chua and Iwabuchi 2008).  
In Hải Thành, love alone is an unswayable reason for marriages deemed undesirable. 
Parents feel that they have no say in their children’s choices of spouses because “the kids say 
they love each other.” Parents in Hải Thành acknowledge that the times have changed and thus 
are very afraid of being blamed for taking away their children’s happiness. They will, contrary to 
the traditions of arranged marriages in the past, let their children marry to whomever they 
proclaim their love no matter the distance or differences in ethnicity or social class. Interestingly 
enough, love is often declared by translocal women, not transnational women, when talking 
about their marriages. Translocal women use love (often at first sight) to defend themselves 
against accusations of money seeking. When asked why they married Hải Thành men after only 
knowing them for a short time, many translocal women responded: I loved him at first sight. 
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Love, as the sole reason, is enough to shut down any public display of skepticism and 
disapproval of people involved (from the couples themselves to their parents)56. Moreover, 
translocal women take love as a critique of transnational women as demonstrated by Trinh’s 
further explanation:  
“I don’t know about others, but I marry a Vietnamese man because it is based on love. 
That way, our marriage and happiness will be long-lasting. Marriages with Korean men have no 
love. They only like each other when they see each other. Then when they live together, they will 
start to see the differences that drive both of them crazy.”  
The critique here is not just of the corruption of love by money as discussed in the 
previous chapter, but also of marriages without love, which is not acceptable because love has 
become the foundation for marriages and personhood in Vietnam. I suspect that love has a 
weighty significance in Hải Thành because their rural location often puts them in a position of 
“backwardness.” By insisting on love, the young people in Hải Thành and their parents show that 
they indeed do belong to the category of a modern Vietnamese. It is also a way for translocal 
women to indicate their differences from transnational women.  
 
Identity and Morality 
One can interpret these moral discourses and critiques as translocal women challenging 
the hierarchy between them and transnational women: by establishing themselves as proper 
Vietnamese women as opposed to the corrupted and loose transnational women. In these 
discourses, the translocal women notice and express their differences from transnational women, 
saying what they dislike about transnational women, and vocalizing their “good” desires (having 
                                                
56 The gossip, however, may still persist, but privately.  
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loving families and dressing nicely but properly). They imply that they may not be as rich as the 
transnational women, but they are morally better.  
However, I believe that the main intention of revealing these moral discourses is not 
necessarily to challenge or contest the social order because these discourses are not widely 
shared. Translocal women, as mentioned previously, are relatively isolated. They have very few 
friends and stay at home most of the time. Thus, they cannot talk about transnational women 
with many people. Moreover, most of them have sisters-in-law who are transnational women, 
restricting them from speaking badly of transnational women at home, especially in front of their 
parents-in-law. The only people that they may speak to about transnational women are their 
husbands, their cousins (if they also marry Hải Thành men), or to me in private. So what is the 
point of these moral discourses? I believe that they serve two purposes: 1) to maintain and better 
care for their relationships with their husbands, and thus, 2) to morally accept themselves and to 
be comfortable with others.  
If morality is first and foremost about sustaining and caring for relationships that matter 
to the self (Zigon 2014a), then translocal women, through moral discourse, remind their 
husbands that they are the moral wives, unlike transnational women. They are modest, hard-
working, faithful, and chaste as opposed to the loose and lazy transnational women. They are the 
wives who will not run away or run after money, who love their husbands and their children and 
who work hard to take care of the family. They are wives that husbands can trust and love, 
especially when the husbands are often away from home. Such trust is so important that most 
translocal women rationalize their husbands’ restrictions on them as helping them stay true to 
who they are and not be influenced by the transnational women. For example, many fishermen 
do not allow their wives to have cell phones (only landlines) or smartphones (because they can 
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get on Facebook pages of transnational women and adopt their lifestyles). They also check the 
call and text history of their wives’ phones. Most translocal women are not allowed to wear 
clothes that show their legs or arms in public, to wear bikinis when going to the beach, or even 
more extremely, to work outside of Hải Thành. Translocal women accept all these restrictions, 
saying that they do not want to be like transnational women, but their acceptance seems to be 
only within the confines of their marriages. Some told me they would be different if they were 
not married. A translocal woman’s remark on how I dressed elaborates my point: 
Because it is so hot in Vietnam, I often wore Aladdin pants (loose pants with tight elastic 
bands at the bottom) all summer long. One day, Hạnh, a translocal woman who married Uncle 
Tú’s son, asked me why I wore such pants. I think at that point, she was comfortable enough 
with me to speak candidly:  
“You wear clothes just like me; they are so ancient (cổ). People who are single like you 
should wear tight jeans and shirts. That will make you look modern. Maybe showing a bit of your 
skin too. If I were not married, I would have dressed like that. Look at my sister(-in-law) Mơ, she 
is divorced, she can wear whatever she wants.” 
Her comment surprised me because until then, I was not aware that modern clothes in Hải 
Thành meant jeans and tight, revealing clothes. I always opted for loose and comfortable clothes 
because I never felt the need to assert my “modernity.” I had successfully relied on my social 
status as a city person educated in the U.S. to gain respect from people in Hải Thành and 
therefore, was not restricted by the local norms of modern dressing for women. Her remark also 
conveys how my understanding of modern dressing is different from the local understanding. 
Hạnh, like most other translocal women, does not have my social and cultural capital of 
education and urban background and looks to clothes as a way to interpret class standing. She 
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saw me, a single woman who chose to dress in a way that is viewed as wrong, as puzzling and 
probably as wasting opportunities.  
In this case for translocal women, clothes are a visible reminder of their subjection, lack 
of power, and imprisonment of wishes within the patriarchal family. The moment a woman is 
married, she is under the power of her husband and his family and loses her freedom to represent 
herself. Therefore, for translocal women, moral discourses and practices (like what to wear, who 
to call, what to do) are aimed at earning and maintaining the trust of their husbands, thereby 
strengthening the relationships with him. That’s what they believe to be moral themselves. This 
belief, of course, fits well with the current construction of Vietnamese femininity that makes 
women responsible for their family happiness through moral expectations of serving the 
husbands and self-sacrifice (Khuat, Bui, and Le 2012, Pettus 2003, Rydstrom 2003, Gammeltoft 
1999). 
In addition to the care of conjugal relationships, moral discourses are important in 
allowing translocal women to accept themselves and be comfortable with others who are 
different. Zigon (2012) argues that what is important about narratives is not their meaning-
making and meaning-sharing capacity but the very act of speaking with others so as to charitably 
live through the moral problem with them. To him, the act of talking is a process of working to 
feel comfortable in the new form of life into which one has been thrown and to find ways to once 
again be with oneself and others. Moral narratives and discourses are, therefore, more about 
anxiety reduction than meaning-making (Zigon 2012). This fits well with my findings among 
translocal women, who, even though not conversing directly with transnational women, use 
moral discourses to reduce the anxiety of their marginalization and social inferiority to 
transnational and local women. More importantly, moral discourses are about accepting who 
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they are and their social positions (they may not have as much money but they are morally 
better) so that they can keep going in Hải Thành: living and interacting with others who are 
financially and socially different. Therefore, moral discourses, as conflicting, personal and 
interpersonal as they are in Hải Thành, are crucial to understand the fluidity of social relations 
that is based not on shared and mutual understanding, but on attempts to accept oneself in order 
to be in the world with others. This is crucial because in the case of translocals in Hải Thành, the 
trauma of migration might entail the loss of one’s very sense of identity. Along with the 
refashioning of bodies, the sense of self must also be reconstituted and reacquired in a new place. 
This sense of self is recreated and renegotiated not only through moral discourses but also 
through other practices (such as how translocal women conduct themselves while living with 
their in-laws), a topic that I will focus at length in the next chapter using Hạnh, uncle Tú’s 
daughter-in-law, as an example.  
 
The Resilience of Small Dreams  
Translocal women have come to Hải Thành through marriages in hopes of better lives 
and, like their female counterparts, the transnational women, their hopes are realized for some 
and dashed for others. Chung had thought that her life would be better when she married her 
husband and moved from the poor mountainous area in Bắc Giang province to Hải Thành. 
However, her husband turned out to be an alcoholic who could not keep his fishing job, shoved 
his anger on his family by beating up his wife and son, and lived off his wife’s meager income 
until he died prematurely in his 40s due to liver failure. Chung openly admired transnational 
women, including both their beauty and what she was told about their “easy” lives abroad. When 
I asked her what kept her from going to one of those selection days to find a foreign husband, she 
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told me it was her fate (số). She said she had proven to her in-law family her devotion by having 
put up with her husband. Her parents-in-law were very supportive of her and would not oppose if 
she remarried while her son, now 18, flat out told her she should marry a Korean man because 
she would then be able to send him money to support him. To him, that was the only way they 
would both be out of poverty. But Chung believed that she was destined to suffer, proven by her 
broken dream and her miserable marriage. Therefore, she should not try to change her life (i.e. 
marrying a foreign man) because adversity had sealed her fate. Unlike the cases of transnational 
women, like Hoa in chapter IV, whose past experience opened up the possibility for change, 
Chung’s past closed the door and kept her living perpetually in suffering and longing.  
The day I went to say goodbye to her before leaving the field, it was raining. I stopped by 
her little food stall by the elementary school near lunch time and she insisted that I go to her 
house to have a proper farewell talk. I told her to get on the back of my motorbike and I would 
get her home but she refused. She turned around to ask her neighbor to look after the stall for her, 
hopped on her grey and rusted bicycle, and said to me, “Let’s go.” I looked at her from behind, 
riding her bicycle, in the rain, bare headed, until I realized I needed to follow her. In that very 
moment, I was made aware of her acceptance of life and resilience.  
Trinh is luckier than Chung. She feels loved by her husband even though once in a while, 
she has to put up with her mother-in-law’s lectures on how to become a good (i.e., Kinh) wife 
because she is an ethnic Thai woman. Nguyệt’s parents-in-law are working near Cát Bà island 
and her husband is also away on fishing trips. She told me she did not have to worry about 
money, and even though she would love to have her husband and family not so frequently absent, 
her two children kept her busy and contented.  
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And finally, there was An. Along with Chung, she was the poorest of all translocal 
women I had met. Her husband is the oldest of three sons and all three of them, as well as their 
wives and children, live together on the same plot of land with their parents. Her own family has 
a small private room that fits a queen size bed, a small wooden cabinet, an old TV, a desk where 
her daughter studied every night, and a fan. Sometimes when I came to see her in the evening 
during the hot summer, we sat together on the floor in the heat because the only fan was saved 
for her daughter sleeping on the bed. An’s husband is a fisherman who is away most of the time. 
An said her husband cares for her and their daughter: whenever he is home, he does not go hang 
out with his friends but stays at home to cook and clean for An as well as picking up the daughter 
from school and playing with her. He told An that they did not need to have another child 
because raising another child with an absent husband would take a toll on her. For him, a 
daughter is enough even though he is the oldest son and expected to have a son to continue the 
family lineage.  
An explained that her daughter eats three times a day with her parents-in-law for free. An 
also has breakfast, which in rural Vietnam is a main meal, with them everyday without having to 
make any monetary contribution. She gets to keep all the salary she earns from the sweatshop. 
She hopes that her savings and her husband’s earnings combined will pay off their share of the 
loan they took for building a boat in two years. Then she can work on fulfilling her dream:  
 I want to build a cute little house for us that has everything. It does not have to be 
expensive stuff but I really like a white fridge, a white rice cooker, a new TV, and a red scooter. I 
will paint the house pink and the windows white. We will have a front yard and I will put a lot of 
plants there. Then I will hang decoration string lights in front of the house and a few pots of 
orchids. When my husband is home, we can all sit and drink tea under the lights.  
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An’s dream is probably the most colorful and cheerful of all the women’s dreams I had 
heard in Hải Thành. Her stories, along with those of Chung, Trinh, and Nguyệt, provide a 
different side of their lives from displacement and isolation. Each in their own way has found the 
courage or acceptance to live without regrets or complaints. There are of course other stories of 
unhappy translocal women who suffer or who have left. Together, they create a more 
complicated picture of migration and life transformation rather than the assumption of a causal 
relationship between the two. The fact that they are women and that their migration happens due 
to marriage demonstrates how gender plays a significant role in shaping the outcome of 
migration. As we shall see more clearly through the life of Hạnh, uncle Tú’s daughter-in-law, in 
the next chapter, gender constructions both produce and become products of the relationship 
between migration and social class.  
Moreover, in Hải Thành, seeing marriage and migration as moral experiences organized 
and realized in moral discourses provides insights into how people live and interact in a morally 
ambiguous world where migration, subjectivity and social worth are unevenly woven. The focus 
on diverse trajectories of migration also sheds light on the hierarchy of mobilities that exists in 
Vietnam, and on the differentiations in status, personhood and rurality that are implicated in 
these migrations. By paying attention to these complex dynamics of mobility, morality, and place 
we can understand how marriage, migration, and social worth intermesh, like the often tattered 
and sometimes empty nets of the fishermen of Hải Thành.   
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Chapter VII 
A Host Family Story 
The Illness of Pride: Expectations and Disappointments of Transnational 
Movement 
 
A Different Reality 
This is a story of my host family that, similar to most others in this commune, exhibits all 
different kinds of movement: those of boatpeople, transnational and translocal marriages, and 
fishermen. Uncle Tú, as I fondly called him, now in his early 70s, worked for 35 years with my 
uncle at Hạ Long Canned Food Company in Hải Phòng. He was one of the very few Hải Thành 
residents that managed to find a state-owned job in the city. His family did not move but 
remained in Hải Thành and he visited home every weekend when still working. Since his 
retirement, he stays in Hải Thành. My uncle has not seen him much but they keep in touch via 
telephone. My uncle said uncle Tú has a daughter who married a foreign man, a sister who fled 
as a boatperson and settled down in Japan, and a younger brother who was the Chairman of the 
commune at the time. I surmised that since uncle Tú had both foreign and political connections 
he must have been doing rather well financially. Then I came to meet him at his house and 
surprises awaited.   
Uncle Tú’s house was small and plain, located modestly at the end of a hamlet. The front 
metal gate had rusted away and small pieces had fallen off. The faded yellow walls were 
weathered and taken over by mold and dirt, creating dark gray patches all over, which made me 
feel like parts of the house had been abandoned for years. The house had only one floor and, in 
contrast to many other fancy houses of Hải Thành, was plain with no exterior decorations. At the 
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center of living space inside was an outsized ancestor altar and a worn out table and a set of 
wooden benches. Two beds were positioned at two other sides of the room and the family’s only 
TV, a small 13 inch, was on a cabinet to the right. Uncle Tú was wearing an undershirt when he 
ushered me in. He made tea and poured some in our cups. I noticed that the teapot and cups did 
not match and both of them were chipped, a few cups had even lost their handles. We talked for 
two hours and I stayed for lunch afterwards. Uncle Tú was warm and welcoming. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 The front gate and a room in Uncle Tú’s house 
Figure 7.2 Uncle Tú standing in front of the main living space 
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Figure 7.3 Uncle Tú and the family altar 
Six months later, at the same table, Uncle Tú nostalgically recalled his past. Our family 
had the first of everything in this community. The first TV. The first fridge. The first motorbike. 
When I bought that TV, the community kids followed me from the store, cheering all the way 
home. That night, we screened a movie in the front yard and all the neighbors came to watch it. 
His family's prominence in the early 1990s was not surprising. At a time when people were still 
suffering after the strict communist command economy, he was among the very few that held a 
steady salaried job in the city. Besides all the appliances, he also used to own a piece of land 
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right on the main street. Uncle Tú’s family was not rich, but his was the better among the poor. 
Over time, Hải Thành transformed into a prosperous rural commune thanks to the remittances 
from transnationals and the fishing industry. More people could afford to buy TVs and fridges 
and build bigger houses. But as others replaced their old TVs with flat-screens, bought Honda 
motorbikes and upgraded them to scooters, Uncle Tú’s first of everything remained the first; he 
had no second or third.  
His younger brother, on the other hand, had made it to the position of a Commune 
Chairman (chủ tịch xã) after 20 years in politics, a position that he held for ten years until he was 
forced to resign in 2013 amid an intense land conflict. He had built a sizeable two-floor house on 
the main road opposite the commune administration building, right at the hub of everything. His 
other house sat next to Uncle Tú’s house in the hamlet but was left vacant for years, waiting to 
be sold when the price was right. In Vietnamese, there is a common saying that “If one person 
has a position of power, his/her whole lineage can benefit from it” (một người làm quan cả họ 
được nhờ). However, Uncle Tú, well-known in the commune for being upright and too frank, 
looked down on and refrained from interacting with his powerful brother. He often mocked his 
brother as “king of the village” (vua làng), implying the limitless and unaccountable power that 
his brother had. I once witnessed Uncle Tú accusing his brother publicly in a yearly lineage 
anniversary of being a “corrupted evil person” (thằng ăn hối lộ xấu xa). Ruffling his influential 
brother’s feathers also means that Uncle Tú did not get along well with his other siblings who 
often sided with the chairman. I attach below his family tree to make it easier to follow the 
stories of Uncle Tú’s family.  
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Figure 7.4 Uncle Tú’s family tree 
Another successful member of the family is one of their sisters, Ms. Liên, who joined the 
boatpeople migration in the 1980s and ended up in Japan. She is the family’s only boatperson but 
has done well enough to build one of the first modern two-floor houses on the main street. She 
paid her sister, Ms. Hy, to live there and look after the house. When I came to Hải Thành for 
fieldwork, Uncle Tú arranged for me to stay on the second floor of that house. He said his house 
was noisy with children and I should have a quiet space for study. I did not have to pay rent 
because Ms. Liên was not there but I offered to pay for utilities. On the first day of my moving 
in, Ms. Hy immediately appointed herself as my “mother.” I found it strange and could not figure 
out why she called herself my “mother” until four months later when I finally understood what 
she saw in me. It started with a story about Ms. Liên and her money and gifts.  
 
Expectations and Broken Dreams 
Uncle Tú’s father died during the American War and his mother died of old age in the 
90s. When she was very sick, she moved in to live with his family. The rumor lingered among 
his siblings, till the day I went to Hải Thành 15 years later, that Uncle Tú wanted to take care of 
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her so that his family could hoard all the money that Ms. Liên sent back to support their mother. 
On the other hand, Uncle Tú said their mother was bedridden and no one else was willing to care 
for her. None of them wanted to do the difficult job of feeding, washing, and changing her. The 
money Ms. Liên sent, he claimed, was not much (300,000 VND or around 15 USD per month) 
and no other siblings contributed any money because they assumed Ms. Liên’s remittances must 
have been big. This assumption speaks to the belief that Việt Kiều are rich and if they are rich, of 
course they will remit substantially. Consequently, family members were often competing and 
jealous of each other with regards to how much remittance they received.  
Being the family’s first Việt Kiều, Ms. Liên also sent gifts back every year to her family. 
The year I was in Hải Thành, she first sent all her siblings new down coats for the winter. Then 
all her nieces and nephews received theirs. In a final batch were coats for the nieces-in-law and 
nephews-in-law for a total of at least 12 coats. The order of sending signals a clear concentric 
hierarchy in receiving her support: siblings first, then their children, and lastly, their children-in-
law. She also sent some miscellaneous items, such as medicinal balms, multivitamins, and 
ceramic knives. I witnessed her relatives fight among each other for the gifts and one of the 
strategies they used was to stake a claim of closeness and entitlement. For example, Ms. Hy 
asserted that she was Ms. Liên’s sister and she took care of her house so she should receive more 
gifts than her other siblings and cousins. It dawned on me then that Ms. Hy immediately claimed 
to be my “mother” because in her mind, I had been living in the U.S. for ten years so I must have 
money and gifts too. How could I not give them to my “mother”? I kept some polite distance 
from her even though we lived in the same house. After Ms. Hy found out later by asking around 
that I had been eating with Uncle Tú’s family, she was visibly anxious. She invited me to eat 
with her for three days in a row, laying on a heavy guilt trip. My turndown made her even more 
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worried that she would have to share my “gifts” with Uncle Tú’s family. When she visited Uncle 
Tú’s house one day, she said in a joking voice to everyone that because I lived with her, I was 
“hers,” not “theirs.” 
 This double assumption of wealth earning and giving made me annoyed but I was not a 
local and only had to live with it for a year. However, for most Hải Thành residents, it has 
created pressure on both transnationals and their families back in the community to perform 
“affluence” accordingly, something that local people refer to as “the status of Kiều is burdening” 
(cái tiếng Kiều là nặng lắm). Uncle Tú’s family perfectly exemplifies this heavy burden.  
After successfully building her new life in Japan, Ms. Liên was in a position to help her 
siblings more. She promised to Châu, Uncle Tú’s youngest daughter, that if Châu took good care 
of her mother, she would help Châu migrate to Japan. But for some reasons unknown to many, 
the daughter of the chairman was sponsored to move to Japan, not Châu. In anger, the nineteen-
year-old Châu decided to marry a foreign man to prove to everyone that she could go abroad on 
her own. She met her Taiwanese husband literally on the road, not through a matchmaker, and 
agreed to marry him soon after in 2003. Uncle Tú told me that he approved of the marriage 
because unlike many other Taiwanese men, his son-in-law was accompanied by his own parents 
when he went looking for a Vietnamese spouse. Uncle Tú said it meant they were a good family 
who cared for each other. Then he sighed. Who would have known the truth then? Châu’s sister 
said the family felt they were cheated. Châu had an elaborate wedding celebration at home with 
all the relatives attending. Uncle Tú made me watch the wedding on tape with him and Châu’s 
sister, Mơ, so that I saw how great a wedding I could have and was inspired to get married soon. 
I was surprised at how much gold jewelry her mother-in-law put on Châu. The wedding and the 
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gold Châu received evidenced to everyone that Châu was married into a good well-to-do family 
and made Uncle Tú very proud. He was smiling contentedly in the video.  
Unexpectedly, Mơ commented: All the gold was fake.  
Fake? I asked in atonishment. 
Mơ :  Yes. All throwaway imitation stuff. Even the wedding ring was fake. Curse them 
(the family-in-law) all. Châu thought they were real – look how broadly she 
smiled.  
Linh:  How did she know they were fake?  
Mơ :  After a long time. She needed to sell some for money and was told the truth by the 
jeweler.  
In a way, Châu’s own marriage played out almost exactly the same as the jewelry. She 
thought she married into a good family but what she received was just an imitation. Her mother-
in-law turned out to be an abusive alcoholic and her husband a lazy gambler. He was a driver but 
owed so much money that they had to sell his car. He was unemployed for a while before finding 
a factory job. Châu was the main breadwinner for a few years, supporting the family, including 
their two sons. She worked at home, sewing shoes on contract for a Taiwanese company and 
earned a meager income. Unlike the stereotypes of Việt Kiều, Châu was poor. Yet, she still tried 
to send money home to her parents, usually before the lunar new year. Multiple family members 
told me that the sum was about 20 million VND (around 1,000 USD) per year. That amount, 
unfortunately, was spent not only on her parents but also her struggling siblings.  
Uncle Tú has four children. The oldest daughter, Thái, was married to a local 
businessman and opened a cellphone store. They were doing well financially until her husband 
went into significant debt and found it impossible to make enough to pay off even the interest on 
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the mortgage. They departed for South Korea in 2014 out of desperation under visitors' visas 
sponsored by their daughter who married a Korean man. They both have been working 14 hours 
in factories to pay off their debts. The second daughter, Mơ, divorced from a fisherman and 
moved back to live with Uncle Tú and his wife. She set up a small food-stall near the commune 
administration building to sell grilled corn in the winter and drinks in the summer. The son, 
Thạch, was a fisherman but stopped because he could not handle the hardship. Now he was 
unemployed and, along with his wife and two daughters, also lived with his parents. Thạch’s 
wife, a translocal woman, sells eggs and bread for breakfast in the market to earn some money. 
Uncle Tú and his wife had to support not only their children but also their grandchildren. The 
whole family of seven relied on his small monthly pension of three million VND (150 USD), 
limited income from the women’s street-side food stalls, and Châu’s yearly remittances. Despite 
their financial difficulties, Uncle Tú’s family still has a designation of “family that has Kiều” 
(gia đình có Kiều) and this reputation has real ramifications.  
 
The Pride Illness 
One fall day near Mid-Autumn festival, we were waiting for Ms. Thơ to come home to 
have dinner when Châu called. Mơ answered the phone and started updating Châu on how the 
family was doing:  
We are struggling here, not enough food to eat. The front gate is severely broken, the 
boundary walls are about to collapse. Thái and her husband just arrived in Korea and he made 
40 million VND (2,000 USD) per month under the table. My friend, Lan, her sister in Taiwan 
makes really good money. Her sister just sent her 17 million VND (850 USD) for her facial 
surgery. It’s harvesting time now and mom has left since two o’clock to glean rice left behind.  
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After a while, uncle Tú’s wife, Ms. Thơ, came home and Mơ handed the phone to her. I 
heard her denying that she went out to glean. Then Châu probably asked if she still had some 
money because she responded: I still have enough for a few more months.  
Mơ immediately said out loud so that Châu could hear her on the phone: All (the money) 
is gone; we only have one bill left.  
Ms. Thơ corrected Mơ: Don’t worry about the money. I can still manage; don’t worry. 
You can send some when you have money.  
Mơ: Send money home; the more (you send), the less (we still feel) (càng nhiều càng ít). 
Châu then likely asked about the boundary walls because Ms. Thơ explained: The walls 
have some pieces broken off but we can wait till Mơ goes to Korea and sends money home to fix 
them. Have you heard anything from the new work place? If they accept you, you should work 
for them.  
At dinner, Uncle Tú looked at me and asked rhetorically: Did you see the pride illness 
(bệnh sỹ)? Châu is a Kiều so she did not want her mother to go gleaning or our house to run 
down. That’s not acceptable because we are a Kiều’s house! 
Ms. Thơ protested: I went out to glean but I biked all the way to Hải Thái to do it. 
Moreover, I went on the back roads so nobody knows who I am.  
Ms. Thơ went on to talk about how Châu wanted to work for a factory so that she could 
earn a bit more. She had been putting aside money in order to pay a fee of 1000 USD for Thạch 
to work in Taiwan as a migrant laborer. Châu insisted to her that: “Our family cannot keep going 
down like this.” 
This exchange reveals the extent to which Kiều has become almost synonymous in Hải 
Thành with “money.” Ms. Hy always told me that Uncle Tú had plenty of money thanks to his 
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daughter Châu. Mơ questioned why Châu did not make as much money as her friend’s sister or 
her brother-in-law and why she did not send more money home. The expectation comes from not 
only within but also outside of the family that Kiều will transform their family lives. When 
people fall short of this expectation, like Châu and her family, they suffer from an illness called 
“pride illness.” This illness affects them mentally and behaviorally. Châu felt ashamed that her 
parents’ house was in a bad shape, that her brother was unemployed, and that community people 
would judge her because her family was going down and not up. Her mother had to go to another 
commune to glean to prevent neighbors from recognizing her. Mơ constantly demanded from 
Châu, without much empathy for Châu’s difficult life in Taiwan, so that her family could be like 
her friend’s family. Similar to the externally fancy but empty houses described in the previous 
chapter, Châu and her family felt the need to keep up a façade, and in so doing, they ironically 
maintain the myth that Việt Kiều must be rich. 
Studies about Vietnamese transnationals and the perceptions of them in Vietnam explain 
why Việt Kiều are believed to be well-off. Ivan Small (2012b) argues that for most Vietnamese 
being overseas means more than just geographic distance but also economic differences and 
imagined opportunities only afforded by idealized capitalist systems. Money is imagined to 
accumulate in a way that is impossible in Vietnam (See also Harms 2011, Thai 2011, 2008, Dang 
2000, Thomas 1999). Thai (2014) adds that the invisibility of the manual and heavy labor that 
many Việt Kiều perform in their new countries in contrast to the heavy spending during return 
visits to Vietnam creates an illusion of money being easily earned and spent. But while there has 
been much research on transnationals’ return visits to show off their new status, especially 
through the way they dress and spend money, little has been written about how their own 
families also struggle to live up to the designation of Kiều. I believe one reason for that lack is 
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the focus on Vietnamese who have migrated a long time ago and successfully sponsored their 
immediate family members overseas. However, for newly migrated transnationals, like Châu or 
many other women from Hải Thành who marrried East Asian men, their migration has not yet 
resulted in the migration of their family. Their social status is evaluated not only on how well-
dressed they are and how much they spend on return visits but also on how financially well-off 
their parental families are. In other words, the financial well-being of their families has become 
the extension of transnationals’ status. Therefore, the pride illness affects not only the Việt Kiều 
themselves but also their families.   
 
Not Competing for Gifts 
When Thái, Uncle Tú’s oldest daughter, and her husband went to South Korea, they left 
behind their eight-year-old son, Sơn, in the care of her father-in-law. He had promised them that 
he would move into their house to take care of Sơn. Sơn was a chubby and rather spoiled kid 
because he was the only son and his parents used to be wealthy. He was not taught any manners 
and would demand anything that he wanted. Every time he visited Uncle Tú and Ms. Thơ, he 
fought with the other grandchildren over candies and toys. I saw him at Uncle Tú’s house three 
weeks after his parents departed in July; he looked a little sad and had lost some weight. When I 
gave the children some biscuits, he took half of them and told me he had not had any biscuits for 
a long time. Ms. Thơ sighed to me: “His grandfather cannot care for him as well as his mother.” 
Two weeks later, I was having lunch with Uncle Tú and Ms. Thơ when Thái called her 
mother to ask if Sơn could come and live with them. It turned out that her father-in-law did not 
stay in their house but came back to his home most of the time. Thái said she was worried that 
Sơn did not eat well and did not do his homework. She asked her mother to take care of him so 
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that she and her husband could focus on working in Korea without worrying about their son. Ms. 
Thơ told her to stay calm. Then continued: “When the new academic year begins, I will come 
and ask Sơn’s teacher if he has done his homework. For now, since you had already asked Sơn’s 
paternal grandfather, you should let it be. If Sơn needs anything or if he is hungry, he can come 
here for help. He is our grandson, we will never shoo him away.” 
I was surprised at Ms. Thơ’s response so I asked both of them why they did not take Sơn. 
Ms. Thơ replied that if they take him now, they will offend his grandfather. Not satisfied, I 
further asked: “He is just an in-law; how come an offense to him is more important than your 
own grandson?” Ms. Thơ kept repeating the same answer until Uncle Tú finally said: “If we take 
him now, we will be said to steal his “work” (công), steal his gifts and his shares (cướp quà, 
cướp phần).” Uncle’s Tú answer reflects the general belief that caring for Sơn will ensure 
rewards from Thái and her husband. It also resonates well with how his relatives believed he 
must be rich for having hoarded all the money Ms. Liên sent to take care of their mother and why 
Ms. Hy was worried when she found out I ate with Uncle Tú’s family. As Hải Thành residents 
compete for Kiều’s remittances, they seem to forget about building and maintaining familial and 
communal relationships that are often seen to be the bedrock of Vietnamese rural life. In this 
particular case, the expectations of gifts reinforce the heavy burden of the Kiều status and the 
pride illness that, sadly, prevented a young child from being cared for properly. Uncle Tú and 
Ms. Thơ finally sent Mơ out to take care of Sơn, but it was after another month of Sơn being 
neglected. Sometimes, Sơn still came to eat with us. He had become a bit more subdued and less 
demanding; I figured it was because his parents were no longer there to fulfill his demands. At 
times he seemed sad to me, but on an eight-year-old face, the sadness looked like an expression 
of confusion. Or maybe it was both.  
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As I explained in the previous chapter, Uncle Tú’s family, like others in Hải Thành, 
struggles with the changing socio-economic conditions of Vietnam that have made it difficult for 
rural people to earn a living and respect. Many have chosen to leave the community in search of 
stable financial lives and self-worth. Unfortunately, the stories of Uncle Tú’s family show that 
physical movement does not always lead to upward social mobility. Yet, both transnationals and 
their families actively maintain that assumption despite the difficulties of living with its heavy 
burden and the pride illness. Such an assumption of success continues to nurture the hopes of life 
transformation in Hải Thành and, consequently, contributes to the massive outmigration of its 
young women, like Châu, in transnational marriages to realize their dreams. However, what 
happens when a Hải Thành woman, despite her desire, fails to get married transnationally? In the 
next chapter, I will discuss the life story of Uncle Tú’s second daughter Mơ and her unsuccessful 
attempts to find a foreign spouse to demonstrate that the marriage migration of women from 
rural Vietnam cannot be separated from issues of beauty, age, and morality.  
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Chapter VIII 
A Daughter Story 
Aging in Timepass: Waiting for a Better Life57 
 
Thirty-nine-year-old Mơ is the second daughter of uncle Tú. When I first met her in 
2011, she had divorced her husband more than a year before and had moved back to live with 
Uncle Tú and Ms. Thơ. Mơ told me that her husband, a fisherman, had an affair with a female 
fish retailer and wanted to keep the retailer as a small wife (vợ nhỏ). Mơ did not want to share 
her husband with another woman and was willing to walk away empty-handed, giving up even 
her children, just to divorce him. Their three children, one son and two daughters ranging from 
10 to 20 were given under full custody to Mơ’s husband and his family, the norm in Vietnamese 
patriarchal society. Mơ swore that she would never step into their house again and her children 
had to come see her at Uncle Tú and Ms. Thơ’s house. Shortly after their divorce, Mơ’s ex-
husband married the fish retailer. Since moving back to her parents’ house, Mơ earned a living 
by setting up a small street-side food-stall across from the commune administration building to 
sell drinks in the evening. This chapter documents Mơ’s life and struggle shortly after she moved 
back to live with Uncle Tú and Mrs. Thơ. Here I discuss the ideas of waiting and life suspension 
as Mơ faces issues of age, expectation and entitlement, and gender relations.  
 
 
 
                                                
57 Timepass is an Indian word that indicates the action of passing the time often aimlessly or 
unproductively.  
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Age and Beauty 
Mơ liked to look pretty and paid attention to her appearance. Mơ’s sister-in-law, Hạnh, 
told me that Mơ used to look old-fashioned (cổ) but since her divorce, she had remade herself. In 
the summer, Mơ usually wore mini shorts, mini skirts, or short dresses. In the winter, she wore 
dresses with high boots and pantyhoses. Mơ knew how to put on a “modern” outfit (i.e. jeans and 
tight clothes): I once saw her wearing a nice pair of skinny jeans on orange wedges, a long black 
Mango shirt under a short denim jacket with an embossed name necklace. Another time she 
surprised me when showing up with a pair of big round eyeglasses even though she was not 
near-sighted. It turned out that eyeglasses were “in,” according to Mơ, and she had to buy a pair 
with non-prescription lenses. She also made sure to paint her face meticulously before going out. 
Once Mơ had to go to a pagoda at four in the morning and since she could not turn on the light 
so as not to disturb her parents’ sleep,58 she put on makeup the night before. She combed and tied 
her hair, painted her lips, powdered her face, and wore eyelash extensions. She later complained 
to me that she could not sleep well that night because she had to lay still for fear of smudging her 
makeup. Whenever I happened to be in the house during or after her makeup sessions, Mơ would 
often ask “Do I look pretty?” I said yes and she tittered like a small child.  
Julia Twigg’s research shows that clothes and fashion offer a sense of renewal, which 
explains Mơ’s feelings of excitement and joy related to feeling pretty. Dressing is a way to re-
present and enhance oneself and one’s mood (Twigg 2013). It makes sense then that Mơ turned 
to fashion after her divorce. Her effort at re-presentation, as I will discuss in more detail later, is 
shaped by Mơ’s social position as a rural, working-class divorcee and reflects Edmonds’ 
argument that beauty capital is highly gendered and classed (that is, when a female is divorced, 
                                                
58 As I described in chapter VII, in the main living space two beds lay on opposite ends. Mơ slept 
in one bed and her parents slept in another.  
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uneducated, and poor, physical attractiveness is the only resource that brings her social status and 
a sense of self worth) (Edmonds 2010). However, Mơ’s apprearance was often seen by other Hải 
Thành people as a gendered transgression and, not surprisingly, garnered both admiration and 
criticism.  
One day, after I had dinner with Uncle Tú’s family and Mơ had left to tend to her food-
stall, Hạnh whispered to me as I washed dishes by the rainwater well: “Mơ wears such revealing 
clothes that our neighbor complained to me. The man who sells furniture across from Mơ’s stall 
said Mơ wore so short a skirt that he could see even her pubic hair. Then Hạnh continued: Mơ 
wears clothes that are only acceptable on young girls. Since she is much older, she should not 
wear anything so short. I told her that but she said it was none of my business. Grandma (Ms. 
Thơ) also talked to her but she insisted that if she liked to wear short clothes, it was her business. 
She also said that she would yell at whoever dared to speak ill of her. But I know she cannot do 
that because if she confronts them, they will shame her. Mơ used to wear full-length clothing 
when she was still married. Here, women who are stylish must be either single or divorced.”  
Hạnh’s remark indicates two important and intertwined factors controlling a woman’s 
body in Hải Thành: marriage (or more generally, relationships with men) and age. A young girl 
is usually single and as a single female, she is free to wear whatever she wants to attract men. 
But once she is married, she should not draw other people’s, especially men’s, attention. 
Spending much time with Mơ, I knew for a fact that she wore undershorts under her short dress. 
Therefore, the furniture seller lied about seeing her pubic hair. His false statement, however, 
does express the problem of slut shaming and how women’s appearance is used to control their 
sexuality, implied in his mentioning pubic hair. Even more explicitly, Mơ’s father and brother 
both scolded and called her “prostitute” (đĩ) many times due to the way she dressed. Feminists 
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have shown that slut shaming is a product of double gendered standards: males are exptected to 
be overtly sexual while women should police themselves and other women to remain minimally 
sexual (Tarrant 2016, Mendes 2015, Tanenbaum 2015, Silva and Mendes 2015). Slut shaming is 
a form of judgment when a female does not adhere to feminine norms. Interestingly, a female is 
called slut usually not because she is sexually active. Studies by Tanenbaum (2015) and 
Armstrong and Hamilton (2013) demonstrate that often this is because she maintains her agency 
and/or because she is socially vulnerable. When a female is perceived to choose to violate 
feminine standards, she deserves her slutty reputation. Slut shaming also signals social class 
boundary as women of middle-class and upper class are seen as “classy” while those of lower-
class are deemed “trashy” (Tanenbaum 2015, Armstrong and Hamilton 2013). Mơ’s insistence 
on her own choice (that the way she dressed was her own business) coupled with her status as a 
rural working-class divorcee makes it easy for people to judge her as trashy.  
However, it was precisely how Mơ kept her appearance that attracted men. Mơ was open 
about finding another man after her divorce. She went on dates, kept an active profile on Zalo, a 
popular messaging app in Vietnam, and met men both locally and in the city. During the time of 
my fieldwork, she had gone out with at least four men who were willing to pamper her with gifts 
and food for an extended period of time. Mơ uploaded new selfie photos on Zalo a couple of 
times a week and constantly received messages from strange men complimenting how beautiful 
she was. Similar to the young girls discussed in the previous chapter, her appearance helped her 
gain admiration from men even though such beauty practices had moral implications.  
More importantly, Mơ enjoyed the attention that she received. It made her happy. She 
usually smiled and laughed when telling about her men: this guy or that guy was pursuing her, 
that a guy would threaten to disturb her food-stall if she did not answer his call or go out with 
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him. Mơ once pulled me aside as soon as I arrived at the house for lunch to tell me that a guy 
frightened her last night. It was very late, around 11.30. I was cleaning up (my food stall) and 
packing up my stuff to go home when a drunken guy came and sat next to me because he said I 
was so pretty. Nobody was around and I was terrified to death. Luckily, I just pushed him away 
and left. I found it strange at the time that Mơ was giggling the whole time she recalled the 
incident. While she claimed to be afraid, she also appeared to be happy. The paradox of being 
afraid of men’s sexual assaults yet liking their sexual attention speaks to the power dynamics 
between men and women in Vietnam: women are subordinate to men and derive their sense of 
importance from men’s approval. The attention and sense of importance that Mơ received from 
men, as we shall see, is significant for Mơ who often felt that to the society she was a failure.   
Not only was Mơ judged according to feminine standards, but also age standards. Hạnh 
remarked that Mơ’s clothes were for young girls. Mơ did indeed wear some clothes belonging to 
her twenty-year-old niece. After Thái (Mơ’s sister)’s oldest daughter married and migrated to 
South Korea, Mơ texted her niece on Zalo to ask whether she could use clothes her niece left 
behind. Hạnh’s comment suggests that even though Mơ was a divorcee and had more freedom 
over what to wear, her  clothes were still inappropriate because of her age. Age ordering in dress, 
as Twigg (2013) explains, is a common phenomenon across cultures. Clothes often express the 
progression of age and dressing appropriately with age is a practice rooted in cultures of aging. 
They often express negative ideas about age and aging, including lesser values of aging bodies 
and older people. 
These centre around the need to cover up, hiding the failure of the body to meet the youthful 
norm; the avoidance of clothes that make claims to the sexual allure in the form of low necks, 
short skirts or exaggerated fit; the addoption of self-effacing, darker styles that make no claim to 
visibility; the avoidance of highly fashionable dress, or girly, seductive, ultra-feminine styles. 
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These “rules” are largely expressed negatively in terms of forms of dress no longer appropriate; 
there is little positive in these norms (Twigg 2013, 147)  
 
The custom of age ordering in dress means that fashion, beauty, and femininity are 
implied in youthfulness and older people, especially women, need to retreat into invisibility, 
asexuality, and androgyny. From high art painting to modern media in Vietnam and around the 
globe, young females and their bodies represent the ideal of timeless feminine beauty and 
desirability (Twigg 2013, Taylor 2004a, Pollock 2003). Mơ herself was very aware of how 
femininity and sexuality are epitomized in young women. One evening in May, I went out with a 
young girl in Hải Thành for a drink. I told her to pick a place and she chose a street-side food 
stall near the stadium because she said the place was lively and fun. As we rode our motorbikes 
past Mơ’s food stall, the young local woman pointed out to me that Mơ’s place was empty and 
not fun because the seller (Mơ) was, in her words, “an old woman” (bà già). When we got to the 
food stall near the stadium, I immediately noticed how packed it was and how young and sexy all 
three sellers were. They wore tight mini skirts, high heels, and heavy makeup, which did not 
make much practical sense for a job that required a lot of walking and bending over (because the 
chairs and tables on the street were very low). But everyone there understood that it was their 
youthful beauty and overt sexuality that attracted customers, males and females alike. I stopped 
by Mơ’s place afterwards to help her clean up and go home. She asked where I had gone that 
night and when I told her about her competitors, she sighed and said: It was crowded because the 
girls are young and wear sexy clothes. A few days later, Mơ hired her own eigthteen-year-old 
daughter, Mai, and Mai’s friend to be her assistants. I rode my bike by their place a week after 
and saw three women (Mơ, Mai, and Mai’s friend) dressing almost identically in short dresses. 
Their sales picked up with more customers since then. 
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The norm of age ordering in dress not only reflects the “failure” of older people to live up 
to youthful beauty standards but also a belief held in many cultures, including Vietnamese 
culture, that old age marks a passage in life that focuses less on the surface and display and more 
on inner essence. Appearance becomes a matter of triviality while virtues are worthy of attention. 
Yet, at the same time, fashion and stylishness still play a notable role in being visible and gaining 
social and cultural status (Edmonds 2010). This paradox puts women who have passed their 
youth like Mơ in a difficult moral position: either violating gender and age “rules” or risking 
slipping into invisibility.   
Dressing brings forth such moral charges because it is a form of disciplining the body and 
its expressions. Studies show that in Foucauldian terms clothes produce subjects under the 
exercise of bio power (Twigg 2013, Ash 2010). For example, the uniforms that prisoners wear 
mark them as separated, disciplined, and docile (Ash 2010). The “dress code” for young girls in 
Hải Thành create self-disciplined subjects that exemplify certain notions of youthful femininity 
and sexuality. Twigg (2013) argues that because clothes makes discipline and social order, they 
are imbued with morality. We are judged by how we look and those who fail to conform to the 
rules are targets of ridicule, exclusion, and criticism. Older women or women of lower class and 
of color are judged even more harshly than men, younger or white upper-class women because 
their violation threaten the social order based on age, gender, class, and race. For these the moral 
language of judgment (such as tacky, cheap, trashy, and inappropriate) generates great anxiety 
when it comes to dressing. The label “prostitute” that was given to Mơ implicitly communicates 
her inferior social position of being an older, working-class divorcee.  
Finally, if dressing is a form of performativity as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
moral condemnation regarding age-inappropriate dressing is also related to the dangers of failed 
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performance (Twigg 2013). Therefore, Mơ’s short dress was improper because it was too sexual 
for her age and because she failed to be attractive to many people in Hải Thành as well (hence 
her need to hire younger women for her food stall).  
Age not only influences how one dresses but also how one acts and behaves. In the case 
of Mơ, she got along great with the young local women who chose to marry (mainly very 
wealthy) Hải Thành men and with young local men. They were often ten years her junior. They 
went on camping trips together, gambled and hung out at each other’s houses, chit chatted at 
Mơ’s food-stall, and dined in various restaurants. While I was not surprised at Hạnh’s claim that 
Mơ should not dress like a young woman, I was astonished to find out that it was improper for 
Mơ to hang out with people much younger than she was. It turned out that Mơ was disapproved 
of for engaging in age-inappropriate practices such as too much of partying and eating out. Uncle 
Tú once explained to me that people like Mơ are considered “ a grown-up without any wisdom” 
(có lớn mà không có khôn), implying lack of maturity. In other words, Mơ was at the age of a 
matured woman and she should not have acted like a young woman. That also means that she 
should not have hung out with people not in her age group. 
The case of Mơ and the young girls described in the chapter III shows that age is an 
important social organizer, along with gender, class, race, and sexuality. Age difference 
separates Mơ from the young girls. The girls were criticized but tolerated to some extent 
because, as many Hải Thành residents explained in chapter III, they were young and did not 
know any better. Mơ, however, should have known better because she was much older. It is hard 
to say if Mơ’s non-conformity is an act of resistance or compliance. While she resisted the age-
ordering dress code, she reinforced the ideals of femininity as being ultra-feminine and sexual. 
At least Mơ’s non-conformity was admired by one of her neighbors, Chung (whom I introduced 
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in chapter III), a woman of her age and a widow. Chung told me in our interviews that she 
wished she had the money and courage to dress as nicely and have as much fun as Mơ. Chung 
saw Mơ as a larger-than-life woman who had the courage to continue cultivating youthful forms 
of femininity that mature (and married) women were supposed to leave behind. 
 
Age, Gender, and Men 
Age also plays a crucial role in Mơ’s relationship with men. In chapter III, I discussed the 
local girls’ rush to get married to foreign men before becoming “old” (that is, in this context, 
early 20s). Those girls who have become “old” lose power, have to close their eyes when 
choosing their spouses and supposedly, end up marrying “old, poor, and ugly” husbands. Yet at 
the same time, there exists a popular belief in Hải Thành that any woman, no matter how young 
or old, beautiful or ugly, able or disable, never married or divorced, can always marry a foreign 
husband if she ever wishes to. Many locals have claimed that women who, by local standards, 
were old, ugly, or disabled, would have been “unsaleable” (ế) and would have remained single, 
but that is no longer the case in Hải Thành. Such a belief reflects two important assumptions: 
first, a remarkable number of local women who have married foreigners, so many that people 
think it is doable for everyone; and second, an implicit moral judgment of the desperation of 
transnational marriages, in which both the men and the women involved would be willing to 
marry even the “undesirable.” However, this is a myth because I have witnessed several 
women’s struggles and failures to marry foreign men and they usually have one thing in 
common: they have passed their youthful age. Mơ is one of them.  
After her divorce, Mơ clearly expressed her wish to remarry and to find a good man to 
“shelter” (đùm bọc) her. Châu, Mơ’s sister in Taiwan, promised Mơ that she would find a 
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Taiwanese man for Mơ. In 2012, Châu told Mơ that one of her husband’s acquaintances, a 54-
year-old man, agreed to marry Mơ after seeing Mơ’s photos. Mơ thought that the man was too 
old and ugly for her but Châu retorted that Mơ herself was old already (she was 35); she should 
not be picky. Shortly after the Lunar New Year of 2012, Châu accompanied the Taiwanese man 
to Hải Thành to arrange a wedding (wedding photos in chapter IV). Unfortunately, 2012 was the 
start of Taiwanese government’s severe restrictions on transnational marriages between 
Vietnamese and Taiwanese after national fear of low-class Vietnamese ascendancy in Taiwan. 
Mơ and her Taiwanese husband went to the embassy three times but were unable to get a visa for 
her to go to Taiwan. Disappointed, her husband asked for a divorce and within less than a year, 
Mơ was single again.  
Learning from her experience, Mơ said she would no longer look for a Taiwanese man 
but instead she asked her cousin (Uncle Tú’s oldest niece), one of the most famous matchmakers 
in Hải Thành, to find a Korean man for her. In January, 2015 Mơ was called by her cousin to go 
to a selection place to meet with a Korean man. The next day I came over for lunch and Mơ’s 
brother Thạch told everyone out loud that Mơ was selected by a Korean director of a 
matchmaking agency. I congratulated Mơ when she got home but she was quiet. Later she said it 
was nothing official, nothing to talk about. During lunch time, Hạnh asked why a man would 
choose an “old” woman instead of a young girl, especially if he was a director. Mơ, on the other 
hand, said a marriage with this man would be difficult. He told her she would have to wait for 
three years before doing any paperwork because she had already married twice before.  
I asked Mơ to go to a café with me the next evening. I noticed that Mơ looked sullen and 
gloomy and I asked her why. She told me she had called off the arrangement with the Korean 
man. It turned out that a cow herder Mơ knew had told her that despite her two previous 
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marriages, she was still eligible for a third marriage and did not have to wait for three years like 
the Korean man explained to her. In a sad voice, Mơ concluded that he lied to her and it meant 
he only wished to have fun with her rather than wanting to marry her. She continued: “Morally, 
how can I do that? What if he has a wife and children? He said he does not but how can I know 
for sure? After all, he is a director.” She then said she would not go to a selection any more: “I 
feel so ashamed. If you go many times, people will know that you failed many times. Moreover, 
those Koreans they inspect you like a commodity. I feel like I lose my dignity. I will wait for 
Thanh to get pregnant and sponsor me to Korea. If I am lucky, I will meet a man who truly loves 
me. Otherwise, I will stay with Thanh and work to save money for my retirement in Vietnam. I 
know it is difficult for me to remarry because I have age (i.e. old) and I am divorced with three 
children.”  
During my four years in Hải Thành, I saw that this was a pattern of Mơ’s relationships. 
All the men who were interested in her started out pampering her and giving her compliments 
but none of them wanted to marry her. Mơ broke up with them after finding out that they had 
lied to her about their pasts, their incomes, and their commitment.  
Age certainly affects Mơ’s relationships with men. As discussed in chapter III and 
reiterated here by Châu, Mơ, considered locally as “old,” should not be so picky when it came to 
marry a Taiwanese man who Mơ thought to be too old and ugly for her. Hạnh thought that Mơ 
also had become unworthy of a man with money and status like the Korean director. I suspect 
that her age, along with her divorce, contributed to her relationship disappointment as she found 
out men she dated only wanted to “have fun” with her. Mơ herself was ashamed at what she saw 
as her multiple failures when going to the wife selection place.  
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Twigg (2013) argues that age is one of the master identities and a key dimension of 
difference. Yet it is often neglected in the intersectionality of gender, class, race, and sexuality. 
When comparing Mơ’s situation with those of the young girls in previous chapters, we see how 
age, combined with gender, orders and ranks people, shapes their experience by enabling or 
limiting it. Hạnh and other people in Hải Thành no longer saw Mơ as attractive and worthy (of 
marriage) as young girls. While it was relatively easy for young girls to get married (thus the 
“myth” that any local woman could successfully marry East Asian men), it was a lot harder for 
Mơ. There are reasons why her age, coupled with her gender as a woman, made the situation 
worse.  
Mơ really wanted to get married. She looked into many options: local men, Taiwanese, 
Korean, Hong Kong, Singaporean, and even French men. However, she had not had any luck 
with East Asian men and she (or her family) did not have money to pay for the initial marriage 
fee with foreigners from other countries.59 All her family members told her that she should just 
wait for her daughter to get pregnant and then sponsor her to Korea. That way, she could go 
abroad for free. None understood Mơ’s desire to find a husband. In my years of knowing Mơ, 
once in a while she would talk about her desire:  
Mơ:  I was divorced and left my children to their father and his family. I did not raise 
them so how can I expect them to support me when I get old? Moreover, they still 
blame me for leaving their father.  
…  
Mơ:  I can’t stay in this house (i.e. Uncle Tú’s house) in the future because I have a 
brother. I don’t have a house.  
                                                
59 Of course, Mơ and her family did not want to let other people know about their lack of money 
because of the illness of Kiều pride (see chapter II). 
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Linh:  Why can’t you stay here in the future?  
Mơ:  I can’t. Because I already left home to marry. It’s difficult. Difficult in a hundred 
ways. I just want to find a husband to entrust my fate to him. If I have a husband 
to rely on, my future will be brighter, right? I don’t need to marry a foreign man, 
but it is difficult to find a decent Vietnamese man my age.  
… 
Mơ:  Marrying a foreigner means, first and foremost, a search for a source of life (tìm 
nguồn sống). I don’t know about life transformation but I want a source of life 
because there is nothing here. Nothing to develop.  
As a woman, Mơ was blamed for the divorce and for destroying the family because she 
chose to leave her husband (even though he had a small wife). Thanh, Mơ’s oldest daughter, told 
me that other women in her extended family were even physically abused by their husbands but 
they never left. “My father never beat my mother,” said Thanh. Relatives of Mơ told me it was 
unwise of Mơ to leave, especially empty-handed because her husband never asked her for a 
divorce. One of them said: “Mơ made a stupid mistake. Her ex-husband gave her money every 
month so why leave? Because she left, the other woman could take over her place and the house. 
If she had not, what could that woman do?” According to them, Mơ lost everything, even a 
husband! Nobody held Mơ’s husband accountable while blaming it all on her. They also implied 
that a woman without a husband is not reputable. Moreover, since she was a (once married) 
daughter, she was not allowed to share the inheritance of the house. The house now belonged to 
Mơ’s brother and Hạnh’s husband, Thạch. Basically Mơ was punished for breaking the marriage 
and the male dominated system that it supported. She felt that she had nothing, “nothing to 
develop.” It is no wonder then that Mơ looked to another marriage as a solution to her problem, 
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as something that would bring her “a source of life” and “make her future brighter.” 
Unfortunately, looking for a husband had been an uphill battle for Mơ due to her age and 
divorcee status.   
The importance of a husband and thus a family to a woman and her sense of self and 
esteem is proven even more so in the events regarding Mơ’s birthday. On the second week of 
June 2014, while having dinner with Uncle Tú’s family, I asked Hạnh when her oldest daughter 
Nhi had her birthday. She replied June 7. I responded with a surprise: “So you didn’t celebrate 
it?” Hạnh told me, “It has not come yet.” It turned out that in Hải Thành, birthdays are  
celebrated according to the lunar calendar. I said, “That is different from Hải Phòng (city). We 
follow the solar calendar. I will buy her a birthday cake when it comes.”  
Mơ:  Oh, cakes from stores in Cầu Đất Street in Hải Phòng are delicious. My birthday 
is July 20. I will also celebrate and I will celebrate it according to the solar 
calendar, no longer following the lunar calendar! 
Mrs Thơ: Oh goodness, who does that? Ridiculous. If you have a husband and children, 
when it comes to your birthday, your husband and children remember it and will 
celebrate it with you. Nobody does it themselves. 
Mơ:  It does not matter. Leave me alone. I like to do it. I will ask my friends to come. 
Hạnh:  Which one? You only have Lan as your friend, nobody else.  
Uncle Tú and Mrs. Thơ: No friends remember other people’s birthdays.  
Uncle Tú: A “friend” like Lan is everywhere.  
Hạnh:  I have not celebrated my birthday for years.  
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Mơ, in her frustration, looking like she was going to cry, reacted: “I have had such a hard 
life. If I want to celebrate my birthday, let me do it. Everyone in this family looks 
down on me.” 
Mơ later did invite her friends over the house on her birthday in July and then out for 
dinner. When her friends left the house, Mrs. Thơ turned to me and said: “what a circus show” 
(trò hề). 
In this exchange, age marks its significant role in shaping people’s experience. There is a 
difference between celebrating a birthday for an eight-year-old girl (Nhi) and a thirty-eight-year-
old woman (Mơ). When someone’s birthday is remembered, the message is that he or she is 
special. Nhi knew she was special because her parents threw her a party on her birthday. Mơ, on 
the other hand, was denied that privilege because she did not check the boxes that Vietnamese 
society requires of her at her thirty-something age: married with children. Birthday, in Hải 
Thành, is an occasion to cement a collective, not a personal, identity. The argument that only the 
family (not friends) should celebrate one’s birthday means that birthday is a show of respect and 
acknowledgement of one’s fulfilling and successful role as a family member (parent, wife, 
husband, child, grandparent, etc.). It is almost like: look around me, I have such a happy family 
and I am such a good family member that my family remembers my birthday. With that 
understanding, we can infer that both Mơ and Hạnh have failed in their expected roles. Hạnh did 
not have a birthday celebration for years because she was in a troubled marriage (see chapter IX) 
and Mơ because she was divorced and left her children to her ex-husband. Thus, the conflict 
between Mơ and her family lies in the tension between collective identity and personal identity. 
Mơ wanted to mark her day for herself while her family thought the whole thing was a circus 
show. Her family saw Mơ as a failure not only because of her divorce but also because of her 
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friends. Recalling that they are a lot younger than Mơ, her family implied that her friendships 
were fleeting. They were not “real” friends for her. Mơ’s age has socially limited how Mơ should 
act and who she should befriend. However, Mơ did not conform to social pressure and still went 
on to celebrate her birthday with her friends. I argue that such an act, perceived by Mơ as making 
up for her hard life, was enabled in part by her expectation of leaving for Korea in the near 
future.  
 
Timepass and Waiting  
Unlike the young girls in Hải Thành, Mơ has not been able to migrate abroad through 
marriage. However, because her oldest daughter Thanh was already married a Korean man, Mơ 
would sooner or later be sponsored to visit her daughter. Mơ’s sister, Thái (introduced in chapter 
VII) and Thái’s husband were already in Korea for the same reason. Parent sponsorship to Korea 
has become very common in Hải Thành. Parents get a six-month visitors' visa to Korea and 
almost all of them work illegally to save money for their future lives in Vietnam. They often 
extend their visas to stay in Korea as long as possible, even for years. Mơ, while hoping to get 
married to a Korean man, was also waiting for her daughter Thanh to get pregnant so that Thanh 
could apply for a visa for Mơ. There was no uncertainty of whether Mơ would go to Korea; the 
question was only when and till then, she had to wait.  
In chapter III, I discussed the idea of self-preservation in which Hải Thành girls practice 
beauty while waiting for their future blossoming in Korea. Building on that premise, I want to 
further examine the experience of waiting in relation to migration by focusing on Mơ’s waiting 
period before she moved to Korea. Griffiths (2014) claims that although the relationship between 
time and space has been well examined by philosophers and geographers, time, especially 
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waiting, remains under-theorized in relation to migration and mobility (see also Conlon 2011). 
Studying the coupling between waiting and moving, or as Conlon (2011) argues, seeing waiting 
as a crucial feature of migrant (im)mobility, will also contribute to the call to see stasis and 
mobility as interconnected, not dichotomized (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, Conlon 2011, 
Hannam, Sheller, and Urry 2006).  
According to Jeffrey (2010), waiting is a key dimension of modernity: the increasing 
regimentation and bureaucratization of time have created multiple settings such as traffic jams, 
offices, clinics, transportation, in which we all wait (see also Hage 2009). Moreover, experiences 
of waiting have become prominent for certain populations, especially the subaltern across the 
globe: the increasing number of migrants in detention centers, the asylum seekers, the 
unemployed, the rural poor, the whole nation or region (such as Zimbabwe in 2008 or Sub-
Saharan Africa) – all waiting/hoping for a different future. They are people “in wait” with 
feelings of boredom and lost time (Jeffrey 2010). Yet at the same time, waiting is often viewed 
as wasteful and passive in which people lack agency. Hage (2009) wrote that waiting “involve[s] 
a large degree of passivity: things are beyond our control, out of our hands, and we can ‘only 
wait’ for what we wish to happen as opposed to actively do something or another to make it 
happen” (Hage 2009, 2). The growth of capitalism in the West and its associated time discipline 
have led to time being seen as quantifiable and split into leisure time and labor time. Time thus 
has become a currency to be spent rather than passed (Thompson 1967). Waiting, therefore, is 
often viewed as unproductive and wasteful (Rotter 2016). There is also a strong association 
between waiting and boredom (O'Neill 2014, Jeffrey 2010). Perhaps, the view of waiting as 
passive, wasteful, and boring in which nothing happens contributes to the lack of attention to 
waiting in mobilities studies.   
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However, some scholars have challenged the limited understanding of waiting. They 
have argued that waiting is not necessarily passive but is indeed actively experienced and lived 
(Rotter 2016, Conlon 2011, Rotter 2010, Jeffrey 2010). Rotter (2016) identifies other dimensions 
of waiting: waiting as an affective state in which an awareness of wants and desires are 
heightened; waiting as a period of intense activity; and waiting as a productive undertaking.  
Waiting is affective because in waiting, people dwell on what they are waiting for. 
Waiting involves the interested aiming at something greatly desired (Bourdieu quoted in Rotter 
2016). A desire for and an investment in the attainment of certain outcomes are essential to the 
experience of waiting. Waiting can make those who wait highly aware of their desires and needs 
(Rotter 2016). As such, in waiting there is also a sense of optimism and hope of achieving 
desires (Hage 2009). Mơ was very mindful of what she wanted in waiting for a marriage with a 
foreign man or waiting for her daughter to sponsor her to Korea. Mơ told me she longed to be 
like her sister Châu in Taiwan because Châu had changed to be more beautiful and speaking 
more softly, no longer as loudly as a cow mooing (rống lên như bò). She also yearned for a 
husband who would take care of her, take her out to dinner at night, call her three times a day, 
and accompany her everywhere. If she could not get married again, she hoped that at least she 
could work in Korea for a few years so that she would have some money when returning to Hải 
Thành later. In other words, Mơ desired a life transformation and she was waiting for a better, 
more secure future in which she would feel loved or independent rather than subordinated as she 
did at the moment.  
More importantly, waiting is not necessarily a period of boredom. While waiting 
generates a sense of limbo and reflects an inability to bring about desirable forms of change, 
waiters can carve out a space of suspended reality in which they can enjoy the freedom otherwise 
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circumscribed by familial and social expectations and controls (Griffiths 2014, Jeffrey 2010). 
Indeed, the young Indian men in Jeffrey’s study developed a sense of mischief and irreverence 
during timepass. Griffiths talked about asylum seekers engaging in otherwise-unacceptable 
activities like waking late, drinking, hanging out, and clubbing. These practices reflect an 
awareness of being partially detached from surrounding institutional norms. Many people in Hải 
Thành have made a similar argument about activities of young girls who wait before their 
marriage migration to East Asia. They have told me that because these girls would get married 
and leave, during their waiting period, they could  do what is socially unacceptable, such as 
having pre-marital sex and “playing” with the boys, wearing too revealing clothes, waking up 
late, not doing housework, or partying too much. In the case of Mơ, waiting for migration has 
enabled her to have more freedom in her life.  
For example, even though Mơ hoped for a marriage with a foreigner, she also enjoyed 
dating Vietnamese men knowing that such dating would not lead to a marriage. One of them was 
too young for her, another was a disreputable local man, and the last one I knew of did not even 
live in town. Mơ told me that dating too many men could give her a bad name, but being a 
woman, it would be extremely sad if no man paid attention to her. Her mother and her family 
turned a blind eye, expressing more than once to me that she could date and play with as many 
Vietnamese men as she wanted so long as she did not marry them. She should wait to get to 
Korea to have a better life. More than just an acceptance of her playing with men (cặp kè chơi 
bời), the waiting period made Mơ aware of time as a resource that she should utilize before 
leaving. The result was her being self-centered and any criticism from her family about her self-
absorbed behaviors was countered with her repeated reasoning: “my life was so miserable 
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already; why do you keep censuring me?” or “my life was already so miserable; just let me do 
what I want now.”  
Mơ’s self focus was shown in several ways. First was her spending time on herself 
without much contribution to her family. Mơ rarely did any housework. She often left home in 
the morning and hung out with her friends. Her mother did all the cooking while her sister-in-law 
Hạnh did most of the cleaning. While I was eating with the family, I did the dishes. When Mơ 
ate at home, she was expected to help me with the dishes but usually she did not. Sometimes she 
said she was too tired or too sick, to which her brother often mocked her “so tired but just a 
phone call to hang out and she felt better.” Sometimes she said she needed to run some errands. 
One day, Mơ finished eating and got onto her bed, sleeping. As I was about to bring the dishes to 
the kitchen to wash, Uncle Tú asked me: “Did Mơ sleep already? “Yes.” He winked at me and 
said “My daughter sleeps so easily; she is very good at sleeping.” He sarcastically implied that 
Mơ pretended to sleep to avoid doing dishes. In the family, Mơ was known to be lazy and dirty. 
Uncle Tú compared Mơ to Hạnh as the following: “One is clean while one is filthy. One is only 
clean with her face, knowing how to use a brush on her face but never touching the broom to 
sweep the floor. She is so “clean” that dirty clothes are piled inside the closet and she lets them 
stink without washing for days.” During the rice harvest time, Mơ was asked to help Hạnh. She 
complained to me that having to wake up at four in the morning was no different from being a 
water buffalo.  
The focus on the self also manifested itself in her exaggerated self importance. For 
example, Mơ told everyone that her Korean son-in-law sent her some lotion that cost 100 million 
VND (around 5,000 USD). Uncle Tú pouted his bottom lip in grimace: “100 million? Why don’t 
you ask him for a house instead?” Another time, I asked the family during dinner about a 
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fisherman I had just interviewed. Mơ told me she knew that man because of her ex-husband who 
was also a fisherman. She then recalled a story about her husband being caught by a marine 
police back when they were together. But the policeman fell for her even though he had just met 
her so he let her husband go. When I asked if she had something to say about the fisherman I 
interviewed, she repeated to me: “The policeman really loved me.” Later we talked about the 
Spratly and Paracel Islands, Mơ said she had been to all of them with her ex-husband. Uncle Tú 
corrected her that her ex’s boat was too small to even get to Nam Định province, let alone to 
these islands. Mơ snapped: “My ex-husband was a great fisherman. He could do it.” Mơ also 
constantly described herself as a hardworking woman, a good daughter who cared for her 
parents, and devoted (ex)wife who handled everything at the house, and loving parent. At first, I 
thought perhaps Mơ’s need to assert her importance and good qualities was an endeavor to 
counter how she was perceived as a failure. But I believe it was also an attempt to navigate the 
liminal space of waiting.  
Mơ liked to have fun. During her time when she waited for her moving to Korea, she 
spent a lot of time dating men, eating out with friends, partying, going on picnics, getting drunk, 
playing cards, and gambling. Hải Thành people often do not approve of these activities, 
especially for women. According to Mơ, having fun was to make up for her difficult life, 
particularly her unhappy marriage, before she eventually went to Korea and had a different life. 
While the liminal status can allow people to feel detached from social control, it is important not 
to overestimate this freedom. Mơ was very aware of social expectations and as such, repeatedly 
denying her acts so as to create her image as a good woman. In August, after not seeing Mơ at 
home for weeks, I asked after her to Mrs. Thơ. She whispered in my ears “She probably went to 
her friends’ houses to gamble.” Mơ’s brother Thạch said out loud: “She has been gambling. She 
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has a new group of friends she plays with now in hamlet three. Yesterday, I heard she told her 
daughter that it cost her 5 million (250 USD) to fix her bicycle and asked her daughter to send 
money for her.” After lunch, I did the dishes by the well while Mrs. Thơ was preparing food for 
dinner. She stood near the kitchen door and talked to me, but as if to reassure herself: “Perhaps 
she did not go out to gamble. If she did gamble, I would scold her. She told me she did not. She 
promised me. She said she only watched.” When Mơ got home later in the afternoon, Mrs. Thơ 
immediately asked: “Did you gamble today? You were gone the whole day.” Mơ denied: “No, I 
did not. I went to fix the bike.” We both knew that it was a lie because the bike was fixed 
yesterday and it supposedly cost $250! Similarly I have seen Mơ denying drinking, dating, or 
spending money on a hairdo. In a way, Mơ walked the fine line between social expectations and 
personal freedom during the liminal waiting period. On the one hand, knowing that she would 
leave, the waiting was a spur to actions outside of circumscription. On the other hand, she tried 
to minimize her social trespassing.  
Mơ’s situation is a good example of “the multiple and ambivalent forms in which agency 
takes shape in relation to waiting” (Hage 2009, 2). The waiter is neither completely passive nor 
totally free. Moreover, according to Hage (2009), there is a politics around who is to wait 
because waiting can define class and status relations in the very obvious sense of who waits for 
whom. Waiting can put waiters in a submissive and less powerful position (Rotter 2016, 
Bourdieu 1999). This sense of powerlessness was clearly conveyed in the classic play Waiting 
for Godot in which Vladimir and Estragon wait in vain for, and in a sense, are “held” by 
someone named Godot (Beckett 1969). However, in the context of migration, waiting has a 
special dimension that gives the waiter a sense of entitlement and expectations that complicates 
the power dynamics of who waits for whom and what waiting entails.  
  
283 
 
Waiting and the Morality of Money 
Most of the activities that Mơ did during her waiting period required money. Mơ actually 
did not have much money but she was good at getting people, from her family to her friends and 
acquaintances, to spend on her. In the example in chapter II, Mơ told her sister Châu in Taiwan 
to send more money home (“the more, the less – càng nhiều càng ít”). Two months after her 
oldest daughter, Thanh, married a South Korean man and migrated, I heard Mơ ask her daughter 
about money on the internet phone: 
Mơ:  When will you send money home for me?  
Thanh: You will have to wait for a while.  
Mơ:  I’m just joking. You can send money when you have it. Do you know this girl 
called Lảnh in the next hamlet? She just left last month and she already sent her 
mother money. But never mind. If a friend of yours is visiting home (Hải Thành), 
please send along the set of lotions that your husband bought for me.  
A couple of days earlier, Mơ said during lunch that she was going to tell Thanh to send 
her some lotion because her hands were dry. Uncle Tú scolded Mơ: “Thanh has not had a job in 
Korea so she does not have any money. You should not ask her for anything.” Mơ retorted: “No 
job, no money but she can still afford a jar of lotion. Look how much she eats in Korea; she’s as 
fat as a pig.” Later in the night, Mơ said she would call her niece in Korea to tell her to ask 
Thanh’s husband, on Mơ’s behalf, for money. When I expressed my reservation about that idea, 
Mơ assured me: “Don’t worry. I know how to do it.”  Earlier in this chapter, Mơ told Thanh to 
send $250 home to cover her cost of fixing a bicycle.60  
                                                
60 $250 was way too much; usually it should have cost only around $50 or less.  
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Mơ received money not only from her family but also her friends. Mơ often befriended 
wealthier people in the commune, usually those who have relatives abroad and/or husbands who 
are talented fishermen. Mơ told me that she carefully chose whom to hang out with and richer 
people were more generous (thoáng) with their money. In early September of 2014 Mơ came 
home to tell her mother and me that she would go to Cát Bà Island over the weekend because the 
brother of one of her friends, who now lived in Canada, just came back to Hải Thành for a visit 
and would pay for her to go with them. Mơ then gave her mother four million VND (200 USD) 
earned from her food stall to put aside for safekeeping. Ms. Thơ mumbled about Mơ going out 
too much and remarked that there was still a little money left in Mơ’s wallet and Mơ got 
irritated: “I have to keep some money with me just in case. I never have to pay when I go out 
anyway so why are you concerned? If I don’t spend it, I will bring it back.” Ms. Thơ did not say 
anything else. In other words, she must have felt that although Mơ should not be hanging out 
with people younger than her, the censure was less severe if Mơ did not lose money.  
According to Mơ, the rich, unlike the poor, did not calculate with their friends. Until, of 
course, they did, in which case Mơ just stopped befriending them. I noticed one day that Lan, 
one of Mơ’s friends with whom she frequently went out, did not come to Mơ’s house to play 
cards. I later asked Mơ if Lan was sick. Mơ said she stopped hanging out with Lan because Lan 
was “tight” with money. I was surprised; Mơ had said in the past that Lan paid for Mơ many 
times. It turned out that after their camping trip the previous week, there was 80,000 VND (4 
USD) left in the group budget. Mơ kept it and was annoyed when Lan asked for it to be divided 
and returned to everyone. Mơ claimed that Lan was rich enough not to take the money from her. 
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“Her sister just sent her money and she spent 20 million VND ($1000) on lotions and cream, and 
another 20 million VND on a facial.”61 
The examples illuminate how money is perceived and received in the context of 
transnational migration. Studies have shown that migrants often view monetary support as a form 
of altruism while their non-migrant relatives regard remittances as a duty and an obligation that 
is connected to moral principles, expectations, and perceptions of migrants’ success (Thai 2014, 
Small 2012b, Cohen 2011, Singh, Cabraal, and Robertson 2010, Carling 2008). Carling (2008) 
argues that migrants and their non-migrant relatives are bound by asymmetric relationships. 
Besides the resource inequalities, migrants and non-migrants are different in terms of 
transnational moralities. For example, migrants are expected to repay the debt to the family and 
the community to which they once belong, otherwise they will be accused of “forgetting where 
they came from” (Carling 2008, Hage 2002). As such, non-migrants often develop a sense of 
entitlement to support from their migrant relatives. This sense of entitlement is commonly 
accepted and morally founded – Gowricharn (2004) calls it “moral capital.” In contrast to the 
popular belief that migrants have the upper hand in the relationships with non-migrants because 
of their remittances and gifts, the non-migrants themselves cultivate a moral capital that makes 
migrants “repay” the gift of communality if the migrants do not want to be morally judged as 
“ungrateful” (Gowricharn 2004). Åkesson (2011) argues that non-migrants frequently downplay 
the remittances and support they receive so as to increase their moral capital and decrease the 
hierarchy of gift giving.  
This finding mirrors Mơ’s experience. Mơ felt a sense of entitlement towards her sister in 
Taiwan and her daughter and son-in-law in South Korea. She guilted her daughter about not 
                                                
61 Knowing Mơ, I highly doubt that these amounts of money were real. However, it indicates the 
way Mơ deemed that transnational money was easily made and easily spent.   
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sending money to her by comparing her daughter to another girl, demanded that if her daughter 
could eat well then her daughter could save money for her, wanted to ask her son-in-law for 
support, and denied the significance of her sister’s remittances (“the more, the less”). What is 
more interesting about the situation in Hải Thành is how entitlement and morality are extended 
even to non-migrant relatives, such as her friend Lan. As I discussed in chapter VII, Mơ first 
used Lan’s sister to question why her own sister, Châu, did not send much money home. Now, 
Mơ ended her friendship with Lan because she morally judged Lan for failing to live up to her 
friendship standards with regards to money. Mơ believed that since Lan received so much money 
from her sister, she should have been generous towards Mơ. This sense of entitlement explains 
why Mơ never seemed to me to mind having her friends (with overseas relatives) pay for her. 
Mơ was not an exception with such expectations in Hải Thành. In a place where many 
households have overseas relatives and where the myth that these Việt Kiều remit a lot of money 
exists, the expectations of support are placed not only on migrants but also their family members. 
Similar to how both migrants and their families have to handle the illness of pride to live up to 
the designation of Việt Kiều, both have to deal with the expectations of giving. I fequently heard 
Hải Thành residents complain that their better-off relatives did not want them to visit their 
relatives’ houses. They said the better-off relatives would “take the broom and sweep them out of 
the houses” (cầm chổi quét ra khỏi nhà) for fear of having to lend money and being unable to 
refuse. The morality of support has an extra layer in Hải Thành.  
 
Conclusion 
Soon after I left Hải Thành, Thanh was pregnant, and in 2015 Mơ went to Korea. She has been 
working there since. This chapter, focusing on Mơ and her waiting time in Hải Thành, examines 
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the role of age in combination  with gender and class in shaping the possibility and outcome of 
marriage migration. Unlike the young and single girls in Hải Thành, Mơ had more difficulties 
finding a foreign spouse and failed to migrate abroad due to her age and divorce. She eventually 
made it to Korea thanks to her daughter after waiting for almost three years. Her waiting in Hải 
Thành, unlike common conceptualizations, was not boring and passive. Waiting was a time for 
Mơ to contemplate her desires and wishes as well as to enjoy her otherwise circumscribed 
personal freedom. The specific conditions of migration and movement, moreover, determine 
what waiting entails, including many self-focused activities and the morality of interpersonal 
relations and expectations. Studying waiting adds to our understanding of the experience of 
migration and movement and demonstrates the important connection between stasis and 
movement. 
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Chapter IX 
A Daughter-in-Law Story 
Humans are not Dragons: Marginalization and Class within the Family  
 
Introduction 
This chapter gives a closer look at the intimate life of translocal women in Hải Thành. In 
chapter VI, I discussed moral discourse as a way for translocal women to gain dignity and make 
sense of the differences between themselves and transnational women. In this chapter, I shift the 
focus to their moral practices and especially how they act in their families. I argue that moral 
practices earn them needed acknowledgement in their own families where exclusion and 
differentiation are as pronounced as outside the families.  
 
What’s Love Got to Do with It? 
One of the main assertions that I kept hearing repeatedly from translocal women during 
my fieldwork was that, unlike transnational women, they married for love. However, love was 
the word that I never heard Hạnh (now 30 years old) or her husband Thạch (34 years old) speak 
about one another. Their marriage was a union of circumstances.  
In 2009 Hạnh was working in a seafood factory in the South when she received a phone 
call from her mother: her father was seriously ill; she needed to come home immediately. Hạnh 
gave up a job she had held for five years and boarded a bus to return to her hometown, a rural 
poor commune that was not too far from Hải Thành.  At the same time, Thạch was in love with a 
local girl, but she abruptly left to marry a Taiwanese man. Thạch’s cousin was married to Huyền, 
who happened to be Hạnh’s cousin. And the story went that Thạch followed his cousin to visit 
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Huyền and her family and he met Hạnh. Hạnh’s father wanted her to get married before he died, 
while Thạch was heart broken and wanted to take revenge on his ex-girlfriend. Their wedding 
was held seven days later. Neither one of them had the time or were in the right mental state to 
get to know each other before marriage.  
After the wedding, Hạnh moved to Hải Thành to live with Uncle Tú’s family. The 
newlyweds were given a small room separated from the main house. Within the next four years, 
Hạnh gave birth to two daughters but found herself often struggling to provide for them. Hạnh 
had a small stall selling breakfast food near the local market, which brought in very little money 
while her husband had been without a stable job for a long time.  
Thạch was a fisherman when he was 20 years old. Uncle Tú and Ms. Thơ once told me 
his story during dinner: “We sold all the gold they saved as well as pigs and chickens to buy him 
a boat, net and boat engine. However, after only a few months, he said that the profession was 
too arduous and demanding. He refused to go and we had to sell the boat and everything else for 
less than half. Then we sent him to Hải Phòng city to take classes to become an electrician so 
that he could make a living. But he dropped out before finishing because it was hard.” Since 
then, Thạch had been mostly unemployed, except for short intermittent periods when he had 
some part-time “light job” (việc nhẹ) (in Uncle Tú’s words). Uncle Tú often lamented that he did 
not know why they (Uncle Tú and Ms. Thơ) had two lazy children (Mơ and Thạch) while they 
both were industrious. Not only did Thạch not like difficult jobs, I was told that he also rejected 
‘lower-class’ jobs such as xe ôm (equivalent to a rickshaw driver except instead of a rickshaw, 
it’s a cheap motorbike). Uncle Tú said Thạch stayed at home but did not want to become a xe ôm 
because of shame. Ms. Thơ added: “If he actually did, he would make quite a bit of money.” The 
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feeling of shame that Uncle Tú mentioned was tied with the pride illness that the family suffered: 
Thạch had a sister who lived in Taiwan, how could he be poor enough to turn into a xe ôm?  
During my time spent with Uncle Tú’s family, I saw Thạch very infrequently. He mostly 
came home for food and, while others in the family were busy cleaning up after a meal, he 
quietly took his motorbike and left silently so as not to draw attention to his departure in case his 
own children might ask to follow him around. Thạch spent most of his time hanging out with a 
small group of friends at a café near the hamlet and spent lots of his money on football bets. 
According to Mơ, if he ran out of money, Ms. Thơ would discreetly supply him with some cash 
behind Uncle Tú’s back. Hạnh said to me that Thạch was not even an invisible husband because 
“an invisible husband who does not do anything or help out, at least, does not beat his wife or 
verbally abuse me.” More than once, frustrated with her husband, Hạnh got into huge fights with 
him. Mơ told me that a few months before my fieldwork began, Hạnh held a knife threatening to 
kill Thạch in one of their fights, but he ended up beating her up instead. When Nhi was two years 
old, Hạnh had enough, left Thạch, and went to her mother’s home. However, she eventually 
returned out of love for her daughter whom she could not have taken with her.  
The story of Hạnh and Thạch demonstrates that translocal and transnational marriages are 
not as different as locally perceived. Many translocal women and local men expressed their 
disapproval of transnational marriages due to what they declared as a transaction without love. 
However, similar to many transnational couples, Hạnh and Thạch barely knew each other before 
marriage and Hạnh’s father wanted her to marry Thạch partly because his family was financially 
better off. They did not love each other. I believe that they are not the only exception. Many 
local men were in the same situation as Thạch: left by local women (who married East Asian 
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men), they quickly married women from other communes whom they did not know well through 
a matchmaker.  
More importantly, this story illustrates a response to the critique of local women who are 
said, especially by local men, to be greedy and naïve in their pursuit of transnational marriage 
without love. Local men generally did not see the role they played in pushing local women away. 
But in the poem I cited at the end of chapter V, the author, speaking on behalf of many women 
who married transnationally, explained why she chose a Korean man instead of a local man. She 
depicted local men as unfaithful, lazy, abusive, and addicted to gambling. Her portrait fits well 
with Thạch and many other local men that I knew. Their behaviors are allowed partly because of 
the wealth in Hải Thành and partly because of the gendered structure that subjects women to 
inferiority and scrutiny. Translocal women who married Hải Thành men had it even worse 
because the added factor of the patrilocal residence and marriage migration pushed them to the 
margin both within the community and the family. 
 
Marginalization and Class within the Family 
In chapter VI about translocal women, I discuss how they are made invisible and 
confined to the home due to their social class as rural (poorer) women and their status as 
outsiders. Here I want to emphasize the gender construction and the way it further displaces 
translocal women. I often wondered why Hạnh, despite having been in Hải Thành for almost 
seven years now and seeming to know all the gossip in town, did not really have any friends 
except for Huyền, her cousin. When I expressed my puzzle to her, Hạnh explained: “Because I 
am married.” I followed up with a question of whether someone in the family forbade her from 
going out or socializing and she responded: “No. But as a married person, if I go out and visit 
  
292 
other people, they will say I am lazy. I should be at home doing housework. If I want a change of 
air, I will go visit my mother.” Hạnh’s situation translates that she would probably only have 
familial relations, not social relations. The double standard that keeps women accountable for 
family happiness and wellbeing while letting men off the hook (Thạch was never subjected to the 
same expectations62) has been criticized frequently in feminist scholarship for holding women 
back with their career and personal development. However, it should be noted that the double 
standard results in not only social and personal restriction but also physical confinement for 
married women in Hải Thành. Being enclosed at home does not necessarily mean that translocal 
women do not experience social differentiation. On the contrary, they often found themselves at 
the bottom of the hierarchy as social class permeates the family.  
Studies on class, despite arguments of individualization in contemporary societies (Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim 2002), still indicate that the family remains central in reproducing social 
classes and inequalities. They see the family as the unit transmitting not only economic capital 
but also cultural and social capital through family enculturation (Crompton 2008, Lareau 2003, 
Kendall 2002). In other words, the family is often regarded as coherent and uniform. The 
importance of family as a unit that buttress against the vulnerabilities of the socio-economy in 
Vietnam is demonstrated in many studies (Earl 2014, Barbieri and Bélanger 2009, Korinek et al. 
2006). However, the gender and class structure in Vietnam challenges this assumption and 
nowhere can we see this better than in Hải Thành because of the pronounced phenomenon of 
marriage migration that significantly affects both gender and class relations. To illustrate the 
                                                
62 Thạch often vocally criticized Mơ that she was lazy, liked to gamble, and lied frequently. I 
once saw Hạnh questioning him “How are you different from her?” to which he responded “It’s 
different for me because I am a man.” 
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class dynamics within the family, I focus on Hạnh’s uneasy relationships with her mother-in-law, 
Ms. Thơ, and her sister-in-law, Thơ.  
On a very hot day in July, we were having dinner when the matchmaker, who was Uncle 
Tú’s niece, visited. The matchmaker came to see her mother who lived right next door to Uncle 
Tú and brought crab for her family. While the crab was being cooked, she walked over to Uncle 
Tú’s place. She came inside the house, sat down next to him and put a 500,000 VND (25 USD) 
note into his hand. Then she called for Nhi and Chi, gave each 100,000 VND (5 USD), and 
handed 300,000 VND (15 USD) to Ms. Thơ, telling her to give it to Thạch later. When she 
looked at our dinner, she exclaimed: “How come uncle has nothing to eat?” and told Hạnh to go 
to her mother’s house to get one crab for Uncle Tú. She asked after Thạch and Uncle Tú said 
“Same old, same old.” She then offered to loan Thạch money if he ever needed it for a job. When 
she left, Uncle Tú told Ms. Thơ to have some crab but she adamantly refused. Uncle Tú 
chuckled: “She gave it to me so you don’t want it, right?” “Yes”, replied Ms. Thơ.  
Watching the whole thing, I remarked, “This woman is strange. She only gave money and 
food to the men and kids in this family while Ms. Thơ and Hạnh were here too.”  
Ms. Thơ clarified: They only give to their own people; we are just in-laws. 
Linh: Has she ever given you anything? 
Ms. Thơ: No, not ever in my 20 years here; she only gives him money.  
This incident is very revealing of how married women were blatantly treated as 
nonmembers in Hải Thành. What is more interesting is how the alienated status prevents them 
from getting economic capital from their in-laws. In a wealthy place like Hải Thành where 
remittance is an important source of income, the gendered differentiation easily produces classed 
differences among members of the family. For instance, Hạnh once told me that every time Châu 
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returned to Vietnam, she gave Hạnh one million VND (50 USD) but Hạnh was sure that Mơ 
received more because “I can’t be as equal as her own sister.” Hạnh, already from a humble 
background, could not compete with Mơ (and Uncle Tú and Ms. Thơ) in getting support, and as 
such remained relatively poor.  
The difference in economic capital translates in how she was treated in the family. Mơ 
never asked Hạnh to join any of her parties at home and while she might save some food for her 
parents, she never offered anything to Hạnh. On a very few occasions when Hạnh’s mother came 
to visit her, Uncle Tú and Ms. Thơ did not invite Hạnh’s mother to have tea in their living room. 
Hạnh’s mother just quietly went inside Hạnh’s room and quietly left a couple of hours later. 
Moreover, Ms. Thơ often remarked how she and Uncle Tú had to help Hạnh financially to raise 
Nhi and Chi yet never admitted her son’s problems. Sometimes, I said that Thạch should have 
helped Hạnh more and Ms. Thơ told me: “In this world, if you have a good wife, you will have a 
bad husband. Humans are not dragons; we can’t have a perfect couple (Thế gian được vợ mất 
chồng; có phải rồng đâu mà được cả đôi). A good couple is too much to ask (Được cả đôi thì ăn 
đủ à?).”  
Here we see how the dynamic of class within the family plays out. It is reflected in the 
distribution of food (who gets to have food), in a constant condescension (not empathy) that 
Hạnh could not raise her children on her own and Ms. Thơ and Uncle Tú have to support her out 
of familial obligations, in social and familial invitations where exclusion of Hạnh and her mother 
was obvious, and in the way Hạnh’s work was minimized and Thạch’s problems were ignored 
because a good wife and a bad husband was a “normal” arrangement; otherwise “we would be 
dragons.” Hạnh’s status as a young daughter-in-law from another village has contributed to her 
exclusion both socially and financially, both in the society and in the family. However, like other 
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translocal women discussed in chapter VI, Hạnh generally does not want to let the alienation 
weigh down on her and instead seeks to assert herself through moral practices of being a good 
wife, mother, and daughter-in-law.  
 
Moral Practices 
During one of our private conversations, I asked Thạch if he loved his wife and he told 
me “no,” saying that his marriage was a product of foolish young age. I then asked him if he had 
any regrets marrying her and he said “not anymore.” In a rare moment Thạch acknowledged 
Hạnh’s contributions: she gave birth to two adorable daughters and she worked very hard, thus 
he could lean on her. Thạch’s statement surprised me because I never heard him speak nicely to 
his wife but it showed that Hạnh’s labor was not invisible. Indeed, despite her disappointment 
and exasperation at Thạch, Hạnh did not stop performing the traditional duties of being a wife. 
For instance, Hạnh told me once that she was done with Thạch: “He yells and swears at me all 
the time. I do housework, he yells. I cook for him, he yells. I clean the house, he yells. He says, 
why do you work so much, for so long? He does not babysit after finishing eating so that I can 
eat. He does not even care if I eat or not. I am so mad. I will not cook for him anymore.” Yet the 
next day, she continued serving him with food as if nothing happened.  
Being a good person is also a way for Hạnh to alleviate her lower status in the family in 
which the other two young people, Thạch and Mơ, do not live up to familial and social 
expectations. It shows best in how Hạnh sometimes intentionally upstaged Mơ. During dinner 
one day, Mơ showed off her newly painted nails and said she was savvy to find a place that did 
her nails for only 30,000 VND (1.5 USD). Hạnh deadpanned “nails that are painted frequently 
will be easily dull-looking” and killed Mơ’s high mood. Later, Hạnh told the family about one of 
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her customers winning a lottery after having a dream. Then Hạnh turned to Mơ to ask: “What are 
the winning lottery numbers today?” Mơ responded: “How would I know? I have never played 
lottery.” However, 15 minutes into the conversation, Mơ slipped out that the winning numbers 
were 83, that she was unlucky because she had the 8 but did not have the 3, thereby exposing her 
own lie. Hạnh knew that Mơ often gambled and that Mơ could not hide it very well, so Hạnh laid 
down the question that seemed random to let Mơ blurt out her lie. The revealing episode 
happened right in front of Uncle Tú and Ms. Thơ, and Hạnh subtly showed her parents-in-law 
that she did not gamble while Mơ did and lied about it.  
Being a good mother is another area that gave 
Hạnh respect. In the family, she was the only one who 
could discipline her oldest daughter Nhi who was very 
cute but quite stubborn. When Nhi refused to eat her 
lunch one day, Hạnh took out a long stick and started 
hitting Nhi on her bottom. Nhi cried and ran to her 
grandparents looking for help but they did not intervene. 
Mơ, on the other hand, told Hạnh to stop. Hạnh reacted: 
“I need to teach my daughter. If I don’t, she will grow up 
to be spoiled like your (second) daughter.” Mơ’s face 
turned pale. After Hạnh left to go into her room, Mơ said 
to her parents that Hạnh’s comment was disrespectful. Ms. Thơ said “Well, she has to discipline 
her children.”   
Figure 9.1 Nhi before going to class 
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Mơ: Who can guarantee that she (Nhi) will be better than my (second) daughter in the 
future? Plus, I might give birth to her but it’s heaven that gives her the personality (cha 
mẹ sinh con, trời sinh tính). 
Uncle Tú: Who knows about the future but if it rains today, at least it is good today (mưa 
ngày nào mát mặt ngày ấy).  
Mơ put her bowl down and walked out of dinner: Yes, I heard you; I heard you loud and 
clear; you don’t need to put me down any more.  
In this incident, Hạnh asserted her confidence and authority in raising her own daughter 
and that no one else in the family could stop her. Moreover, referencing Mơ’s second daughter as 
a bad example, Hạnh indicated her superiority as a mother over Mơ at that very moment. Mơ 
tried to minimize what her family members considered to be failed parenthood by referring to the 
nature vs. nurture debate, arguing that child development and growth were mostly ‘natural.’ 
Uncle Tú did not buy that argument, essentially siding with Hạnh and embarrassing Mơ. Because 
Vietnamese women are still held responsible for family well-being and happiness, fulfilling her 
role as mother and wife allows Hạnh to have earned some regard in the family. More 
importantly, it gives her leeway in countering restrictions from her more powerful mother-in-
law.  
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Figure 9.2  Hạnh prepared food while looking after her daughter at the same time. Uncle Tú 
often helped with the babysitting 
 
At the end of the harvesting season, one of Hạnh’s relatives in her hometown who farmed 
fish in a pond told Hạnh to come to catch fish for free if she wanted. Hạnh held her youngest 
daughter, one year old at the time, to Ms. Thơ and asked Ms. Thơ to look after the daughter 
while she went fishing. Ms. Thơ muttered that she was tired and that she had already helped 
Hạnh this morning in the rice paddy. She also questioned why Hạnh needed to go. Hạnh did not 
ask any more for help and brought her daughter with her. At four o’clock in the afternoon, Ms. 
Thơ complained loudly that Hạnh still had not come home and was gone for far too long. Hạnh 
did not get home until 7 o’clock but transported back a giant bag of at least 70 pounds of fish 
(some to feed the chicken and dogs, some edible for humans). Ms. Thơ saw that amount of fish 
and said nothing more.  
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Ms. Thơ, as usual, remarked how she had helped Hạnh in an attempt to subtly control 
her. But Hạnh resisted Ms. Thơ’s wishes and went fishing anyway because she knew she would 
bring fish back for the family. Acting as a good family member in this situation enabled Hạnh to 
trump her mother-in-law’s rein over her. It is a way for Hạnh to bargain for personal freedom 
within the constraint of class and gender as a poorer daughter-in-law. Moral conduct, similar to 
moral discourse, helps displaced translocal women in Hải Thành like Hạnh negotiate their 
inferior status and reshape their sense of self in a new home(town). She asserts her agency 
(“weak power”63) in a way that is culturally scripted and socially tolerated. Focusing on moral 
practices reflects not only the resilience of translocal women but also their vulnerabilities that 
necessitate more of these practices.  
The exclusion and class differentiation that translocal women experience within their 
families demonstrate that the connection between movement and upward or downward mobility 
is highly contingent on the gendered structure. Furthermore, unlike the traditional, and at times 
romanticized, understanding, family is not necessarily a coherent unit that promotes and supports 
the well-being of its members against the difficulties of the society. We see this 
conceptualization clearly in how transnational women (and local girls) in Hải Thành expressed 
that their decision to get married was to help their families (chapter V). But the situation of 
translocal women proves that family can also be where class distinction is felt daily and closely.  
This chapter on Hạnh concludes the last part of my dissertation in which I aim to show 
the complexities of movement and social class in rural Hải Thành. Retelling the stories of 
struggles in my host family, I explore significant processes that disrupt the connection between 
movement and upward mobility. For example, Mơ’s life story indicates the importance of age 
                                                
63 See Fiske (1993) 
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and beauty with regard to marriage migration. The situation of Hạnh shows how the devaluation 
of the rural, the hierarchy among different ruralities, and the gender structure result in 
displacement and marginalization rather than social mobility for translocal women. The 
expectations of money and remittances reveal the morality of debt, altruism, and face saving and 
the demands of migration. The consequences of failure to meet the demands range from shame 
and guilt, anxiety and disappointment, distrust and neglect, to a reinforcement of stratified 
hierarchy right within the family for those who ironically want to overcome it in the first place. 
The complicated process of migration, social class, and rurality offers important understanding 
of contemporary Vietnamese society in which historically and socially shaped experiences and 
forms of desire have come into unequal relations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
301 
Conclusion 
Moving the Chains 
 
“Nobody Loves Me” 
On April 2014, ten days after Thanh, Mơ’s oldest daughter, left for Korea, Mơ, Thạch 
and Mơ’s other daughter Mai decided to go to China to work (illegally). Mơ told me that she 
decided to go because she wanted Mai to have a job. They each had to pay one million VND (50 
USD) to the middleman who agreed to take them to China. They had to cross the border in 
Quảng Ninh province. Unfortunately, on that same day, a group of 16 Chinese, who were being 
deported for illegal entrance, shot at the Vietnamese police and killed one policeman at the check 
point where they planned to cross (Sơn 2014). The checkpoint was closed for days and the three 
had to return home. When Mơ, Thạch, and Mai left in the morning, Thạch and Hạnh’s daughter, 
four-year-old Nhi threw a tantrum, crying that “Everyone in this house left; nobody loves me 
anymore. I will find my way to go too.”  
Less than a year after I left the field, Ms. Thơ was diagnosed with brain cancer. When I 
called Uncle Tú and Ms. Thơ on the phone from the U.S., she had been sent home by the 
hospital. She sounded very weak but still remembered to wish me success with my study. Uncle 
Tú told me Mơ had left for Korea and no one else was around to help take care of Ms. Thơ. Hạnh 
was busy with her own daughters while Thạch remained absent. Uncle Tú shouldered almost all 
of the caretaking. A few days before the lunar new year of 2016, Ms. Thơ passed away. It was 
only then that her three daughters, one in Taiwan and two in Korea, could all come home but her 
grandchildren abroad could not. Four months later, Thanh posted a photo of Uncle Tú with 
Thanh, Thuý and Thắm (Thái’s daughters) and their children standing in front of the house. A 
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family reunion of three generations across two nations: Vietnam and South Korea. However, 
Hạnh was not included in the photo.  
To me, these two stories emphasize the commonality of movement in Hải Thành that 
even a four year old thought she could go away. More importantly, they converge on the same 
theme of movement and loss, whether it is Nhi’s perceived loss of love, the absence of family 
members when Ms. Thơ was sick, or the saddened loss of Ms. Thơ. They also, as clichés-
sounding as they are, reflect people’s constant striving and search for a better life even when it 
means having to leave behind their own family. What I find moving when looking at the photo of 
this family is that it is not that “nobody loves me” but, on the contrary, it is because of love that 
the acceptance of what migration entails comes more easily: the triumph as well as the failure, 
the losses and the gains, the departure and the reunion. Yet, at the same time, the absence of 
Hạnh and her daughters in the photo is a reminder of the social hierarchy that, while prompting 
movement and creating transformation in Hải Thành, is still being reinforced.  
 
Encounters, Interconnections, and Rurality 
I began this dissertation by asking how it was possible for a place like Hải Thành to exist 
– a place of contradictions: rural yet modern, local yet global, people with working-class 
profession (fishing) who have family members that are (seen as) upper-class transnational Việt 
Kiều. I also asked why my host family was the exception to the successful stories of migration in 
Hải Thành. How, why, and to what ends does movement play a role in producing and sustaining 
these contradictions and what insights does it provide us with the study of rurality? In the 
previous nine chapters, I have followed the two groups of women in Hải Thành: local girls 
waiting to become transnational brides and translocal women migrating from other rural towns in 
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Vietnam. Their encounters in everyday dialogic processes illuminate how migration, desires for 
beauty, glamour, modernity, and life transformation arise out of the recent tremendous social 
changes in Vietnam. These changes reveal stark differences in terms of class, gender, ethnicity, 
region, and rural/urban dichotomy that fundamentally question and refashion Vietnamese 
identity and self-worth. In how they come to identify and be identified, especially morally, the 
two groups of women highlight the struggles of many rural Vietnamese in a search of belonging 
and dignity (that is, what it means to be a successful moral Vietnamese) amid ubiquitous 
differences.  
At the core, this dissertation is about exploring the changing landscape of Vietnamese 
rurality and the apparent social stratification in Vietnam through the lens of rural-to-rural 
movement (rather than the more common approaches that look at consumption and lifestyle). 
Because rurality has specific connotations related to class (lower class, lack of modernity), 
gender (tradition, seen as both backward and moral), ethnicity (minority), the complex 
interaction of class, gender, ethnicity, and age in a rural setting like Hải Thành refashions the 
link between movement and social class in surprising ways. I particularly deconstruct dualisms 
that shape the hierarchical social structure and instead show the covert relationships that reverse 
the order and/or join noticeable differences. By focusing on interpersonal encounters of 
seemingly distinctive female groups, I make the case for the coexistence and connection of 
contradictions.  
The women in my study are both victims and agents of marriage migration, both 
admirable and at times, hard to sympathize with, in their acts and practices. Their identities rest 
on both traditional Vietnamese values and Western aspirations and display the hierarchy between 
the East and the West, socialism and capitalism, while simultaneously contesting it. They are 
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regarded by local people as both moral daughters, wives, and siblings and as immoral self-
indulgent girls or immoral ‘ugly’ rural women. Their marriage migration links imaginaries with 
the experience of movement, connects the period of waiting with a relative sense of restrained 
freedom, and leads to both belonging and displacement, upward and downward social mobility. 
Prevalent binaries in mobilities studies such as motion and fixity, local and global, transnational 
and internal movement, imaginaries and experience of movement, victimhood and agency, rural 
and urban, moral and immoral fail to explain the complicated relationship between migration and 
social class in Hải Thành. Rather, the fluidity of categories and the interconnection of 
dichotomies in Hải Thành show us how human ties develop and become meaningful in aligned 
and misaligned way. It is through the relationships between differences that cultural meanings 
and identities are both rescripted and transformed, which make room for continual attempts, 
struggles, and endurance.  
Choosing Hải Thành as the site of my research on migration, the dissertation explores the 
transformation, heterogeneity, and stratification of ruralities in an era of urbanization and 
globalization. Rurality is often treated as a homogeneous category and, as a destination, the rural 
is usually ignored in migration studies. However, I have argued for the complexities of rurality 
by describing the different kinds of rurality that exist inside and outside of Hải Thành. They are 
intertwined by the process of migration and the search for upward mobility. The many layers of 
rurality, expressed through different standards of beauty, education, economic capital, and 
morality, illuminate different ways to understand rurality in Vietnam. The rural can be both 
modern and traditional, mobile and emplaced, cosmopolitan and local, flashy and modest, 
financially rich and socially devalued, etc. What the rural represents depends on how 
transnational and translocal migration is interpreted and evaluated. Studying the relationship 
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between movement and social class in a rural context like Hải Thành, therefore, demonstrates 
how the meanings of rurality are contested and renegotiated and how a rural place, like any 
urban center, can be diverse, different from one another, and constantly transforming.  
 
Future Threads 
My dissertation, due to time constraint, only focuses on the migration of women. As I 
turn to look to future research, I want to weave in the movement of (fisher)men in Hải Thành. 
This addition will contrast and complement the research on female migration and paint a more 
comprehensive picture of movement. In particular, a study of fishermen’s movement will explore 
how movement embodiment shapes our understanding and evaluation of movement. The 
fishermen’s maritime movement is very distinctive from land-based movement and will reveal 
unique ways to study questions of meanings, borders, and exclusion. Second, due to the 
intersectionality of gender and age, most (young) women in Hải Thành are excluded from public 
political life, leaving the men to maneuver the bureaucracy of the local government. As more 
global conflicts have moved outward from the land to the sea, the relationship between 
fishermen and the state is becoming increasingly important. Therefore, a study on fishermen’s 
movements will bring to life much more clearly the role of the Vietnamese state in shaping 
movement and its meanings. Last but not least, because men are considered the root of the 
Vietnamese lineage system and, in rural Vietnam, are often in charge of religious rituals, a close 
examination of fishermen will highlight the role of religion in relation to movement. This future 
project on fishermen will be a crucial contribution to the study of maritime movement, which has 
been given almost no theoretical space in mobility studies (Anderson and Peters 2014, Peters 
2010, Phelan 2007).  
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A Concluding Remark 
Rosa Luxemburg once said, “those who do not move do not notice their chains.” Indeed, 
movement in Hải Thành is a mirror that illuminates the chains people face. This dissertation is a 
modest exploration of the weight of those chains as well as the un/successful efforts to break the 
shackles. It shows the interplay and tension between the world we live and the world we want or 
imagine, which is both poignant and hopeful, like the reunion photo of Uncle Tú’s family.  
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